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Abstract 
The need for a technical standard for the conversion of Internal Combustion 
Engine (ICE) to electric drive has been identified by government regulators in 
New Zealand (NZ). The aim of this project was to review the technical and 
inspection requirements that would allow Electric Vehicle (EV) conversions of 
passenger vehicles of gross weight < 3500 kg (Class MA), to be safely designed, 
built, sold, and operated in NZ. A detailed description of the spectrum of EV 
technology is given. A literature review of NZ and international transport 
regulations and technical standards has shown many requirements affecting EVs. 
A risk analysis showed that most EV technological risks related to electrical, 
battery and braking safety are controlled by implementing a reduction in risk 
event likelihood, rather than a reduction in risk event severity. This indicates that 
risk controls need to be reliable in order to be effective. A detailed review of EV 
electrical systems, Lithium Ion (Li-ion) battery systems and regenerative braking 
technology is also carried out. With the use of battery chemistries and designs 
which minimise the risk of failures, coupled with adequate safeguards in the form 
of redundant protection and well designed component management systems, EV 
converters can achieve safe and high performance conversions. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Electric Vehicles (EVs) are currently undergoing a resurgence of interest as the 
environmental and energy use benefits become increasingly important due to 
concerns about peak oil, energy security and climate change. New Zealand (NZ) 
is in a unique situation with regard to EVs as a high proportion of electricity 
generation is from renewable sources such as hydroelectric, geothermal and wind. 
Studies have also shown that by utilising off-peak charging a large number of EVs 
could be supported in NZ with relatively small increases in electricity production 
and new infrastructure cost (Dirr 2008; Erwan Hemery 2008).  
In a national cost-benefit assessment of the early uptake of EVs in NZ, Hyder 
(2009) summated that “EVs are good for New Zealand”. Hyder‘s modelling 
shows considerable private net benefit from purchasing of EVs once EV prices 
drop below Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) vehicle prices. 
The EV can be seen as a new technology that presents unique challenges to 
regulators and the automotive industry as we learn about the different safety 
characteristics of this technology. The recent development of new interest in EV 
technology has highlighted the need for technical safety focused standards to 
govern the modification and scratch building of EVs in NZ. Vehicle maintenance, 
certification and emergency personnel also need different skills and training for 
working with these vehicles. All stakeholders in this technology system need an 
understanding of the implications of EV adoption in NZ. 
In NZ vehicles and transport energy are supplied by an international market place. 
This thesis proposes that the conversion of an ICE vehicle to an EV could become 
commonplace if a sharp rise in the cost of petrol creates a demand that cannot be 
met by major international EV manufacturers. This thesis will explore the risks 
associated with emerging EV conversion technology and how these risks may 
impact on the development of technical safety standards specific to NZ. 
A life cycle costing for several different EV configurations and future energy 
scenarios are analysed and discussed. A risk analysis is carried out to identify the 
major sources of technological risk in the EV system. The risks are discussed in 
detail and recommendations are proposed providing an input to the development 
of a new Low Volume Vehicle (LVV) standard for EVs. Assessment tools are 
also provided to aid transport policy decision making for both government and 
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industry groups. The consumer issues of environmental and energy use labelling 
are discussed briefly as these issues have implications for government regulation. 
This thesis aims to inform and encourage further debate between stakeholders 
which is an essential part of policy making. It is hoped that the recommendations 
put forward by this thesis can be used to develop a Low Volume Vehicle (LVV) 
Standard for the conversion and scratch building of EVs. Information collated in 
this thesis is also offered as a useful resource for not only policy makers, but also 
those who are involved in the development and construction of EVs in NZ. 
The design of EVs requires new engineering solutions in order to reduce the 
inherent safety risks of the technology. It is the assessment of these solutions that 
is the focus of this thesis. 
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1.1 Research Focus 
The last 30 years of automotive development has seen the development of 
vehicles focus on emissions, safety and electronics. We now see low energy 
consumption and carbon dioxide emissions joining this list.  
Discussion within this thesis has been limited to passenger vehicles of gross 
weight <3500 kg (Class MA), but does not include Light EVs (LEV) such as 
electric power-assisted cycles (<300 W), scooters, motorbikes, and heavy vehicles 
(>3500 kg) such as trucks and busses. The applicability of the information in this 
thesis is not confined to passenger vehicles as much of the general requirements 
will also apply to other vehicle classes.  
During this project many issues concerning EVs were identified but were outside 
the scope of this research. These issues however, all warrant further research in 
helping to contribute to a broader understanding of EV implementation in NZ. 
These include; 
• Lightweight low speed EVs (LEVs). These vehicles which are also 
sometimes referred to as ‘neighbourhood EVs’ or quadricycles, are not 
used in NZ due to current safety requirements (King 2007). However 
LEVs are included in international standards for pedal assisted cycles and 
scooters. Bossche (2003) identified that there is less risk with LEVs due to 
smaller batteries and lower voltages. Research investigating the risks of 
allowing ‘neighbourhood EVs’ into the NZ transport fleet is 
recommended. 
• The environmental and resource use of EVs particularly with the 
manufacture and recycling of batteries (Lazar 2009). Supply constraint 
issues may also exist with the materials used for EV batteries and motors. 
• Taxation and revenue collection issues. King (2007) identified particular 
issues identified for Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEV). The full re-
write of the Road User Charges (RUC) legislation investigates the merits 
of alternative methods of collecting revenue from diesel vehicles. The 
taxation of new energy vehicles requires further research. 
• Government incentives for the mass- adoption of EVs, and 
• Insurance implications for EVs. 
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The focus within this thesis has been restricted to the area of vehicle safety. The 
dominant aim was to review the technical and inspection requirements that would 
allow EV conversions to be safely designed, built, sold, and operated in NZ. This 
also includes the identification of some infrastructure issues such as energy 
labelling. 
EV technology continues to develop at a great rate and many new documents on 
EV safety have been published in 2010. Although some of the information in this 
thesis may date quickly, a number of general design guidelines have been 
identified and discussed. It is acknowledged that some technical positions 
explored in this thesis may be controversial and not all parties may agree on the 
right stance to take on a particular issue. Rather than offer one solution to a 
complex discussion, this thesis proposes viable options concerning particular 
safety issues for EVs specific to NZ.  
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1.2 Research Methodology 
A variety of research methods were employed in this research such as an 
extensive literature review, interviews, calculations, vehicle testing the attendance 
at conferences such as the EECA Biofuels and Electric Vehicles Conference 
(2010).  
A thorough literature review was completed of NZ and international transport 
regulations and technical standards. An important focus for this project was to 
review the international technical standards for EVs and assess the engineering 
requirements for the safe design of EVs in NZ. 
A variety of testing and assessment exercises were also used throughout this thesis 
to explore different scenarios. For example, vehicle testing was completed 
involving vacuum and deceleration measurements on ICE vehicles. This 
information helped to fill in knowledge gaps about EV braking. An assessment of 
the economic performance of EVs was also undertaken where several fuel price 
scenarios were investigated by comparing the cost of EVs with ICEs. While a 
detailed risk assessment was developed to clarify what risks are associated with 
EVs and how to mitigate for these. 
Over 25 informal face to face interviews were also completed. Although the 
interview process applied in this research was not fully consultative, opinions 
were sourced from across the EV sector. This included discussions with 
representatives from; NZTA, LVVTA, LVV certifiers, importers, designers (in 
NZ and internationally), EV modifiers (in NZ and Australia), and members of the 
public engaged in private EV conversions. A list of organisations is given in 
Appendix 1. 
The methodology used during these interviews was based on informal face to face 
discussions, but also included ongoing dialogue with some participants by means 
of emails and telephone conversations. The objective was not to conduct a 
‘formal’ interview with a prescribed set of questions, but rather to gain a broad 
insight into what EV policy, regulations and technical standards may look like in 
the future for NZ. These interviews also influenced some of the dominant 
perspectives put forward in the following chapters concerning electrical, brake 
and battery safety implications for EVs. Most interviews took place across New 
Zealand and some in Australia where fieldwork was undertaken in Melbourne, 
Sydney and Brisbane.  
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During this process it became clear that battery safety of specific battery 
chemistries is a major issue when discussing the safety of EVs. From this concern, 
it was decided to attend a major conference on the most promising battery 
technology, Lithium ion (Li-ion). The conference attended was the EV Li-ion 
Battery Forum 2010 in Beijing, China which was a 5 day event which focussed 
specifically on Li-ion Batteries for EVs. Information gained from this conference 
was invaluable in building a detailed understanding about the implications of Li-
ion batteries for EVs. This has been summarised in Chapter 7. 
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1.3 Background 
1.3.1 Brief Historical Context 
The concept of practical EVs is not new. Over one hundred years ago, during the 
birth of the automobile age, EVs made up a high proportion of the vehicle fleet. 
EVs were a common sight in NZ with over 200 in operation in Christchurch in the 
1920s as shown Figure 1.1 below. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 More than 50 of Christchurch’s electric vehicles on Bealey Ave, 1924. 
(Riley 1976). 
 
After the 1920s the electric road vehicle receded into niche applications such as 
industrial vehicles, the concept only to be revived during the 1970s OPEC oil 
embargo (Bossche 2003). At present the increased interest in EVs is due to a 
combination of factors such as peak oil, energy security, local pollution and global 
climate change. To illustrate the link between EVs and oil prices a graph of 
historical oil prices is given below which shows a peak in the 1970s and today. 
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Figure 1.2 Graph of oil prices from 1861–2009 from USD/barrel. from; 
http://www.bp.com 
 
1.3.2 Sustainable Transport Technologies 
NZ is in a strong position to support the development for EV technology due to 
several features: 
1. NZ has a 230 V domestic electrical system, 
2. approximately 65-70% of electricity generation is from renewable sources and 
3. the NZ public has a history of being enthusiastic early technology adopters. 
All of the worlds energy comes from the sun. Sustainable energy is short cycle 
solar energy converted for use by various renewable technologies. Some energy 
pathways to sustainable transport are shown in Figure 1.3 below. The light 
coloured boxes represent technologies that are currently available or in use and 
would require minimal technological development for large scale implementation. 
The darker coloured boxes represent technologies which require either; 
• large capital investment in equipment, 
• change in public perception or acceptance and/or 
• investment in technological development. 
The darkest boxes represent technologies which currently are difficult to 
implement and may never be practically or economically viable. 
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Figure 1.3 Energy Pathways to Sustainable Land Transport. 
 
The above Figure does not represent an exhaustive list; for example fringe 
technologies such as compressed air storage, stirling cycle engines and flywheel 
energy storage have been omitted for clarity. The sustainability of current nuclear 
power generation technology is also controversial and so has not been included. 
The aim of the above Figure is to show that EVs represent a viable pathway to 
sustainable land transport. Furthermore, the above ‘electricity box’ has the most 
arrows going to and from it and so it is likely that some form of electric drive-
train will be a feature of vehicles in the future. 
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1.3.3 What is an Electric Vehicle (EV)? 
An EV or electrically driven vehicle uses and/or creates electricity on board. EVs 
cover a wide range of products from simple mobility scooters to large busses and 
trucks capable of moving thousands of kilograms. The definition of an EV covers 
a broad spectrum of vehicles that include hybrid traction systems which employ 
both electric motor and ICE. In Christchurch, locally manufactured LPG/battery 
electric hybrid busses are in use and an important part of the Wellington public 
transport system is the electric trolley buses that draw electricity from overhead 
wires. As stated previously, this project will focus on vehicles that utilise an 
onboard energy storage provided by a ‘Rechargeable Energy Storage System’ 
(RESS), typically in the form of a battery pack. 
As a concept, the Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) is the simplest type of EV. 
Charging of the battery requires an external power source connection so the BEV 
must be plugged into a power supply at its destination. Periodic refuelling at the 
petrol station however is no longer required. The range or distance a BEV can 
achieve before it requires recharging is a critical specification. 
Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs) use a mixture of electric and ICE or Fuel Cell 
(FC) to propel the vehicle. A pure HEV generates all its electrical energy on 
board, using a control system to employ the electric portion of the traction system 
as a load levelling device and power absorbing device (by regenerative braking) to 
achieve higher efficiencies in use of energy. The electric motor in a HEV is 
primarily a power assist device so the HEV battery is optimised for power 
delivery and absorption rather than energy storage. All the energy to drive the 
vehicle comes from petrol. The HEV can be described as a ‘non-depleting hybrid’ 
as the battery is never fully discharged during use and never charged from outside 
the vehicle (the battery is usually at approximately 50% State of Charge (SOC)). 
The Toyota Prius (Figure 1.4) has become the ubiquitous HEV during the last ten 
years however during 2010 other models entered the NZ market including the 
Honda Insight and the Australian manufactured Toyota Camry Hybrid. 
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Figure 1.4 1999 Toyota Prius Hybrid Car. 
 
The Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV) differs as the battery is able to be 
recharged from the grid. The performance of a PHEV depends on its motor 
configuration, battery size and control architecture as well as its operation. A 
PHEV that fully drains the battery in EV mode before it switches to the range-
extending ICE is called a Range-Extended EV (REV). This is because its range 
performance is no longer constrained by battery pack energy storage capacity. 
This type of PHEV can be exclusively operated in EV mode (within its EV 
range), without using any petrol during its lifetime (it is beneficial to design the 
size the battery pack around the expected travel distance). As identified by 
Bossche (2003), there are two different operation modes for PHEVs which 
determines the energy use profile of the vehicle (petrol or grid electric); 
1. EV with range extender used in city mode (EV mode) and for occasional long 
distance travel, 
2. HEV with zero-emission capability for short trips. The EV mode is used only 
occasionally (Bossche 2003). 
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2010 has seen the launch of the Chevrolet Volt REV on the US market. As shown 
in Figure 1.5 the marketing used by GM separates this vehicle from other PHEVs. 
 
 
Figure 1.5 Creating a new propulsion category - GM Chevrolet Volt range 
extended electric vehicle (Cai 2010a). 
 
The Chevrolet Volt can travel 40 miles (64 km) in EV mode then a range extender 
ICE provides power with no torque to the wheels from the electric motor. The 
electric motor has a 100kW power rating. The ICE range extender generator can 
also drive vehicle at 110 Mph continuous (Cai 2010a). The electricity producing 
Fuel Cell (FC) generator can also be used in a Fuel Cell Hybrid Vehicle (FCHV). 
A Fuel Cell Vehicle (FCV) could conceivably operate without a battery using a 
direct drive electrical transmission between the FC and motor. 
In a micro-hybrid the battery and electric motor do not provide any motive force 
to the vehicle but the ICE is turned off whenever the vehicle is stopped and would 
otherwise be idling. By keeping the combustion engine from idling, fuel is saved 
and the engine economy improved, typically in the range of 5–10% (Pistoia 
2010). 
The HEV represents a range of technology from a microhybrid or start–stop 
hybrid to a mild hybrid, full hybrid and then plug in hybrid. The typical 
technology employed in each type of vehicle is summarised as follows; 
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Vehicle 
category 
Battery 
voltage [V] 
Electric motor 
power range 
[kW]1 
Battery energy 
content [kWh] 
Typical battery 
chemistry 
(Optimisation) 
LEV 12, 24, 36, 48 1 1 - 2 LA, Ni  (Energy) 
Industrial 12, 24, 36, 48 1 - 100 5 - 50 LA       (Energy) 
BEV 200 - 500 100 - 200 25 - 75 Ni, Li   (Energy) 
FCV 300 - 400 100 - 200 1 - 5 Ni        (Power) 
HEV - Micro 12 2 0.5 LA       (Power) 
HEV - Mild 42 - 200 15 1 Ni, Li    (Power) 
HEV - Full 300 - 500 30 2 - 5 Ni, Li     (Power) 
PHEV 300 - 500 30 - 100 5 - 20 Li, Ni     (Energy) 
Table 1.1 Summary of EV characteristics. Adapted from (Pistoia 2010) (p. 499). 
1Added by author. 
 
 
Figure 1.6 Energy Storage: Requirements and Technology. Volkswagen Research 
Lab China (Giebel 2010). 
 
Figure 1.7 below from the European Council for Automotive R&D (EUCAR) 
illustrates the electrification of the vehicle power-train through the application of a 
range of vehicle technology. 
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Figure 1.7 Electrification of the power-train from (EUCAR 2009) 
 
These vehicle technologies are also described in the typical vehicle component 
schematics below; 
 
Figure 1.8 Electrification of the power train - a spectrum of technology. 
 
In summary, ‘EV’ refers to a spectrum of technology which this thesis uses as a 
general term meaning ‘electrically propelled vehicle’. Unless stated otherwise the 
term EV encompasses BEVs, HEVs, PHEVs, REV and FCVs. 
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Chapter 2 - Cost Aspects of EV Conversions 
2.1 Introduction 
The financial cost of products is a major determinant of consumer behaviour and 
as such economic factors will be a significant driver in the large scale adoption of 
EVs in NZ. This section will present a simple cost comparison between EVs (that 
are entering the market) and currently available petrol and ICE hybrid vehicles to 
determine what cost factors are the most important in influencing consumer 
behaviour. Many cost/benefit studies that take into account the wider economic, 
social and environmental characteristics of EVs have been identified such as in 
the recent report by Hyder (2009); National Cost-benefit Assessment of the Early 
Uptake of Electric Vehicles in New Zealand. This section however will focus on 
the direct financial cost to the vehicle user, to help determine what factors may 
influence consumer behaviour in the future. Environment, air pollution and other 
external costs are identified as important features below, but are not included in 
the cost analysis. 
 
2.1.1 Factors for the Adoption of EVs 
A vehicle that can transport 5 passengers and luggage in comfort, travel at 100 
km/h for 1000 km without refuelling has been immensely beneficial to society.  
As such the ICE vehicle has been one of the leading tools used in the 
advancement of first world society over the last one hundred years. The negative 
impacts of the widespread use of ICE vehicles, such as energy use and 
environmental pollution are widely recognised and different technologies are 
being assessed as alternatives, including EVs. The drivers and barriers for the 
introduction of EVs have been identified as follows; 
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Drivers Barriers 
Running cost Purchase cost and electricity cost 
Environmental credibility; Individuals and 
companies are buying EVs to associate 
themselves with environmental causes. 
General taste preference for ICE vehicle. 
 
Local pollution; Air quality, reduced noise 
BEVs have zero tailpipe emissions. 
Vehicle performance; Range anxiety. 
Recharge time. 
Climate change; Reduced CO2 
emissions. 
Lack of charging infrastructure 
Peak oil; Energy security, Fuel cost  
Table 2.1 EV drivers. 
 
Which of these factors results in a major uptake of EVs remains to be seen? 
Although different customers will have different requirements cost will always 
remain a dominant factor in influencing the wide scale adoption of EVs. 
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2.2 Comparative Cost Analysis 
2.2.1 Model Assumptions 
The costs of ICE vehicles, whilst being uncertain for most vehicle owners (due to 
unforeseen maintenance or replacement) are well understood. EVs however have 
a unique cost profile over the life cycle of the vehicle. Hyder (2009) outlines the 
model assumptions used in the study National Cost-benefit Assessment of the 
Early Uptake of Electric Vehicles in New Zealand and identifies the most 
important assumptions as: 
• USD/NZD exchange rate 
• EV battery price 
• new and used vehicle purchase prices 
• price of carbon 
• price of oil 
• petrol and diesel costs 
• fuel consumption 
• price of electricity 
• vehicle kilometres travelled 
Hyder (2009) notes that;  
“…many of the model assumptions are highly uncertain.  Changes to the 
assumptions impact not only on the estimates of EV demand, but 
ultimately the cost-benefit assessment and the results of the study” (Hyder 
2009). 
 The cost model developed and presented in this section assumes a use profile for 
all vehicles assessed as being driven 14000 km/year (the NZ average of 38.3 
km/day) during the first years of ownership. The vehicles chosen are well known 
and representative of their class. High profile EVs such as the Tesla Roadster are 
high performance luxury sports cars and are not included in this analysis. The 
purchase cost of the Nissan Leaf is taken as the reported price for the first EV 
models to be released in 2011. The price of this vehicle is expected to drop in 
subsequent years. Hyder (2009) gives the initial purchase cost of mass produced 
EVs as between $52,000 – 65,000 NZD1. Davis (2010) however, reports that the 
newly launched Mitsubishi iMiEV will cost $84,500 NZD. 
                                                 
1 For more information see: Hyder (2009), Table 4-1, p.10 
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The period studied is the first 100,000 km which represents 7 years and 51 days of 
vehicle use. 100,000 km represents a reasonably long period over which costs 
might be recovered. Converted EV vehicles have a battery life exceeding 100,000 
km (3000 cycles assumed for a Li-ion battery), so it is assumed that battery 
replacement is not required (The exception is the LA battery which has an 
assumed cycle life of 600 cycles). The analysis takes values from the AA 2010 
Car Running Costs Folder which provides a breakdown of costs and uses 
information from the NZTA Heavy Vehicle Selection Guide (NZTA 2005;  NZ 
AA 2010). 
The cost of vehicle energy is currently assumed as 0.24 $/kWh for electricity 
including domestic lines charges and 0.195 $/kWh 2 for petrol. The data for ICE 
petrol consumption is published from vehicle drive cycle tests. The values for ICE 
fuel consumption shown in Table 2.2 below were taken from the website 
http://www.fuelsaver.govt.nz/. The indirect (external) costs identified by NZTA 
(2005) such as safety, environment, maximising load, driver retention and 
brand/image are not considered in this analysis as these are considered secondary 
commercial considerations. The assumed vehicle cost data has been summarised 
in Table 2.2 below. Maintenance and insurance are assumed to be equal for the 
vehicles studies, however in reality there will be differences. No assumptions 
have been made of whether government policy will provide economic incentives 
for ‘clean vehicles’, however the exemption of EVs from Road User Charges 
(RUC) as is currently the case until 2013 is included in the cost analysis. 
Incentives for EVs are discussed by King (2007) and a summary of national 
incentives is given by BERR. (2008, p. 57). 
 
                                                 
2 This is calculated from an assumed cost of petrol of $1.90 litre which is representative of 2010 
prices and a lower heating value of 35 MJ/l. Petrol energy per litre, 35/(3.6) = 9.722 kWh → Petrol 
cost, 1.90/9.722 = 0.195 $/kWh. 
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 Toyota 
Corolla 
Toyota 
Prius 
New Nissan 
Leaf 
Blade 
Electron 
Converted 
EV/ Li-ion 
Converte
d EV/ LA2 
Nominal 
Purchase 
Cost1 [NZD] 
30000 50000 70000 62200 26000 12000 
Fuel Use 
[l/100km] 
8 4.5 NA NA NA NA 
Battery Size 
[kWh] 
(Range) [km] 
NA NA 24 (160) 16 (100)3 16 (100) 26.6 (80) 
Energy Use 
[kWh/km] 
0.78 0.44 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.29 
Energy Cost4 
[$/km] 
0.152 0.0855 0.04 0.035 0.035 0.035 
Fixed Cost5 
[$/day] 
6.39 6.39 6.39 6.39 6.39 6.39 
Running 
Cost6 [$/km] 
0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 
Total Cost7 
[$/km] 
0.39 0.32 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.30 
Total Cost7 
[$/day] 
14.79 12.24 9.95 10.02 10.02 11.61 
Table 2.2 Assumed vehicle cost data. 
1 http://www.companyvehicle.co.nz/webfiles/Adrenalin/files/Company_Vehicle_Nov_2010_1.pdf 
2 24 Trojan 6V T-105 Flooded LA (185Ah and 600 cycles assumed) (Rekker 2009). Pack replacement cost 
at 48000 km assumed $7200 NZD. 
3 http://bev.com.au/about/specifications/ 
4 Calculated from petrol fuel consumption (ICE) or from energy to charge 80% battery capacity at an 
efficiency of 0.9 divided by the range on one charge (BEV). 
5 Vehicle licencing, warrant of fitness, interest on outlay, Insurance 35 year old male, comprehensive policy 
including glass cover (NZ AA 2010).  
6 Oil, tyres, repairs and maintenance excluding petrol and electricity energy costs. 
7 Excluding capital outlay 
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Figure 2.1 The Hyundai Blade Electron. 
 
2.2.2 Analysis 
The ICE vehicle operating costs are dependent on petrol prices.  As BEVs rely 
only on electricity for energy, BEV operating costs are dependent on electricity 
prices.  On the other hand operating costs for PHEVs (not considered here as 
drive cycles need to be considered) are a function of both petrol and electricity 
costs. An analysis of the values in Table 2.2 gives the life time costs of the 
vehicles which are presented in Figure 2.2 below. 
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Figure 2.2 Plotted vehicle cost profile. Petrol 1.90 $/litre (0.195 $/kWh), 
Electricity 0.24  $/kWh. Petrol/Electricity price ratio = 0.81. 
 
A baseline (control) cost is represented by the Toyota Corolla ICE vehicle which 
is shown by the dashed bold line. The upper two lines represent the approximate 
costs of currently available EVs whilst the lower two line represent the costs of 
EV conversions for the home builder. Home conversion costs represent the cost of 
materials only and would not generally include the labour required to convert the 
EV. The kinks in the Converted EV LA line represent the replacement costs of the 
LA battery (assumed as $7200 every 48000 km).  
This analysis shows that the purchase price of the EV has a large effect on the 
overall life cycle cost of the vehicle and that new OEM EVs would need to be 
priced a similar level to ICE vehicles to be competitive. This is confirmed in the 
report by (Association 2010) which states;  
“Many factors affect the vehicle running cost, but contrary to popular 
belief, although fuel cost is one of those components, the biggest factors 
are depreciation and interest rates” (p. 5).  
Therefore, a decline in the purchase price of EVs has a greater effect on the 
overall ownership costs than the same proportional increase in the price of petrol 
would. This situation is also born out by the fact that most New Zealanders buy 
second hand cars, where significant depreciation has already taken place. Simpson 
(2006) discusses the economics of PHEVs and concludes “…that  it  will  be  
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quite  a  challenge  to  justify  the  PHEV  capital  cost premium on the basis of 
reduced lifetime energy costs alone” (Simpson 2006, p. 13). 
It is useful to investigate what happens in this model when petrol prices increase. 
Below is a representation of a scenario that involves a more than doubling of the 
petrol price to 4.0 $/litre. It is assumed that the electricity price remains constant 
so the petrol/electricity price ratio goes to 1.71. 
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Figure 2.3 Plotted vehicle cost profile. Petrol 4.00 $/litre (0.195 $/kWh), 
Electricity 0.24  $/kWh. Petrol/Electricity price ratio = 1.71. 
 
This Figure shows that with high petrol prices, the EV becomes economically 
attractive and if EV purchase costs were at parity with ICE vehicle costs, EVs 
would have a strong economic advantage. The Hyundai/Blade Electron pays back  
its capital cost at around 80,000 km compared with a Toyota Prius Hybrid. This 
analysis is simplistic as it does not take into account any increase in electricity 
prices as petrol prices increase. As  Donovan et al. (2008) explains;  
“High oil prices also have the potential to directly affect the costs of other 
energy forms. Oil is the major pillar of an increasingly interlinked global 
energy market. These linkages mean that the price of oil closely influences 
the price of other fuels, such as natural gas. Thus when the price of oil 
increases the price of natural gas tends to follow. This has potential 
implications for electricity generation, which contributed approximately 
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17% of electrical energy generated in 2005 (MED, 2006). Should domestic 
gas supplies dwindle and be replaced by imported gas then New Zealand’s 
electricity consumers may become increasingly exposed to international 
gas prices and, by default, global oil prices” (p. 18). 
It has been shown that vehicle purchase price is currently the most important 
factor in EV cost. EV prices will need to reduce to be comparable with ICE 
vehicle prices before a large number of consumers will make the shift. This is 
especially pertinent considering the reduced performance of range and refilling 
time the customer is accepting when purchasing an EV. The BEV will first be 
purchased by commercial users as half of all new vehicles are purchased by 
businesses and as explained by AECOM (2009);  
“…owners of larger vehicles and vehicles that travel large distances tend 
to purchase a higher proportion of EVs. This is due to the fact that 
operating costs are more important for these vehicle owners” (p. i). 
This is evidenced by the fact that the Toyota Prius has become a popular vehicle 
for taxi service. During research for this thesis, one Taxi operator reported to the 
author savings of 1000 $/month when compared to a V6 Holden driven 12,000 
km/month, and he commented on the increased reliability of the Toyota (personal 
communication). 
Another factor in favour of the ICE status quo is the high elasticity of demand of 
petrol. This results in people tending to pay higher prices before reducing 
consumption or moving to alternatives. 
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2.3 The Case for Converted EVs 
In this section a scenario is presented to show how a global EV supply constraint 
could trigger demand for locally converted EVs. Parker (2008) discuses the 
economics of the introduction of new technology; 
“Peak oil could be another ‘millennium bug’ event. Peak oil arguments 
ignore rationing function of market and their power to induce innovation 
…we know that the arrival of alternative fuels or substitutes is not 
necessarily slow. There are always part-developed or dormant 
technologies that have been biding their time, waiting for oil prices to rise. 
These can be activated relatively quickly” (p. 16). 
The EV conversion represents one of these technologies. Parker (2008) goes on 
further, to say; 
 “The transition to a reduced dependence on oil is likely to involve a 
myriad of technologies until, by a process of iteration, a new paradigm is 
developed” (p. 16). 
It has been shown in the previous Section that the cost of imported OEM EVs is 
too high to recover by reduced fuel consumption. EV purchase prices could 
remain high if the global demand for EVs increases but the supply of EVs is 
constrained as the capacity to manufacture these vehicles catches up. 
The scenario presented here suggests that the conversion industry would be quick 
to take advantage of this market opening, as it is unconstrained by the industrial 
momentum of the major automakers. Low cost producers of converted EVs would 
quickly enter the market. During research for this thesis it was noted that NZ has a 
base of EV enthusiasts and engineers with the knowledge and capability to 
produce EV conversions to a reasonable standard and performance. This situation 
may be further advanced by a good supply of EV batteries as battery 
manufacturers have been positioning themselves for a growing market (Deng 
2010). 
The current situation in NZ is that EV enthusiasts build their own vehicle, 
absorbing the labour costs themselves. As economic factors become favourable 
these people can quickly take advantage of this market opportunity. Several 
professional EV converters including Blade Electric Vehicles are currently 
operating in Australia. Reports indicate that a low technology conversion can take 
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as little as three days to a week to compete. With sophisticated conversions taking 
a large number of hours. 
An example of an EV supply constraint scenario used by Hyder (2009) is shown 
in Figure 2.4 below; 
 
Figure 2.4 Example of an assumed supply constraint scenario showing a 17 year 
gap (Hyder 2009). 
 
2.4 Battery Costs 
The battery pack is the most expensive component of a BEV. Although a detailed 
assessment of future petrol and electricity price scenarios is outside the scope of 
this thesis, it is worth noting that the cost of EV batteries will play a significant 
role in the future costs of EVs. The cost of EV batteries is likely to reduce as the 
market develops. (Deng 2010) describes the situation for Li-ion batteries as 
“…not so rapid market development” indicating the EV battery market is not 
ready. As such manufacturers are currently producing batteries and investing in 
new production facilities for market positioning, not profit. The market for Li-ion 
batteries is currently being lead by the Chinese E-bikes market. The use of E-
bikes in China has grown from 0-80 M in the last 10 years (Deng 2010). Current 
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production of E-bikes is 20 M/year, however most are equipped with Lead Acid 
(LA) batteries with Li-ion batteries currently representing around 1% of the 
market. 
A reduction in battery cost is likely as the production of cells for EV applications 
enters the mainstream. Although future costs of EV batteries remains highly 
uncertain it is useful to give current and future price estimations for the most 
promising EV battery, Li-ion. 
 
Source Current Future ~ 2020 
(Yang 2010) >10561 <5282  
(Cheng 2010) 924 - 1188 3303 - 396 
(Nakamura 2010) 1580 - 3160 316 
http://bev.com.au 5454  
Generic LA ~ 200  
Table 2.3 Li ion battery costs, current and future predictions/target [NZD/kWh] 
1 Large format prismatic cell 
2 18650 format cylindrical cell 
3 Pistoia (2010) suggests this a lowest probable specific cost for batteries in BEV 
4 Thundersky TS-LFP100AHA large format prismatic at 3.6V nominal 
 
This Table shows why Thundersky is the most popular Li-ion battery for EV 
converters in NZ. It should also be noted it is not only the cost of the Li-ion 
battery that is an issue, but the Battery Management System (BMS) is also a 
significant cost, where Li-ion unavoidably has a greater cost than other 
chemistries due to increased system complexity. Prakash (2010) gives the 
ambition of Reva Electric Vehicle for battery cost and life performance of Li-ion 
cells in Figure 2.5; 
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Figure 2.5 (Prakash 2010) Reva, Li-ion costs. 
 
This shows that battery life is as equally important as cost and that this should be 
taken into account when choosing a battery. Figure 2.2 given above also suggests 
that the price performance of LA and Li-ion should be carefully compared by 
taking into account the cycle life and replacement cost of each battery type. 
The drivers for EV introduction will include both the cost of petrol (energy cost) 
and battery cost (the cost of the alternative). This scenario is given by both Jen 
(2010) and Willums (2010) and is presented in Figure 2.6 below. The interaction 
of these two factors will influence the economic viability of EVs in the future. 
 
Figure 2.6 EV cost scenario adapted from (Jen 2010; Willums 2010) 
Time 
C
os
t 
? 
Battery cost↓ 
Petrol fuel ↑ 
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An EV battery will also have a residual value after it is no longer fit for EV use. 
The EV battery is currently regarded as nominally spent after it reaches 80% of its 
original energy capacity. These batteries can be reused in stationary Uninterrupted 
Power Supply (UPS) applications, grid stabilisation facilities or even low 
performance or industrial EV applications. This residual value of the spent battery 
should be taken into account when a detailed cost analysis is undertaken. Jen 
(2010) suggests the use of the new LA battery price for the residual value of a 
used Li-ion battery. The prediction and measurement of battery end of life or 
failure mode holds many technical challenges but is important for vehicle costs, 
insurance and warranty claims. 
 
2.5 New EV Business Models 
New business models will emerge to attempt to negate the upfront cost of the EV. 
Several organisations are exploring alternative cost models such as car share 
schemes, battery leasing, battery switch. The main objective of these enterprises is 
to change battery investment into an operating cost (change CAPEX to OPEX) 
and to manage the technology and market risk (Willums 2010). 
Organisations involved in these types of operations must have a thorough 
understanding of the battery degradation over time and use in real-life, to 
determine the residual value of the battery. Wolkin (2010) presenting on behalf of 
company Betterplace gives the cost advantages of battery switch as; 
• making EVs cost competitive with petrol-powered vehicles and, 
• optimal charging in controlled conditions to prolong battery life and 
maximize residual value. 
Betterplace has ordered and will operate over 100,000 AESC Li-ion batteries in 
Renault built vehicles over the next five years (Wolkin 2010). 
 
2.6 EV Costs Summary 
This analysis has shown that the economics of EVs are a major determinant in the 
market uptake of EV technology. It has been found that two factors are important; 
1. the purchase cost of the EV (influenced by battery cost) and less 
importantly, 
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2. the ratio of petrol to electricity cost. 
A reduction in the purchase price of an EV has a greater effect on the overall 
ownership costs than the same proportional increase in the price of petrol would. 
EV battery costs are predicted to decrease as manufacturing increases, resulting in 
a reduction in EV price. New business models, based on car sharing or battery 
leasing are also developing to contend with the current high cost of EVs. 
 “Once EV prices drop below ICV prices, Hyder‘s modelling shows 
considerable private net benefit from purchasing EVs… Most of the net 
benefit (91%) is accrued by the vehicle purchaser in terms of a lower long-
run purchase price (inclusive of battery replacement costs), and lower fuel, 
electricity and maintenance costs” (Hyder 2009, p. 118). 
EV conversions represent a good option for EV growth in NZ. Low cost 
producers of converted EVs can quickly enter the market and take advantage of 
international EV supply shortages as economic and market factors become 
favourable. 
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Chapter 3 - NZ Regulations and Standards 
3.1 Introduction - Why have Regulation for EVs in NZ? 
The EV represents a new product paradigm. The additional risk posed by the 
introduction of new technologies is unknown. The question is, what is the risk to 
society with the introduction of new technology? The road environment is a place 
where all people from all societal and socioeconomic groups interact with one 
another, whether it be as pedestrians, cyclists, car drivers or bus operators. EVs 
and EV conversions will be involved in accidents (Figure 3.1) and they need to 
perform in at least a similar safety manner as ICE vehicles. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 A crash in Denmark between a Tesla Roadster (BEV) a Toyota Prius 
(HEV) and a VW Touareg (ICE) (Scardino 2009). 
 
One hundred years of ICE car development has resulted in huge advancements in 
technology. The EV will have a different development route as we now have a 
high expectation of safety. 
One way to assess the effect of a new technology is to look at the way it might be 
used. Hybrid electric vehicles are designed as direct substitutions for ICE vehicles 
 31 
which currently dominate the vehicle fleet. Their operating characteristics allow 
them to be used for long distance travel on rural roads as well as in an urban 
setting. If all the current fleet were to be substituted by hybrid vehicle technology 
which had an equal inherent safety then you would not expect any change in road 
casualties. BEVs however, are likely to have a limited range and so are more 
likely to be operated for shorter trips in an urban setting. 
Is regulation justified regulation for EV conversions? The current numbers of EV 
conversions are insignificant (less than 10 per year). So the risk to society is 
small. However it has been shown that the number of EV conversions could 
increase rapidly and it is important to have standards in place before they are 
really needed. EVs already fall into various aspects of law but EVs are not an 
exact fit and there is confusion about some areas as. Other important questions 
are; where should regulation be targeted? Who should pay the costs? 
High volume production OEM vehicles need to go through stringent testing and 
certification to international standards in order to become part of the NZ vehicle 
fleet. The risk of these vehicles being unsafe is low as these vehicles will be 
purpose designed and rigorously tested. With these vehicles it is thus possible to 
adopt the international standards (discussed below) for EVs and allow importation 
and entry certification to be controlled by these standards. 
With converted EVs however the technical risks are high, the risks of non 
compliance are high and the risks to OEM EV industry from bad publicity are also 
high. The MED have seen fit to regulate 230 V installations in campervans 
because the installation of solid core domestic wiring is not designed specifically 
for vehicles so the risks are higher. A 4 yearly Electrical Warrant of Fitness 
(EWOF) is thus justified. 
The safety engineering of new technologies is not always certain. This can be seen 
from a number of examples both in an out of the transport industry. 
An example of unforeseen consequences in the large scale implementation of a 
new but simple technology occurred recently in Australia with the installation of 
aluminium foil in the ceilings of residential buildings. Poor installation practices 
led to major electrical safety issues causing fatalities. It was reported that; “The 
government relied on (insulation installation) guidelines partly formed by 
Standards Australia when it first introduced the scheme, but has since toughened 
the program's rules following the deaths of four workers ” age.com.au , 
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17/02/2010). The Australian government is now in the position of auditing 48,000 
homes which may have ‘live’ ceilings caused by an existing electrical fault or 
poor foil installation practice. 
There is also a risk to the EV industry if EVs were seen to be dangerous as shown 
by the following example. This example is given to show that the introduction of 
new technology can cause confusion.  
On 1 January 1996, New Zealand began to institute a completely unleaded petrol 
market by the introduction of premium unleaded fuel to replace the existing 
leaded 96-octane petrol. At the time there was great concern that the new fuel was 
the cause of vehicle fires as a result of rubber sealing components degrading. 
Garrett (1998) however, states;  
“For most people a vehicle fire will be a once-in-a-lifetime experience. 
Therefore, given the widespread publicity linking vehicle fires and 
unleaded petrol during March-April 1996, it would be reasonable for 
anyone who changed from leaded to unleaded petrol and experienced a car 
fire around that time to infer a causal relationship … On balance, it is 
unlikely that there was any increase in car fires related to the introduction 
of premium unleaded petrol into New Zealand in early 1996. Certainly 
there was nothing like the problem suggested by news media publicity at 
the time” (p. 328). 
It is hoped that by implementing sensible regulation that a similar situation 
occurring with EVs would be avoided. 
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3.2 The Current NZ Regulatory Situation 
The EV does not fit into the same regulatory framework as the ICE. EVs can be 
viewed as a completely new technology, or a mix of existing technologies. The 
EV can be interpreted as both an electrical appliance and a road vehicle as its 
operation is not confined to on road use. The ICE vehicle is essentially not 
operating when it is parked, a plug-in EV however is connected to the electricity 
grid and performs charging and other functions whilst it is parked. From this you 
can see that the EV will fit into a different regulatory framework and have a 
different safety profile from the ICE vehicle due to its use of different technology. 
EVs are also unique in the way they handle energy. Peter Morfee (2010) of the 
NZ Ministry of Economic Development (MED) Energy Safety Service explains: 
“…They (EVs) can move energy in both space and time. No other storage system 
can do this” (personal correspondence). Figure 3.2 below illustrates the regulatory 
silos that the EV and ICE belong to. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Regulation silos. 
 
This Figure shows that government regulators need to collaborate across many 
different areas to regulate for EVs. A government group comprising of Meridian 
Energy, Contact Energy, MOT, NZTA, EECA and MED (Energy Safety Service) 
representatives has already held informal meetings about EV safety. 
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3.3 Current Legislation 
EV safety is covered by two main areas of NZ legislation; 
The first is vehicle safety standards which are covered by the Land Transport 
Rules administered by the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA). Under the 
Land Transport Rules, NZ accepts all vehicles made to European, Japanese, 
Australian or United States standards. The Land Transport Rules have number of 
additional clauses which affect EVs these are listed in Appendix 2. The second are 
the NZ electricity regulations the main regulation here being the Electricity 
(Safety) Regulations 2010. These regulations apply both when the vehicle is 
moving and stationary. 
 
3.4 The Low Volume Vehicle (LVV) System in NZ 
The NZ Low Volume Vehicle (LVV) approval system is based on the European 
model of Individual Vehicle Approval (IVA). For a history of the development of 
the NZ LVV approval system see Johnson (2007). Under the European vehicle 
regulations each country within the European Union is permitted to have its own 
national IVA scheme to approve individually modified or scratch built vehicles. 
IVA approvals are only valid for the country in which they are issued.  
The NZ LVV approval scheme is administered by the Low Volume Vehicle 
Technical Association (LVVTA) and is legally binding due to it being 
incorporated by reference in the Land Transport Rules (Johnson 2007). The 
concept of low volume vehicles and certification for such vehicles was not 
initiated until after 1991. Under the NZ LVV code up to 200 vehicles can be 
produced by a manufacturer in any one year3.  
The process for approval involves certification of the vehicle by way of a survey 
of the vehicle to the relevant LVV Standard by a LVV Certifier appointed by the 
NZTA. Standards are jointly drafted by the LVVTA and the NZTA and are 
written using three different methods of certification; prescription based, 
performance based, and compliance. Compliance can also be shown via 
verification methods in some cases. 
No LVV Standard for EV conversions currently exist however LVV certifiers 
have been using an unofficial document to certify vehicles which was developed  
                                                 
3 For more detail see: LVVTA (2004) Low Volume Vehicle Code- Issue 4. Terms and Definitions. 
p.22.  
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over 10 years ago. LVV EV certifiers as thus do not currently have the tools to do 
their jobs. 
 
3.5 The EV - An Appliance or Connectable Installation? 
During the literature review and discussions with various people across the EV 
sector it became clear that confusion surrounds the status of EVs with regard to 
the issuing of an Electrical Warrant of Fitness (EWOF) for EVs and EV 
conversions. The issuing of an EWOF is well established for motorhomes and 
caravans that have a standard low voltage (230 V) connection under section 76 of 
the Electricity (Safety) Regulations 2010 (MED 2010). These EWOF are issued 
for a period of four years after which they must be renewed. The standard 
AS/NZS3001:2008 Electrical Installations – Transportable Structures and 
Vehicles Including their Site Supplies is cited by MED (2010) as the applicable 
standard for EWOF certification. 
Although EVs converters have also been obtaining 4 yearly EWOF for their 
completed conversions, it is unclear whether EVs are ‘connectable installations’ 
or ‘electrical appliances’. This is because the scope of AS/NZS3001:2008 
(Standards NZ 2008), does not specifically state that the standard is applicable to 
EVs, and instead focuses on vehicles with accommodation or other commercial 
purposes that requires a 230 V electricity supply. 
This area requires clarification by the authorities concerned. If EVs are found to 
be ‘connectable installations’ and as such do need a EWOF every four years, this 
would also apply to imported OEM EVs as the Electrical Safety Regulation (MED 
2010) makes no distinction whether the vehicle or electrical system is homebuilt, 
professionally built or imported (or a LVV for that matter). Furthermore as cited 
by the regulation, the standard requires that; 
“…a person must not hire or lease out, or offer to hire or lease out, a 
vehicle, relocatable building, or pleasure vessel that contains a connectable 
installation unless the connectable installation has a current warrant of 
electrical fitness” (Med 2010, p. 55. Section 77(1)) 
The Passenger Service Vehicles (PSV) Rule Section 6.5 also has requirements for 
‘electrical equipment’ fitted to PSVs and here it is clear high voltage traction 
system is included as it makes mention of ‘Trolley-booms and heads’ which are 
traction components of trolley busses. 
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The Electrical Safety Regulation thus would require vehicle rental and taxi 
companies to obtain an EWOF for vehicles that charge from the grid. A situation 
could arise whereby two OEM HEVs from the same manufacturer, one of which 
is a PHEV the other a non-depleting HEV, have different electrical certification 
requirements whilst having a very similar risk profile. It seems from this research 
that the requirement for a EWOF for EV conversions has been adopted by the 
certification community without it being an actual legal requirement. One LVV 
certifier told the author that he requires a copy of the EWOF before the LVV 
(mechanical) certification is issued however a Warrant of Fitness (WOF) testing 
station does not require or check for an EWOF before issuing a WOF or 
Certificate of Fitness (COF) to a motor home or caravan. 
One option is to continue to require EWOF for converted EVs (home or 
professionally built) but not for OEM EVs. These areas however, need urgent 
clarification in both electrical and transportation law as to the intent of the 
regulations to avoid further confusion. Further research is required to ascertain 
how this issue has been resolved internationally. 
The Electrical Safety Regulation has defined the building and maintenance of EVs 
to be not ‘prescribed electrical work’ requiring an electrical registration. Working 
on homebuilt EVs thus does not come under the jurisdiction of the Electrical 
Workers Registration Board (EWRB) even though the traction systems in these 
vehicles may have voltages in excess of 600 V (MED 2010). 
 
3.6 Mechanical and Electrical Certification of Low Volume Vehicles (LVVs) 
The LVVTA provides training, technical support and all necessary LVV 
documentation to the LVV certifiers. LVV certifiers for EVs must be appointed as 
a Category 4 (Electric Vehicles) certifier. It can take a number of years for an 
automotive trade certificate holder to achieve this. 
There is currently no published LVV standard for EVs in NZ. Converted EVs 
however are being certified to the LVV code using an unpublished document the; 
Code of Construction & Inspection Forms for Electric Vehicles, released March 
1997 by the NZ Hot Rod Association (Inc). 
The LVV certification of EV conversions involves assessing the properties of a 
number of technological systems which are shown in Figure 3.3 over the page. 
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Figure 3.3 Some inspection criteria for EV conversions and the respective NZ 
certification systems 
 
During interviews with EV converters and certifiers it became clear that parts of 
the vehicle were not being inspected by either the electrical or LVV inspector. 
The dashed cells show the certification areas covered by the two different EV 
conversion certifications currently in use. EWOF inspections tended to cover only 
the entry of 230 V cable into the vehicle and its wiring to the onboard charger. 
Not the battery or traction circuit. This is a potential safety issue as neither the 
LVV (mechanical) or the EWOF (electrical) certifier have the training to inspect 
these particular areas and due to the small numbers of EVs being currently 
certified, there is not much chance to learn. 
It is unclear who is certifying what. The new LVV standard for EV conversions 
must thus clarify the roles and demarcations of the certifiers involved in 
complying the vehicle. Many of the mechanical areas of an EV conversion are 
covered by existing LVV standards and thus should not be repeated. One option is 
to bring the electrical areas into the LVV specialist certification – making it part 
of the vehicles standards (transport) legislation rather that electrical (as with the 
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Passenger Service Vehicle (PSV) Rule). Training can then be provided specific to 
EV electrical systems. 
During interviews it was discovered that the EV conversion community are 
extremely nervous about new regulation regarding EV LVV certification. Lengthy 
discussions are summarised by the fact that EV home builders do not want any 
regulation that increases the cost of building an EV, complying an EV or running 
an EV. It is strongly advised that the EV community form a national advocacy 
group so as to be involved in any standards formation process. 
 
 
3.7 The Motor Vehicle Register 
The purpose of the NZ motor vehicle register is manifold; it enables vehicles to be 
taxed and statistics on the vehicle fleet to be gathered. Using these statistics it 
should be possible for lessons to be learned from field failures and accidents 
which can be utilized and incorporated into test protocols so that their effects can 
be understood and mitigated in the future. During this research it was discovered 
that there is currently no way of identifying EVs in the NZ vehicle fleet King 
(2007) also identifies this). It is possible to search model name however this might 
obscure the main energy source of the vehicle. Future research in the area of EV 
safety will depend on data being available on the accident rates of EVs. Changes 
must be made to the motive power classifications in the motor vehicle register 
these should include classifications for ICE, BEV, HEV, and PHEV. Future 
taxation schemes for EVs in NZ will also need this information as discussed by 
King (2007). 
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Chapter 4 - International EV Regulations and Standards 
4.1 Introduction 
As a guide when discussing standards for EV conversions it is useful to have 
knowledge of the international safety requirements for EVs. Currently there are 
many standards published for EVs and EV components internationally. Bossche 
(2003) gives a detailed discussion of the development of EV standards between 
the late 1800s to 2003. The standards relating to EV safety are published by 
leading standards organisations such as UNECE, ISO, IEC and SAE. The main 
vehicle standards from the leading standards organisations are reviewed in this 
section. Standards for EVs are subdivided into the following groups; 
• Vehicle 
• Battery 
• Electric supply - recharging devices 
• EV components 
• Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) 
The standards are generally focussed on either; 
• design requirements or 
• testing protocols 
The standards discussed here are EV vehicle standards rather than battery 
standards. EV battery standards are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. The 
design of electrical components have there own traditions which might not be 
adhered to in the new paradigm of EVs and so a number of international EV 
component standards have also been published. 
 
4.2 UNECE Regulations 
NZ already recognises an international regulation relating to EVs as NZ is a 
Contracting Party to the UNECE agreement on the harmonisation of vehicle 
regulations, Geneva 1958. Over one hundred UNECE vehicle regulations are in 
force including seven UNECE regulations with specific requirements for EVs as 
identified by Bossche (2003).  UNECE Regulation 13, Uniform Provisions 
Concerning the Approval of Vehicles of Categories M, N and O with Regard to 
Braking is discussed further in Chapter 8 on braking issues. The UNECE 
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regulation specifically concerning EV safety is Regulation No. 100, Battery 
Electric Vehicles Safety. The regulation addresses three areas; 
1. Traction battery safety. This section gives requirements for ventilation, 
electrical fusing, insulation resistance and a detailed hydrogen emissions test. 
2. Functional safety. ECE 100 specifies a number of requirements, all of which 
can be found in the EV safety standards (ISO 6469 and EN 1987) which are 
discussed below. The concordance between the regulation and the standards is 
very good and any vehicle which complies with the standards will also comply 
with the regulation (Bossche 2003). The regulation gives requirements for 
protection against direct contact and bonding of conductive components. 
3. Protection against electric hazards. For voltages below 60 VDC or 25 VAC, 
no specific protection is needed. Unlike the standards discussed below, ECE 
R.100 has  a number of charger interlock and safety requirements 
There is a strong argument that UNECE R.100 should become familiar to EV 
converters as this regulation is available free of charge. 
 
4.3 ISO 6469:2009 Electrically Propelled Road Vehicles – Safety 
Specifications 
ISO 6469 is a vehicle based standards that, like UNECE R100, comes in three 
parts. 
Part 1; On-board Rechargeable Energy Storage System (RESS). 
Part 1 gives requirements for battery systems up to 1000 VAC, the marking of 
hazardous voltages, insulation resistance and battery ventilation requirements. 
Part 2; Vehicle operational safety means and protection against failures. 
Part 2 specifies requirements for functional safety means and protection against 
failures  related  to  the  specific  hazard  of  the  electric  propulsion  system  of 
battery-electric passenger cars and light commercial vehicles. Various switching 
is controlled to prevent unintentional behaviour of the vehicle including the 
requirement for two distinct control actions for power-on and reversing. 
Part 3; Protection of persons against electric hazards. 
Part 3 requires that protection against direct contact shall be provided either by 
basic insulation of live parts, by barriers/enclosures, or both. The standard gives 
requirements for enclosures as well as stating requirements and testing for 
protection against water effects (Bossche 2003). 
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4.4 IEC Standards 
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is the international 
standards and conformity assessment body for all fields of electro-technology. 
The IEC has published some EV vehicle standards as well as many component 
based standards addressing areas such as wiring and connections, instrumentation, 
motors, controllers as well as battery and charging standards (Bossche 2003). 
 
4.5 FMVSS 305 (US) Electric Powered Vehicles  
Electrolyte Spillage and Electrical Shock Protection 
This standard specifies requirements for limitation of electrolyte spillage, 
retention of propulsion batteries during a crash test, and electrical isolation of the 
chassis from the high voltage system. This regulation gives good post crash 
measurement procedures (FMVSS 2009). 
 
4.6 Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) 
The SAE is an industry association which has published a large number of 
automotive standards and design guidelines including over 20 standards relevant 
to EVs with many others in active development. The standards include; 
• EV and HEV performance standards 
• EV safety 
• Battery - Hydrogen emissions, battery crash testing, battery modules, 
battery performance, lifecycle testing, pack functional guidelines, 
vibration, and abuse testing. 
• Electrical - HV cables, HV wiring assemblies and HV connectors. 
• Charging infrastructure – conductive charging, Inductive charging, energy 
transfer system. 
• Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) 
SAE J2344: Guidelines for Electric Vehicle Safety is reviewed in relevant 
sections of this thesis. (Bossche 2003) gives a summary as follows. The SAE 
‘standards’ are more stringent than the UN regulations however the SAE are 
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guidelines not standards. International OEM manufacturers generally comply with 
the more stringent SAE guidelines. 
4.7 UL Underwriters Laboratories 
Underwriters Laboratories Inc. (UL) is an independent, not-for-profit  product 
safety testing and certification organisation. (Bossche 2003) and (Tabaddor 2010) 
give an overview of the UL standards relevant to EVs. It seems likely that UL 
2580 - Batteries for use in Electric Vehicles will become an important battery 
safety standard for EV manufacturers when it is published in 2011. 
 
4.8 Japanese Electric Vehicle Association (JEVA) 
The JEVA has published over 20 standards, some of them only available in 
Japanese. (Bossche 2003) gives a brief description of these. 
 
4.9 NCOP 14 National Guidelines for the Installation of Electric Drives in 
Motor Vehicles (Australia) 
No Australian Design Rules (ADRs) for type certification of EVs exists in 
Australia. The Australian individual vehicle approval scheme is based on the 
documents of the National Code of Practice for Light Vehicle Construction and 
Modification (NCOP). The code of practice relevant for EV conversions is NCOP 
14 - National Guidelines for the Installation of Electric Drives in Motor Vehicles 
(NCOP14 2011). Newly published, this is the most up-to-date and local document 
available. The standards covers – Electrical technical and safety requirements, 
mechanical technical and safety requirements and other requirements such as 
pedestrian safety. The standard covers much of the ground of the international EV 
standards as well as a clause on the battery management requirements of lithium 
chemistries. This standard provides a good model for NZ. 
 
4.10 UK Single Vehicle Approval (SVA) 
The UK SVA manual covers the requirements for modifying vehicles in the UK. 
It does not have any requirements for EV conversions. 
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4.11 The Work of Standards Australia  
Standards Australia is actively addressing EV standardisation. The preliminary 
work undertaken is described in Standards Australia scoping study (Lazar 2009). 
In discussions with the author, whilst any published standard is some time away, 
it seems likely that a standard for EV conversions is high on the agenda and it is 
recommended that Standards NZ and the LVVTA become active in this process. 
This process could result in a standard that could be adopted as a LVV standard in 
NZ. 
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Chapter 5 - EV Technology Safety Risk Assessment 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to use a formal method of risk assessment to 
identify the most important aspects of EV safety in the context of the converted or 
modified vehicle. The formal risk management process which will be used is 
outlined in AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management – Principals and 
Guidelines (Standards NZ 2009). This risk management process establishes 
systematic practices for risk management, including application to specific 
projects. Guidance from (Ashtiani 2007) was used as he gives a procedure for risk 
analysis, assigning a Hazard Risk Number (HRN) to quantify identified risks and 
applying hazard controls to reduce risk. Morfee (2010) has also been referred to in 
regard to applying a risk assessment model to design a regulatory system for 
electrical products in NZ. 
 
5.2 Definitions 
This section will look at the risk of new EV conversion technology entering the 
NZ market. Risk here is defined as a negative deviation from the expected 
objective of ‘safe EV use in NZ’. Risk assessment concerns include ‘risk’ that 
directly effects the general public including safety concerns, but not 
‘organisational risk’ to potential EV governing agencies such as the MOT, NZTA 
and other government departments. 
 
5.3 Assumptions 
In the context of adopting a new technology such as converted EVs, this 
assessment is confined to the ‘current point in time’, as technology is moving fast 
in this area. There is a need to keep the risk profile up to date as new information 
becomes available. Risk management is an iterative process which includes 
monitoring review and continual improvement of the framework. With this 
project it is not possible to achieve an iterative approach as given in AS/NZS ISO 
31000 due to research constraints. In order to achieve a fair assessment of the 
likelihood of a risk event therefore, it is assumed that large numbers of converted 
vehicles (>10,000) will be in use on NZ roads. This is necessary as the number of 
converted EVs in NZ is currently so small that risk event likelihoods are 
negligible. 
 45 
As information on the risk profile of new products is not freely available due to 
commercial confidentiality of test data, the following risk assessment provides an 
educated guess of the risk of EV technology.  This assessment will change once 
the product is used publicly and risk data is collected and analysed. 
 
5.4 Methodology 
Figure 5.1 shows the risk management process. This project will limit the scope to 
the highlighted area, risk assessment (5.4). 
 
Figure 5.1 The risk management process. From AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 Risk 
Management. 
 
Firstly, safety risks of EVs will be identified. It is important to be exhaustive with 
this step as any risks not identified at this stage will not be able to be included in 
the risk analysis. In the following analysis values expressing the results of an 
engineering assessment of risk are far from firm. By analysing and calculating the 
risks in this manner however, they can at least be better understood and focus 
attention on the most important matters. Ashtiani (2007) defines the hazard risk of 
an event as follows: 
HRN = L  S 
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Where HRN is the Hazard Risk Number, S is the Severity or consequences and, L 
is the Likelihood of occurrence of a risk event. The severity and likelihood levels 
used are chosen from the Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below: 
 
S Description Criteria for Severity Classification and Effects 
0 No effect No effect, No loss of functionality 
1 Reversible Loss  of Function No defect; no leakage; no venting, fire, or flame; no 
rupture; no explosion; no exothermic reaction or 
thermal runaway. Temporary loss of battery or 
vehicle functionality. Resetting of protective device 
needed. 
2 Irreversible Defect/Damage No leakage; no venting, fire, or flame; no rupture; no 
explosion; no exothermic reaction or thermal 
runaway. Vehicle or battery irreversibly damaged. 
Repair needed. No injury. 
3 Leakage  Δ mass < 50% No venting, fire, or flame; no rupture; no explosion. 
Weight loss <50% of electrolyte weight. Light smoke 
(electrolyte = solvent + salt). 
4 Leakage  Δ mass >= 50% Venting; No fire or flame; no rupture; no explosion. 
Weight loss >=50% of electrolyte weight. Heavy 
smoke (electrolyte = solvent + salt). 
5 Fire or Flame 
 
No rupture; no explosion (i.e., no flying parts). 
Risk of injury or severe injury. 
6 Rupture  
Severe failure 
 
No explosion.  RESS could disintegrate but slowly 
without flying parts of high thermal or kinetic energy. 
Risk of severe injury or death 
7 Explosion  
Catastrophic failure 
 
Explosion (i.e., disintegration of the RESS with 
externally damaging thermal & kinetic forces).  
Exposure to toxic substances in excess of OSHA 
limits. Likelihood of death 
Table 5.1 Severity levels, adopted and modified from Ashtiani (2007) 
 
L Rate of occurrence Ppm (%) Description 
10 100,000 (10%)   Extremely High 
9 50,000 (5%)   Very High 
8 20,000 (2%)  High 
7 10,000 (1%)   Above Average 
6 5000 (0.5%)   Average 
5 2000 (0.2%)   Below Average 
4 1000 (0.1%)   High Low 
3 500 (0.05%)   Average Low 
2 100 (0.01%)  Low 
1 10 (0.001%)   Very Low 
Table 5.2 Likelihood levels adopted from Ashtiani (2007) 
 
Once the risks are characterised by the Hazard Risk Number (HRN) and identified 
in the risk space (a plot of L vs S shown in Figure 5.2) unacceptable risks can be 
detected and decisions made on how to control the risks. Severity and likelihood 
cut-offs can be defined as threshold limiting values to control unacceptably high 
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severity events (consequences) and unacceptably high likelihood events 
(unreliability). 
 
Figure 5.2 The risk space (Ashtiani 2007). 
 
Risk controls are assessed by putting forward a control measure and evaluating 
the impact of that control by representing it with a number in the range of [0 1] 
called the Hazard Control Number (HCN). The risk reduction is then represented 
by a modification of the HRN as follows: 
HRNc = L  S  (HCN) 
HCN values suggested by Ashtiani (2007) are given in Table 5.3 below: 
 
HCN Description 
0.9 
Modest Risk Reduction 
0.8 
0.7 
Above Average Risk Reduction 0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
Notable Risk Reduction 0.3 
0.2 
0.1 Significant Risk Reduction 
0.0 Prevention 
Table 5.3 Hazard Control Numbers 
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5.5 Evaluating the Risk Space 
In risk management it is important to begin with what is known as there is 
currently minimal data on EV accidents. For this reason, it was decided to review 
some ICE risks which have similar failure modes to the failure modes possible 
with the EV. The objective is then to compare the possible severity and likelihood 
of the EV risk event against that of the known risk data for the ICE vehicles and 
then arrive at an assessment of the HRN. 
Although a major objective is to eliminate all risk associated with vehicle use, 
some level of risk has to be accepted with the current use of petrol in vehicles. As 
a method of assessing the current risk of the use of petrol in vehicles I have used 
the vehicle fire as a risk event due to the availability of statistical data and the fact 
that during this research, similar safety issues have been identified for EV 
batteries. The risk of vehicle fire unrelated to vehicle accident is thought to be a 
function of fuel use risk and system reliability (older vehicles are over-represented 
in vehicle fires) (Garrett 1998). The likelihood of vehicle fire in NZ can be 
evaluated by using the data collected by Garrett (1998) which suggests  that in NZ 
each year, there are about 900 vehicle fires unrelated to accidents or theft. Using a 
value of 2.7 million licensed vehicles in New Zealand in 1998 the likelihood of a 
vehicle fire is 333 ppM giving an L value of approximately 2.5. The severity of 
such a fire was assessed as S = 5 giving an HRN calculated to be HRN = S L 
=12.5. This is plotted in Figure 5.3. 
Data from the Pedestrian Crash Fact Sheet (MOT 2009) and the NZ Vehicle Fleet 
Data Spreadsheet (MOT 2010) was also used to calculate the risks of pedestrian 
injury and fatality on a per vehicle basis (see Appendix 3). The results are also 
plotted in Figure 5.3 below. 
Furthermore, in July 2007 the United States Advanced Battery Consortium 
(USABC) published tables in its safety gap analysis to help EV battery 
manufacturers to better design and develop batteries for automotive propulsion 
applications. The safety requirements provide targets (limits) in terms of HRN as a 
minimum safety requirement for batteries (Ashtiani 2007). These limits have been 
also plotted in Figure 5.3 along with a hyperbolic curve representing a constant-
risk contour is defined by the hyperbola: S L = 16. Later these HRN values will 
inform the assessment of HRN values for EV risk events. 
 
 49 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
L
S
 
Figure 5.3 The risk space for vehicle risk events in NZ. 1. Pedestrian minor injury 
(HRN = 11), 2. pedestrian serious injury (HRN = 10.8) and 3. pedestrian fatal 
injury (HRN = 7) - 2008. 
5.6 Risk Analysis 
The specific risk events and controls described in the Figures that follow will be 
discussed throughout this thesis. The risk assessment is a summary of findings 
and an attempt to justify specific risk levels and control measures in the absence 
of hard data. The risk analysis was carried out using a risk control matrix which is 
presented in Appendix 3. The risks of various events in Appendix 3 was estimated 
and plotted in the risk space in Figure 5.4 below. 
Vehicle fire 
unrelated to 
accident 1998 
HRN = 12.5 Likelihood cut-off limit, LL = 8 
(Unreliable product) 
Severity cut-off limit, SL = 6 
(Unacceptable consequence) USABC battery 
unacceptable risk 
limit 
USABC battery 
risk target 
Constant risk 
curve HRN = 16 
1 
2 
3 
Cut off limit 
Key 
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Figure 5.4 Risk space for EV conversion risks. 
 
Risk controls were then applied and the risks recalculated and re-plotted in Figure 
5.5 below. For example the point 2.2 in Figure 5.5 above represents the risk of fire 
during charging which is assumed as (6 , 4.0). Appendix 3 shows the risk controls 
applied to this and an excerpt is given in the Table 5.4 below. 
 
Risk ID -  2.2 S L HRN Risk controls HCN HRNc Sc Lc 
 Fire during 
charging 
6 4.0 24 
Use correct 
charger, 
BMS over 
temp cut-off 
switch 
Use LA or 
LiFePO4 
battery 
chemistry 0.5 12 5 2.4 
Table 5.4 Excerpt from Appendix 3, Risk Control Matrix. BMS – Battery 
Management System. LA – Lead Acid. 
 
The risk controls result in a modified Severity and Likelihood, Sc and Lc (5, 2.4). 
It is this controlled risk that is plotted in Figure 5.5 below. The risk of fire during 
charging with the risk controls above in place is now HRNc = 12. The reduction in 
risk is shown by the green arrow in Figure 5.5 below. 
L 
S 
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Figure 5.5 Risk space for EV conversion risk controls. See Appendix 3 for 
details. 
 
As shown above most of the risks have been reduced to acceptable levels by the 
control measures proposed. It is interesting to note that most of the control 
measures result in a reduction in likelihood rather than a reduction in event 
severity (horizontal rather than vertical shift in risk). This means that the potential 
for high severity events still exist with EV conversions, however focus must be 
placed on reducing the likelihood. The controls must be robust and based on 
reliable measures to reduce the risk sufficiently. To achieve this robustness the 
control measures are recommended to have design characteristics such fault 
tolerance and redundancy. This design philosophy is shown by Prakash (2010) of 
Reva Electric Car where the Reva BMS has two (2) levels of protection for;  
a. over-temperature, b. over-voltage, and c. under-voltage, with further protection 
given by the power inverter as regeneration over-voltage and drive under-voltage 
protection (Figure 7.5). 
A further note on risk management and public policy is made by discussing risk 
acceptability. 
Risk reduction 
(Lessen in likelihood) 
 
Risk mitigation 
(Lessen in severity) 
 
Meaning of Arrow 
Direction 
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5.7 Risk Acceptability 
Risk quantification cannot measure ‘risk acceptability’. Decision makers must 
judge the benefits, resources and other factors such as public opinion. The 
perception of risk and the values of society must also be taken into account when 
making decisions about regulating a technological system. Griffiths (1982) argues 
that individual risk decisions are made by evaluating the following tradeoffs; 
(a) some benefit is gained by the individual at risk 
(b) everything reasonable (in whatever definition) is done to reduce it and 
(c)  the individual then judges that he has a good bargain. 
However, if some of the risks created by the individual are transferred to the 
public (as is the case with LVV EVs used on public roads) formal intervention 
may be needed if the risk can cause harm. Regulators must then make similar risk 
decisions where some judgement of 'risk acceptability' is implied by the 
legislation. These value judgements are essentially political decisions which 
cannot and must not be replaced by calculation (Griffiths 1982). Instead it is 
important to understand the issues which have particular relevance to the political 
space of converted electric vehicles in NZ. These are listed below: 
Support for Regulation 
• ICE vehicles have an established history of car development and the 
public expectation of safety is high. The development of regulation for 
EVs can help to maintain and improve public road safety with EVs as part 
of the transport system. 
• Regulation will help mitigate against poor public perception of safety in 
regard to EVs. This will make the ‘market’ for EVs stronger, and increase 
vehicle choice for consumers. 
Against Regulation 
• Too many economic implications that impose safety measures can inhibit 
the growth of EVs in NZ. The question is how can we support the 
maintenance of high safety standards without it being an hidden tax on 
new technology (Griffiths 1982)? 
• Currently there is ‘freedom’ to build EVs in NZ and use these without too 
much hindrance by regulations. During interviews it was found that the 
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EV conversion community in NZ is strongly opposed to the development 
of more LVV regulation.  
• EVs benefit the NZ transport system by reduced vehicle emissions and 
offer potential savings directly to the vehicle user (Hyder 2009). 
It would be great if NZ were to have a burgeoning EV conversion industry that 
produced safe, reliable and high performance vehicles. It should be the intention 
of future regulation to not inhibit the possibility of this happening regardless of 
how unlikely an EV industry in NZ may seem at present. 
 
5.8 EV Risk Summary 
Figure 5.5 shows that the majority of risks associated with EV conversions are 
controlled by a reduction in the likelihood of a risk event occurring. This is shown 
by the majority of the risks moving from right to left rather than from top to 
bottom. With this type of risk it is important that the control is reliable as the 
severity level is still high. This reliability can be can be increased by system 
redundancy and/or component de-rating. Yang (2010) discusses a multi level 
approach to preventing thermal runaway in EV battery systems. This will be 
discussed further in Chapter 7 which discusses batteries. 
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Chapter 6 – EV Electrical Systems 
6.1 Introduction - Vehicle Safety Design for EV Conversions 
There are many simple things that EV converters can do to increase the safety of 
the finished vehicle. Many parts of the EV conversion can follow standard 
automotive engineering practice and incorporate available guidelines such as 
LVVTA Standards and the Hobby Car Technical Manual (Johnson 2007). What 
needs to be noted however, is that some engineering issues are unique to EVs and 
need specific attention to detail to minimise risk. The three major areas of risk for 
EV conversions identified by this project are; the electrical system, the traction 
battery and the braking system which will be discussed in that order. 
You can expect EV converters to be highly innovative when designing and 
building conversions. It is not the purpose of this section to stifle innovation, but 
to put forward suggestions on the current best practice in EV safety design and to 
provide examples of how OEM EV manufacturers are solving the many new 
safety issues concerning EVs. This current Chapter will discuss EV electrical 
issues. 
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 6.2 Background of the EV Electrical System 
The following section on electrical safety for EVs takes a large portion of its 
recommendations from the EV standards such as ISO 6469. An EV electrical 
system can include a number of components that are not onboard the vehicle. 
Figure 6.1 describes the major components included in the 230 V electrical 
system in NZ. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Typical NZ residential situation showing components of the EV 
electrical system. Telecoms and smart grid communication and control systems 
are not shown. Adapted from Bossche (2003) (p. 296). 
 
The rating of EV supply equipment is thus concerned with all three parts; 
• the utility infrastructure, 
• domestic wiring and 
• the electric vehicle. 
NZ uses a 230 V Multiple Earth Neutral (MEN) electricity system where the 
neutral conductor of  the distribution system is earthed at the source of supply, at 
regular intervals throughout the system and at each electrical installation 
connected to the  system (StandardsNZ 2007). The EV traction circuit on the other 
hand uses a ‘floating’ traction circuit with a traction battery (DC), cables, motor 
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and other components isolated from the chassis of the vehicle and earth. The 
chassis is grounded during charging. The Table 6.1 below shows the system 
voltage classifications for the NZ electricity supply and the major international 
EV standards. 
Voltage class DC Systems [V] AC Systems [V] rms 
NZ Extra low voltage < 120 1 < 50 
NZ low voltage 120 < V < 1500 1 50 < V < 1000 
NZ high voltage > 1500 1 > 1500 
NZ, PSV Rule 31001 > 115 > 32 
SAE J2344 > 60 > 30 
ISO 6469 class A 0 < V ≤ 60 0 < V ≤ 25 3 
ISO 6469 class B 2 60 < V ≤ 1500 0 < V ≤ 1000 3 
FMVSS 305 > 48 
UNECE R.100 ‘High voltage’ 60 < V < 1500 30 < V < 1000 
NCOP 14 (2011) HazV > 60 > 25 
Table 6.1 Voltage classes of electric circuits. 
1 Ripple free DC 
2 Taking into account humid weather conditions 
3 ≤ 10 % ripple voltage (rms) 
 
This Table shows that the NZ regulations have good consistency with the EV 
standards except for in the low voltage DC area. EV traction motors typically 
require 300 V or higher to provide sufficient motive force as required in full 
hybrids, EVs, and PHEVs (Pistoia 2010). Appendix 5 gives some traction system 
voltages for vehicles that are commercially available. The 2010 Toyota Camry 
Hybrid has a 650 V three phase traction circuit supplying the motor. Most EV 
conversions however, do not currently reach that voltage level with 60 – 144 volts 
being typical. With a large number of EV conversions below 120 V DC, the 
traction system then does not need to have an EWOF. Higher voltages are 
beneficial as less current is required and thus smaller cables can be employed and 
reduced battery charging time is needed. Doubling the voltage will reduce the 
current by half and thus reduce the effective size and weight of the wiring 
installed (Pistoia 2010). We would expect EV conversion voltages to increase as 
EV conversions become more sophisticated/performance orientated. 
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The question of demarcation between brushless DC, which employs a series of 
pulses to the motor and AC which employs a waveform is answered by ISO6469-
3 (2001). ISO6469-3 (2001) gives a definition; for non AC but repetitive pulse 
voltages if the peak duration is above 10 ms, the considered working voltage is 
then the max peak value. If the peak duration is less than 10 ms, the working 
voltage is then the RMS value (ie AC) (ISO6469-3 2001). Brushless DC motors 
can thus be regarded as ‘switched DC’ and not AC if they fall into the above 
definition. 
Figure 6.2 shows a typical schematic of an EV traction and charging circuit. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 An example of a typical EV electrical circuit schematic. 
 
6.3 EV Electrical Safety Hazards 
EVs contain potentially hazardous levels of electrical voltage and current. It is 
important to protect people from exposure to uncontrolled releases of energy in 
normal and abnormal operating conditions. Electrical isolation is achieved 
through physical separation however, certain abnormal events such as impact, 
maintenance or wear can occur and lead to a degradation or failure of this 
isolation. If or when electrical components fail it is essential that they fail in a safe 
manner. ‘Fail to safe’ design should be considered. Both the ISO and SAE 
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standards have the requirement that a single-point failure of hardware, software or 
trained personnel to follow instructions should not result in an unreasonable safety 
risk (ISO6469-2 2009; SAE 2010). 
The electrical hazard presented by the EV traction system is unique due to the 
battery size and the fact that you cannot turn a battery off. It is also not possible to 
ascertain the battery state from its external appearance without using measurement 
equipment. As EV traction batteries store a large amount of energy and are a low 
impedance energy source, a large energy release should be expected when short 
circuited. Even after disconnection of the battery the High Voltage (HV) hazard 
persists as lethal levels of electric energy are still present in the battery pack, and 
could also persist for some time within EV components due to capacitance. It is of 
utmost importance that an EV battery pack be treated with the same caution and 
respect as a full gasoline fuel tank in an internal combustion vehicle (Dhameja 
2002). The design and management of the HV and high current traction system 
for EVs thus requires careful consideration. 
The EV electrical system presents three major safety hazards for people (Pistoia 
2010); 
1. electrocution, 
2. arcing  resulting  in  ignition (fire) and 
3. arc-flash (burns). 
 
Electrical Safety 
The primary passive protection measures against EV electrical hazards are 
isolation and earthing. Protection against direct contact is provided by restricting 
access to live parts (this should only be possible with voluntary action) and 
protection against indirect contact is ensured by using insulation and by galvanic 
connection of exposed conductive parts (bonding or earthing). Secondary 
protection measures are provided by active devices such as a variety of automatic 
disconnects. 
 
6.4 Isolation Breakdown Hazard 
The electrical systems of EVs are exposed to large fluctuations in temperature, a 
high level of vibration and may also be exposed to a variety of conductive 
contaminants. Electrically conductive fluids may be generated within the engine 
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compartment during abnormal operation or from environmental conditions such 
as rain, snow, and salt spray. Exposed high-voltage terminals may create arcing 
and arc-flash hazards. These electrically hazardous conditions may be  
exacerbated  by  a  collision or accidental dropping of metal tools on exposed HV 
terminals or improper use of measuring instruments, such as low-cost multimeters 
resulting in arcing which can spray hot metal and cause burns and fire (Pistoia 
2010). The following sections will discuss best practice solutions to the above 
issues. 
 
6.4.1 Insulation 
Isolating the HV system is a matter of specifying the correct insulation and 
providing appropriate separation and enclosure. Figure 6.3 gives an example of 
poor practice. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 EV conversion. A series string of 7 lead acid modules of 12 V each 
giving 84 V between the front and rear terminals. This arrangement, without 
terminal insulators, could conceivably be short circuited by somebody jumping on 
the bonnet of the car. The hazardous voltage (by some definitions) is also 
accessible without the use of tools. 
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6.4.2 Requirements and Testing of Electrical Isolation 
The standards give the same requirements for HV isolation testing. ISO6469-1 
(2009) describes a detailed procedure for measuring the isolation resistance of 
both terminals of the HV battery pack. The requirement is that the isolation 
resistance shall be 100 Ω/V if not containing AC or 500 Ω/V if containing AC, 
without an additional isolation monitoring system. These minimum requirements 
are designed to limit harmful leakage currents to 10 mA DC or 2 mA AC 
respectively (SAE 2010). Isolation resistance should be measured at both the 
positive and negative HV bus. Isolation resistance measurement can be taken at 
the time of LVV certification and WOF although some training of certifiers will 
be needed. A vehicle with an isolation resistance monitoring system would not 
need to undergo this test. 
 
6.4.3 Creepage Distance 
ISO 6469-1 has requirements to deal with leakage-current hazard between 
conductive parts at different potentials due to the risk of electrolyte and dielectric 
medium spillage under normal conditions (ISO6469-1 2009). Creepage distance is 
defined as the shortest distance along a surface of a solid insulating material 
between two conductive parts. The minimum creepage distance between two of 
the two battery pack terminals shall be; 
d = 0.25U + 5   where 
d = the creepage distance measured on the tested RESS, in millimetres (mm). 
U = the maximum working voltage between the two RESS terminals, in volts (V). 
This creepage distance is also applied between any live part and the vehicle 
chassis with a reduced factor of 0.125. This requirement is easy for EV converters 
to follow and certifiers to test for and it is therefore recommended for inclusion in 
a LVV EV standard. 
 
6.5 Earthing and Bonding 
Earthing and bonding is critical for charging safety and for proper function of the 
isolation resistance monitoring system. The conductive case of the battery box 
must be earthed to the vehicle body as well as all other metal components. The 
EV charger (and thus the vehicle chassis) must be grounded through the supply 
cable during charging. If an off-board charger is used then grounding of the 
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vehicle through this must also be assured. The hazardous situation is shown in 
Figure 6.4 below: 
Figure 6.4 Hazardous situation in mode 1 charging without proper earthing or 
RCD in supply circuit (Bossche 2003). 
 
Bonding of the conductive EV components to the vehicle chassis is achieved 
though providing low resistance mechanical connections such as earth straps, 
bolting or welding. UNECE R.100  gives a requirement for the potential 
equalization resistance (continuity) between any two exposed conductive parts as 
0.1 Ω (UNECE 2009). This is in line with the requirements of the standards. 
UNECE R100 requires a measurement current of at least 0.2 A. ISO 6469 
however states that the measurement current shall be at least 25 A or 1.5 times the 
traction circuit current, but these currents are not achievable during a LVV 
certification. The ISO value is to simulate a fault current whereas the UNECE 
value simulates a leakage current (Bossche 2003). Further research is required to 
decide what is appropriate for NZ vehicles. NZ EV conversions should have the 
equalisation resistance between major conductive components and the chassis 
tested during vehicle commissioning. 
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6.6 Automatic Disconnects 
Many OEM vehicle manufacturers employ a combination of disconnect systems 
to provide redundancy for safety purposes and isolate the rest of the vehicle from 
the traction battery voltage. Dhameja (2002) states; 
“… all OEM EVs have automatic high-voltage system disconnects as a 
primary safety design feature. These automatic disconnects include a 
combination of ground fault monitoring, an inertia switch, and/or a pilot 
circuit” (p. 149). 
A number of disconnects can be used including: 
• vehicle crash sensor (inertia switch, air bag), 
• loss of isolation (ground fault), 
• HV interlock loop – access panels, service (manual) disconnects, 
connectors interlocks etc, 
• welded contactor detection, 
• rollover sensor, 
• smoke alarm, 
• immersion sensor and 
• condensation sensor. 
SAE (2010) suggest the following instances of faults which might need to be 
indicated; 
• loss of HV system isolation, 
• low battery State of Charge (SOC), 
• low oil pressure (analogous to engine oil pressure), 
• over temperature, temperature fault or temperature out of range, 
• hazardous voltage fault and 
• failure of contactor to open when commanded (welded contacts). 
It should be noted that in some situations it might be appropriate to substitute an 
interlock for a system which restrict access to non-user-serviceable functions and 
HV areas with the use of special tools coupled with appropriate labelling (SAE 
2010). 
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6.7 Manual Disconnect 
It is important that any automatic electrical safety systems be backed up by 
manual systems in case they fail to operate. As such a single pole manual 
disconnect should be located as close as possible to the electrical centre of the 
battery pack (Figure 6.5) so as to remove any voltage between the positive and 
negative battery output terminals. This requirement is one that is given in SAE 
J2344 (SAE 2010). The operation of such a device should not require a tool to 
operate, be easily accessible and labelled. A circuit breaker with a manual switch 
could perform this function. Below (Figure 6.5) is a photo of a manual disconnect 
(service plug) in a 1999 Toyota Prius. 
 
Figure 6.5 1999 Toyota Prius manual HV disconnect located in the boot of the 
vehicle. 
 
6.8 HV Isolation Fault Detection 
A HV fault detection system ensures that vehicle drivers or emergency responders 
will not be subject to a hazardous shock by the accidental loss of isolation 
between the positive or negative electric busses with respect to the vehicle frame 
or chassis (Dhameja 2002). All OEM EVs employ such a system to ensure 
electrical safety. 
Several different methods for achieving this exist; 
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• Residual Current Device (RCD) – uses a differential transformer to 
compare current flow on either side of the traction battery. Any ‘missing’ 
or ‘leaking’ current indicates the main contactor should be operated. 
• Measuring or monitoring isolation (insulation) resistance. An isolation 
resistance monitoring system periodically or continuously monitors the 
insulation resistance between live parts and the electrical chassis 
(ISO6469-1 2009). 
• Measuring or monitoring chassis voltage with respect to the bus voltage. 
The different methods will have different operating characteristics or 
susceptibility to nuisance tripping. Further research is required to understand 
which methods might be the best to be mandated for use in NZ EV conversions. 
Some vehicle controllers or Battery Management Systems (BMS) may have a 
built in HV fault detection function. 
It is reasonable that a requirement for an isolation fault detection system (also 
termed Ground Fault Interruption (GFI)) is made mandatory for EV conversions 
in NZ. As most conversions currently do not have any form of ground fault 
monitoring it would be best practice to align them with OEM vehicles which have 
these installed and with the requirement for domestic wiring to use RCDs. It is 
noted that the introduction of such a requirement would add extra cost, with a 
floating pack leakage detection for a DC system adding $500 – 600 to the cost of 
a conversion (personal communication). 
In Australia currently this is not a mandated requirement for EV conversions 
NCOP-14 (2011) states; 
“A ground fault detection circuit or device may be used to identify that 
either the battery pack positive or battery pack negative have come into 
contact with the chassis or ELV (Extra Low Voltage) part of the vehicle, 
and flag this as a fault to the driver or service technician” (NCOP14 2011) 
(p. 13). 
The standards (ISO 6469 and SAE J2344) also do not mandate an isolation 
resistance monitoring system. This situation represents a challenge to regulators 
and the EV conversion community as a high level of safety is desired but no 
precedent exists from international standards. Alternative methods to achieve HV 
isolation fault detection include the use of a pilot circuit running next to the HV 
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cable. This represents a more cost effective but less reliable solution to this issue. 
In the event that the HV cable is severed the pilot circuit is also severed signalling 
the HV contactors to automatically disconnect the HV cabling from the battery 
pack. An inertia switch also prevents HV discharge from the cables however, only 
during an accident. 
It is recommended that at least one of the above three systems be employed in any 
EV conversion in NZ. This issue would benefit from discussions between the 
regulator, the NZ EV community and the authors of NCOP14 who have recently 
reviewed this issue. 
 
6.9 HV Cable Identification, Labelling and Routing 
High voltage cables are routed between the EV battery pack,  the  electronic  
controller,  the  motor,  the  battery  charging port,  and  other  high-voltage  
components (Dhameja 2002). The HV cables should be located in areas where 
they are expected to be seen by emergency personnel. Under the floor (outside the 
passenger compartment) in the centre of the vehicle is the most common position 
for these cables and as such, if at all possible this route should be chosen. The 
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) has specified that  orange cables are the 
standard colour for HV wiring in EVs (Dhameja 2002). This seams to have been 
adopted as the global standard for both positive and negative sides of the traction 
circuit. Orange conduit should be used to further protect these cables from the 
chassis. The orange colour is important to distinguish it from the ordinary low 
voltage wiring to enable it to be identified by maintenance technicians, emergency 
services workers and automotive dismantlers. 
When choosing a HV cable suitable for an EV conversion both the voltage and 
current ratings and suitability for use need to be taken into account. Currently the 
‘rule of thumb’ that welding cable should be used for EV power transmission is 
not correct as the voltage rating of the insulation is not taken into account. 
Welders operates at low voltage and high current and so welding cable insulation 
might not have the appropriate voltage rating for use in EVs. An example is one 
converted EV surveyed during this research used extra HV sleeving on the main 
cables to account for this. Flexible cable should be chosen to avoid breakage from 
vibration and cables should also be secured at regular intervals. Two examples of 
HV cabling practice for EV conversions are shown over the page. 
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Figure 6.6 Water cooled Tritium controller installed in an EV conversion. 
 
 
Figure 6.7 Blade Electron professional EV conversion. 
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6.10 Vehicle Labelling 
Home or professional EV conversions represent a greater risk than do OEM 
manufactured EVs as they have not been through a type approval process. 
Furthermore, EV conversions are not readily identifiable by their body style or 
make and model badges and such should be subject to additional labelling 
requirements to facilitate quick identification by emergency services personal. 
Voluntary labelling is already occurring on many vehicles as EV converters add 
their own labelling as a cultural identification. This labelling is currently not 
consistent, but in future may take the form of an alternative energy ‘battery logo’ 
affixed to the front and rear of the vehicle. No international standard format has 
been identified for this label however one is suggested for use in NZ, see Figure 
6.8 below. 
 
Figure 6.8 Suggested bumper label for EV conversions. 
 
6.10.1 Component Labelling 
After identifying the vehicle as an EV, an emergency worker would expect to 
encounter HV cables and components in the area around the battery, charge point 
and motor. The labelling of the HV system should also warn of reasonably 
foreseeable hazards associated with operation, maintenance and rescue work. The 
EV standards require HV equipment to be identified and conspicuously labelled 
EV 
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using following internationally recognised symbol (ISO6469-1 2009; SAE 2010; 
NCOP14 2011); 
 
Figure 6.9 International safety symbol for ‘caution, risk of electric shock’ (at least 
40mm high). 
 
The international hazard symbols for the particular battery chemistry should also 
be clearly labelled on the battery pack and individual cells (NCOP14 2011). 
 
6.11 Environmental Protection of Electrical Equipment 
The continued safe function of an electrical system is dependent on its resistance 
to water, rain, dust and condensation. The EV safety standards have requirements 
for environmental protection. SAE (2010) requires that total or partial immersion 
(as specified by the manufacturer) should not result in hazardous electric 
potential, current, gas or liquid emissions. ISO6469-3 (2001) gives requirements 
for water protection and a detailed test procedure for class B (>60 VDC, Table 
6.1) equipment. The tests are to simulate washing, a heavy rainstorm and 
flooding. The critical areas for the washing test are the seals between two parts of 
the bodywork. Driving in flooded conditions is simulated by testing the vehicle in 
10 cm of water at 20 km/h over 500 m. The requirement is for the insulation 
resistance monitoring system to shut down the vehicle if a fault is detected. 
NCOP-14 (2011) requires all batteries to be enclosed to provide water resistance 
and exclusion of foreign objects, to a rating of at least IP2X. See Appendix 4 for 
the meaning of IP (Ingress Protection) ratings. Appendix 4 also gives examples of 
IP code allocations for different vehicle installation situations.  
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EV converters and certifiers should employ common sense solutions such as 
sealed and ventilated enclosures which have appropriate IP ratings and mount 
inverters and other HV components high in the engine bay (external areas) to 
avoid water damage. The fitting of a water or emersion sensor close to HV 
components is recommended. 
 
6.12 Contactors 
For high current applications a powered relay, or “contactor” is employed for 
switching the traction circuit. The HV contactors for an EV conversion should be 
carefully chosen as these are the primary HV controls. The contactors should be 
of the normal open type, requiring a low voltage control signal to enable current 
flow. They are designed to have minimal contact resistance and may have 
multiple current paths to reduce heating. They should have appropriate DC 
voltage and current ratings.  
For higher voltages (>250 V) it may be required to use vacuum contactors to 
control arcing. Systems using higher voltages should also employ at least 2 
contactors (one on each side of the pack) as there is a low chance of both 
contactors welding themselves in the closed position The EV electrical system 
should also be designed to monitor the contactors with respect to proper operation 
and provide a warning signal upon malfunction (welding). The main contactors 
should be positioned as close as practical to the battery pack terminals or between 
sections of the pack to ‘split’ the pack into safer voltages (SAE 2010). Cai 
(2010b) discussed the GM Chevrolet Volt PHEV, which he stated as having 7 HV 
contactors to perform various functions in the vehicle and charging systems. 
 
6.13 Traction System Circuit Protection; Fusing and Electrical 
Discrimination 
Components for EV traction systems should be properly rated. Pistoia (2010) 
states; “…for example, a traction power inverter should have a voltage rating of 
150% of the bus voltage” (p. 508). The traction circuit bus should be rated to 
handle the battery short-circuit currents which will be at their highest when the 
battery pack is new. However (Korinek 2003) explains; 
 “Accurate battery short circuit current and resistance values are required 
to properly size and select the proper circuit protection device. Estimated 
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short circuit values can vary widely depending upon the test method and 
measurement technique. Multi-stepped discharge methods that use a large 
span in current and voltage provide the best accuracy in estimating battery 
short circuit current and resistance. Equipment that directly measures a 
battery’s resistive properties can provide a reasonable alternative to 
discharge tests, with the use of correction factors” (p 7).  
The battery manufacturers data on battery short circuit current should be used 
wherever possible. Fuses and circuit breakers are for excessive current protection 
of the circuit and should not be used as personnel protection devices as they are 
not sensitive enough (SAE 2010). Ground fault leakage detection or RCDs are 
used for this purpose. The principals of electrical discrimination should be used 
for coordination between the operating characteristics of two or more protective 
devices. Separate fusing of traction and charging circuits should be undertaken 
and High Rupture Capacity (HRC) type fuses should be utilised (NCOP-14 
(2011). A simplified representation of the rating of circuit protection components 
is shown below; 
 
Figure 6.10 Rating of circuit components. 
 
The various levels of protection circuit components should be chosen such that 
they have different failure modes and that the ratings do not overlap. This ensures 
an event which causes one set of components to fail does not propagate to form a 
cascading event and cause the remaining components to fail. A systematic design 
approach which includes the use of failure modes and effects analysis, fault tree 
analysis, and other methods can be used for circuit protection design (Pistoia 
2010). 
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6.14 Electrical Design for Impact and Crashworthiness 
EV converters should use flexible conduit to prevent piercing or cutting of HV 
cables. The routing of high current cables under the vehicle floor should be 
considered to protect the cables from impact. Metal enclosures should be designed 
not to pierce the conduit in case of impact. The battery pack main terminals can 
also be located as far away as possible from each other in order to minimise the 
chance of contact during a crush event. 
ICE vehicle manufacturers use inertia switches to de-energise electric fuel pumps 
in the event of a crash. Inertia switches should therefore also be a mandated 
requirement for EV conversions and be located in the front of the vehicle where 
the highest decelerations occur during frontal impact. Some OEM vehicles use the 
airbag sensor for this purpose. 
 
6.15 EV Charging Electrical Safety 
The battery aspects of charging safety are discussed in Section 7.8 with the 
electrical safety aspects discussed here. 
A typical EV charger consists of a number of electrical components; 
1. a charging controller with ground fault interruption, 
2. contactor/s, 
3. a connector such as an SAE 1772, 
4. a fuse (current overload). 
The connection of the vehicle to the utility network is covered by the electrical 
standards such as those published by the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC).  Charging requirements thus, do not appear in the EV vehicle 
standards. UNECE R.100 however states some requirements about the connection 
of the vehicle to the mains network (Bossche 2003); 
• The vehicle shall not be capable to move by its own means when 
connected to the network or to off-board charger. This corresponds to the 
“drive train interlock” specified in the IEC standard (IEC 61851). 
• The components used when charging the battery from an external power 
source shall allow the charging current to be cut in case of disconnection 
without physical damage. 
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• The coupling parts likely to be live shall be protected against any direct 
contact in all operating conditions. On  this  subject,  the  IEC  standard 
requires  specific  IP  protection  measures:  IP55  in  road  position;  IP44  
when charging, also for the connector and the socket-outlet when not in 
use (see Appendix 5 for IP ratings). 
• All  exposed  conductive  parts  shall  be  linked  through  a  conducting  
wire plugged to earth when charging. This is also specified in the IEC 
standard. (Bossche 2003) (p. 327). 
The first requirement above is for a charger interlock. A park brake and starting 
interlock for charging might be the simplest way to achieve this. The next two 
points concern the ratings of the connector, the IP 44 rating allows the vehicle to 
be charged outside. As part of the certification process this could be reduced if a 
restriction of ‘garage charging only’ is imposed. 
The final point requires earthing of the vehicle chassis during charging to avoid 
the hazardous situation shown in Figure 6.4 above. A further level of safety is 
gained by adding an extra low voltage conductor in charge cable to form a pilot 
circuit. As Bossche (2003) explains; 
“This infrastructure involved a dedicated socket-outlet, fitted with a 30 
mA RCD and with an earth loop monitor which continuously controlled 
the integrity of the earthing circuit through injecting a small current in the 
“pilot” conductor, which returned through the protective earth conductor. 
If this loop was interrupted, the main contactor would open, cutting off the 
supply.” 
The main functions of the pilot circuit are; 
• verification of proper vehicle connection and 
• verification of equipment ground 
UL2231 - Personnel Protection Systems for Electric Vehicle (EV) Supply Circuits 
covers ground fault protection requirements for charging circuits described as a 
Charging Circuit Interrupt Device (CCID). Communication of battery state and 
cooling ventilation requirements can also be made via the pilot wire. When the 
vehicle is plugged-in the HV connection is made first, then the pilot connection. 
Contactors are then switched to start the charging process. This requirement is 
mandatory for many charging standards such as SAE J1772 for modes 2, 3 and 4 
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charging. Professionally built EV conversions would be expected to employ such 
a system. This is not a requirement for low current systems (mode 1 charging). 
 
6.16 Choice of System AC vs DC 
Power electronic components can fail and possibly fail closed, allowing current to 
continue to flow. A hard short in a DC brushed motor controller can result in an 
uncontrolled motor at full power. Brushless DC and AC induction motors need 
active switching to control motor speed and as such any failure of the controller 
components will cause the vehicle to stop. Certain controller/motor configurations 
can also cause wheel lock under failure conditions. These safety aspects should be 
considered and as a design guide, a single point failure in the controller 
components should not result in a safety risk. 
 
6.17 Safety during Vehicle Operation and Maintenance 
6.17.1 User Information 
SAE (2010) and ISO6469-2 (2009) both have requirements for an EV 
manufacturer to provide an; 
• owners manual (including charging procedures), 
• emergency response information and 
• a service manual. 
Toyota also publishes hybrid vehicle dismantling manuals for its vehicles. For EV 
conversions, especially those sold on the open market, this information needs to 
be available. For the home builder, providing this documentation will be 
prohibitive and so on-vehicle labelling might be more appropriate. An EV 
advocacy group could publish a set of ‘standard documentation’ for converted 
EVs. 
6.17.2 Functional Safety 
It is essential that a vehicle is able to be used a in a safe manner, even when it is 
used by someone for the first time. The control layouts and switching functions 
should follow the many well established automotive conventions. The EV 
standards establish their own principals where these cannot be borrowed from ICE 
vehicle standards. ISO6469-2 (2009) gives requirements for starting the vehicle - 
the power on function must use two deliberate and distinct actions and it shall be 
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indicated (continuously or temporarily) that that the propulsion system is ready 
for driving. A charging interlock is a common requirement discussed above. 
Reversing or driving backwards also requires two separate actions. If only one 
control action is used to change the vehicle direction then a safety device must be 
fitted to only allow a direction transition when the vehicle is stationary or moving 
slowly. If a standard gearbox is used then the ICE vehicle standards shall apply. 
ISO6469-2 (2009) gives requirements for parking and it should be indicated 
whether the vehicle is drive enabled or not. SAE (2010) gives some guidelines for 
preventing vehicle rollaway due to the lower resistance of the electric motor. 
Equipping the vehicle with a SOC gauge is a necessary safety requirement as it is 
hazardous to have the vehicle stranded on the side of the road. Vehicle safety 
systems such as headlights need to have priority over energy use. NCOP-14 
(2011) has a detailed clause on this issue; 
“An independent auxiliary ELV (nominally 12V) must be used to 
guarantee the supply of power to safety  equipment  such  as  lights,  brake  
boosters  and  windscreen  wipers  in  the  event  of  a shutdown  of  the 
main  battery system  in  the  vehicle.   (Typically this power supply is a  
12V battery). The auxiliary supply must be capable of operating the hazard 
lights (four-way flashers) at normal duty cycle, for a minimum period of 
20 continuous minutes. If the auxiliary supply is charged via a DC/DC 
converter from the main traction battery pack, then it must be supplied in 
preference to the traction circuit” (p. 17). 
Readily identifiable indicators should be used such as those from ISO 2575: 2004 
or those published by the Japanese Electric Vehicle Association (JEVA) shown in 
Figure 6.11 below. 
 
Figure 6.11 JEVS Z804 Electric Vehicles - Symbols for controls, indicators and 
telltales. (Bossche 2003) (p. 311). 
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The majority of the above requirements are easily included in EV conversion 
designs and should be included as part of an EV standard. 
 
6.18 EV Electrical Safety Summary 
Electrical safety of the EV HV traction system is an important aspect of EV 
design and thus should be a major focus of an EV conversion standard. The 
current regulations however sit in the area of electricity regulations rather than 
transport regulation. Safety principals for EV electrical systems are well 
established in international EV standards and general electrical standards and as 
such should be included in an EV conversion standard for NZ. A high standard of 
workmanship is expected securing of cabling keeping cables away from sharp 
edges and protecting cables under the vehicle against damage. 
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Chapter 7 - EV Battery Safety 
     4 
7.1 Introduction 
The battery is the cornerstone of modern EV technology. Advancements in battery 
technology have been a major driver for the development of EV technology as 
vehicle performance has improved. This chapter will discuss the safety aspects of 
current EV battery systems. The focus will be on a systematic building of design 
methods for the safe installation and use of traction batteries for EV conversions. 
A detailed discussion of the chemistry of various cells is outside the scope of this 
thesis (much of this information can also be proprietary) however, the safety 
related nature of various cell chemistries is discussed with a particular focus on 
Lithium Ion (Li-ion) cells as these are becoming the cell of choice for EV 
conversions. 
 
7.1.1 The Function and Operating Characteristics of EV Batteries 
The primary function of the EV battery is to store electrical energy for the 
operation of the vehicles traction system. The operation of an EV is similar to that 
of an ICE vehicle however in a pure BEV the vehicle must operate with the 
battery SOC in mind. This is similar to the ICE vehicle in that it needs to be 
periodically refuelled. The main difference is the limited energy storage capacity 
(which manifests itself in reduced vehicle range) and recharge time. The functions 
of the EV battery include; 
• an acceptable recharge time (power acceptance), 
• sufficient energy capacity (energy acceptance) typically 10 - 60 kWh, 
• good discharge energy (deep discharge), 
• a high cycle life, 
• acceptable discharge power, 
• high manufacturing tolerance for series applications, 
• a high reliability, 
• communication capability with controlling equipment and user interfaces, 
• an appropriate pack voltage (60 – 400 V), 
• discharge current up to C rate continuous and 3 C peak and 
                                                 
4  Battery warning symbol ISO 2575:2004 
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•  reliable safety  systems (Battery Management System (BMS) and thermal 
management) 
The battery must perform these functions efficiently and safely. As stated by 
battery manufacturer Boston Power; “Safety is the most important criterion for 
electric car batteries” (Warner 2010). 
 
7.1.2 The Cell, Module, Pack and Battery System; Some Definitions 
An EV battery pack is built up of electrochemical units or cells. The cell is the 
basic building block from which the pack is made up, it has a fundamental 
electrochemical voltage which may or may not be suited to the application. To 
make a practical battery a set of cells is put together to form a ‘module’. The cells 
are assembled in series and/or parallel and packaged in the form of a module. The 
standard automotive Lead Acid (LA) starter battery for example, is a set of six 2V 
cells connected in series to form a 12V module (Rand 2001). A ‘battery pack’ is 
made up of a number of modules connected in a sometimes complex array of 
series and/or parallel connections to form a pack which has the desired voltage, 
energy capacity and power capacity. This battery pack is part of the vehicles 
‘battery system’. The SAE describes an EV battery system as follows;  
“A battery system is a completely functional energy storage system 
consisting of the pack(s) and necessary ancillary subsystems for physical 
support and enclosure, thermal management, and electronic control". 
The battery system can include components from outside the vehicle such as an 
off-board charger or the charge control system used by a ‘smart grid’ utility 
operator. The use of the terms cell, module, battery, pack and battery system are 
used interchangeably in this thesis however, in some contexts the particular 
definition can be important. The acronym RESS (Rechargeable Energy Storage 
System) is used by many of the standards to describe the battery system. 
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7.1.3 Current Battery Chemistries for EVs 
In the introductory Chapter Figure 1.6 (Giebel 2010) gives an overview of various 
electrochemical battery technologies and their application to EVs. The three main 
practical chemistries for EV batteries are; Lead Acid (LA), Nickel Metal Hydride 
(NiMH) and Lithium based chemistries. As (Pistoia 2010) explains;  
“Traditional lead-acid (LA) batteries were replaced by nickel-metal-
hydride cells in commercial hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs), while  
lithium-ion (Li-ion) cell formulations have found favor in pure battery  
electric vehicles (BEVs) and the next generation of plug-in hybrid vehicles 
(PHEVs)” (p. 494). 
There are many battery chemistries that may be considered for EVs however, 
apart from the ones listed above they remain experimental and are generally not 
available to EV converters. Any chemistry outside the above three is not assessed 
by this thesis and include Nickel Cadmium (Ni Cad), Vanadium Redox, Sodium 
Nickel Chloride, Nickel Zinc batteries and Ultra Capacitors. The application of 
these other types of battery, or any battery for that matter to an EV conversion 
should be done with specialist knowledge of the safety risks of the particular 
battery chemistry and characteristics. 
Although LA continues to be the major cell type used for EV conversions, this 
situation is rapidly changing as EV converters are learn about the performance 
benefits of Li-ion cells as these cells become more available. LA cell technology 
is dominant in industrial vehicle applications and e-bikes and will continue to be 
important for low cost EV conversions. Some EVs that have spent time on the 
road using LA cells are also commonly upgraded to Li-ion cells after the LA cells 
have degraded. Many new EVs available from OEM manufacturers are such as 
the Mitsubishi iMEV, the Nissan Leaf, Cheverolet Volt and the Tesla Roadster 
use Li-ion cells. Professional conversions such as the Hyundai/Blade Electron 
also use Li-ion cells as these vehicles tend to offer higher range and power 
performance.  
It is expected that the use of Li-ion batteries will become the dominant technology 
for home and professional EV converters as the cost of these cells decrease and 
the availability increases. Other cell chemistries viable for EV use will also 
emerge in the medium to long term as this is an area of active research and 
investment. 
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This chapter will discuss in general terms the relative safety of these battery types, 
focussing on the safety requirements of Li based chemistries as these have 
performance improvements and are expected to become market dominant over LA 
chemistries. LA batteries have a proven safety profile in EVs and industrial 
vehicles and the engineering requirements are well understood. NiMH batteries 
are limited to the HEV application as these packs are engineered to be power 
optimised rather than the energy optimised designs used for BEV applications. 
Ramaraju Prakash (2010) discuses the switch from LA to a Li-ion chemistry for 
the EV manufacturer Reva Electric Vehicle. He states that; “All roads lead to 
Lithium Ion… But Li-ion does not come easy” (Prakash 2010). Many safety 
issues exist with Li-ion batteries. This chapter will show the risks of using this 
type of battery and discuss methods by which this risk can be reduced. 
 
7.2 Lithium Battery Risks 
Whilst evidence of poor Li-ion battery safety in EVs or EV conversions is non-
existent due to the small number of EVs in NZ and across the world, evidence is 
available from other uses of Li-ion batteries. Li-ion batteries are commonly used 
in portable devices such as laptop computers, cell phones and power tools. One 
NZ example of a Lithium Polymer (LiPo) battery failure is a fire which consumed 
part of a workshop and resulted in the NZ Fire Service issuing a fire safety 
warning, see; 
http://www.fire.org.nz/Fire-Safety/Research Investigation/Pages/Warnings.aspx)5 
On the NZ Fire Safety Website they have also included a video link which details 
tests performed by an electrical engineer and fire safety officer. These tests show 
a damaged battery exploding with temperatures exceeding 1000°C highlighting 
the fire dangers of improper charging of damaged batteries and to damaged 
batteries in general. 
Upon viewing this footage it is easy to imagine the potential risk of a fire 
involving an EV battery pack as it would be approximately 400 times larger. The 
severity of such an event is further increased by the fact that an EV fire has a high 
chance of occurring during overnight charging and is likely to take place in an 
                                                 
5 A full report of the investigation is also available from TVNZ (2010). 
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attached residential garage which could pose a serious threat to property and 
people if not contained safely. 
Portable devices do not generally have a battery energy capacity greater than 60 
Wh compared to a medium sized BEV pack of 24 kWh (some vehicle pack 
capacities are given in Appendix 5 for comparison).  
The ignition of laptop computer batteries is another well known example of 
lithium battery fires. World wide incidence of this type of failure have resulted in 
the NZ Fire Service issuing three Fire Related Product Recall Notifications since 
2007 relating to laptop batteries and one for a Li-ion wireless headset battery. All 
these recalls relate to battery overheating, which could pose a risk of fire. 
Worldwide more than 2 million products containing Li-ion batteries have been 
recalled since 2006 (Pistoia 2010) (Table 18.1). 
 
Tabaddor (2010) gives the Li-ion battery safety challenges as fire/explosion of the 
cell/pack caused by; 
1. Electrical Hazards – e.g. external short-circuit, overcharge, over-discharge, 
cell imbalance. A cell manufacturing problem could also cause an internal 
short due to contaminant from process or defect with cell assembly. 
2. Mechanical Hazards – e.g. shock, drop, crush, nail intrusion, vibration, 
mechanical abuse/crash leading to cell damage. 
3. Thermal Hazards- e.g. overheating, thermal cycling. 
4. Insufficient or lack of quality control measurements – complicated by 
global supply base of raw materials and battery pack components. 
These safety issues must be addressed during all stages of the battery life cycle as 
well as the anticipated abuse of the battery as described in Figure 7.1; 
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Figure 7.1 “Undesirable behaviours” of EV batteries. Adapted from (Comsol 
2010)  
 
Two forms of stored energy are important when it comes to Li-ion battery safety; 
1. the electrical energy of a fully charged battery and, 2. the chemical energy 
released during a fire of the lithium based cathode materials and flammable 
electrolyte (Pistoia 2010). Lithium is a highly reactive light metal that will react 
with atmospheric oxygen and water, has a density of 0.5 kg/m3 and a melting 
point of 180°C. Later it will be shown that the electrical energy that can be 
released during discharge, charge or short circuit (external or internal) can result 
in heating of the battery.  
The second form of energy release happens when the cell or battery reaches a 
higher temperature and the lithium cathode material and electrolyte becomes 
active in combustion, the reactions being either fed by reactants from the battery 
chemistry or from an external source. Local combustion of lithium at the cell level 
will quickly lead to thermal runaway and propagation of the fire or explosion 
throughout the pack. This situation is illustrated by a heating test on a Li-ion 
battery carried out to UL-1642 Lithium Batteries. During this test the cell is 
heated to and held at 150°C. The results are discussed by Pistoia (2010) and 
shown in Figure 7.2.  
“During the test performed, exothermic reactions within the cell caused its 
temperature to increase above the ambient temperature eventually 
resulting in the cell going into thermal runaway, venting and ejecting its 
internal contents” (p. 469). 
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Figure 7.2 Cell surface temperature during heating test based on the UL1642 
heating test (Pistoia 2010). 
 
The critical links in this chain of events are described by Yang (2007) as 1. a 
heating source (either internal or external to the cell) leading to temperature rise 
and 2. a thermally unstable cathode material. A Figure from Yang (2007) is 
reproduced below to illustrate this; 
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Figure 7.3 “What safety issue come from?” Adapted from Yang (2007). 
 
Most cell failures, followed by thermal runaway are a result of a cell internal fault 
caused by the stressing factors listed in Figure 7.3 (Pistoia 2010). The chemical 
processes involved in these cell failure modes are summarised by Pistoia (2010).  
An example is given to illustrate the heating and thermal runaway of battery if the 
battery pack is short circuited. It is assumed that the pack heats in an adiabatic 
condition (very quickly so as to heat without heat transfer to it surroundings). The 
electrical energy stored in the battery pack is converted to thermal energy 
controlled by the batteries internal resistance. It is assumed that ambient 
temperature is 20 °C and that thermal runway starts at 100 °C. 
Li-ion Pack Specifications: 
• Pack configuration; 88S1P (88 Series 1 Parallel) 
• Pack weight 160 kg 
• Voltage 360V 
• Heat capacity Cp Range  = 1000 – 4000 J/kg/K 
• The cell internal resistance is assumed as 1.0 mΩ. 
Placing the cells in series gives a pack internal resistance of 88(1.0) = 88 mΩ. The 
short circuited pack at will draw 360/0.88 = 409 A at a power of 147 kW. The 
energy it takes to heat the battery to 100 °C can be estimated from; 
Q = m Cp ΔT = (160)1000(80) = 12800 kJ  
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At a heating power of 147 kJ/s [kW] this gives 12800/147 = 87 seconds to heat 
the pack. 
This rough calculation shows that after during hard short circuit an EV battery 
pack could reach uncontrollable thermal runaway in approximately 1.5 – 6 
minutes. It should be noted that the cell internal resistance will also decrease with 
increasing temperature and with the development of internal short circuits during 
the cells destruction. 
The engineering effort expended on Li-ion cell level safety must be focused on 
eliminating or controlling the sources of battery heating or damage and choosing a 
cathode that is chemically stable, so the risk of a thermal runaway is reduced or 
eliminated. The implications of these findings and practical application of design 
methods are discussed in the Sections below. 
 
7.3 Standards for EV Batteries 
The international standards for EV batteries are very much still under 
development with most of the major standards organisations in both the electrical 
and automotive fields having standards under development. Whilst the battery 
standards for consumer electronics are maturing  Pistoia (2010) describes the EV 
situation as follows; 
“…limited field experience and architectures which are still works in 
progress make it challenging to define an all encompassing standard that 
can provide an effective, one-size-fits-all baseline for abuse and safety 
characterization testing of these battery systems” (p. 479). 
Tabaddor (2010) from Underwriters Laboratories gives an overview of selected 
EV battery standards which has been adapted, expanded and presented in 
Appendix 6. The major standard for Li-ion batteries currently in use are the UN 
transport regulations UN - 3090 for the shipment of lithium cells and batteries in 
bulk (as Class 9 dangerous goods). This standard seems to have been globally 
adopted and was developed after a number of uncontrollable lithium battery fires 
during transport and mishandling of battery shipments during the last decade. The 
standard is based on a series of eight abuse tests described in UN (2003) in section 
38.3. A brief description of the tests is as follows; 
• T1. Altitude Simulation (11.6 kPa for air transport) 
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• T2. Thermal Test (75 + 2 °C for six hours) 
• T3. Vibration (8 g at 200 Hz) 
• T4. Shock (50 g) 
• T5. External Short Circuit (0.1 Ω at 55 °C) 
• T6. Impact (drop 9.1 kg from 60 cm) 
• T7. Overcharge (voltage twice recommended) 
• T8. Forced Discharge (at maximum discharge current) 
Cells used in EV conversions in NZ shall comply with this standard before they 
enter the NZ market, let alone used in an EV. The standards which are detailed in 
Appendix 6 are vehicle based or describe a standardised testing procedure which 
may or may not have pass/fail criteria. Although they have not been reviewed, 
they have been provided for completeness and to inform further research. All 
standards for Li based batteries are based on testing and so cannot be applied by 
the home EV converter. This area is very much still in development and it remains 
to be seen which standards will be globally dominant. The battery safety 
requirements of EV vehicle standards such as ISO 6469, are focused on system 
level safety and have been discussed above. 
EV batteries which are tested at the cell or module level will also be tested at the 
vehicle level, as EV products that are manufactured by the major auto makers are 
rigorously tested before they enter the market. The introduction of EV technology 
represents a major product liability risk for car companies. These testing programs 
will as such always exceed the requirements of the standards set out for this 
purpose. Vehicle manufacturers battery/vehicle testing will involve crash testing 
(with battery focus), hot weather, cold weather, corrosion, water trough, pothole, 
dust incursion and battery vibration6. As this type of testing is outside of what 
even a professional EV converter can afford, careful and conservative design of 
the battery system must be undertaken. 
 
                                                 
6 Video showing some of the tests being carried out on the Chevrolet Volt are available at 
http://gmtv.feedroom.com/ 
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7.4 Battery System Design Process 
The development of EVs presents a unique situation to vehicle and battery 
manufacturers as they have to work together to develop the vehicle system as a 
product. Many automakers are investing in joint ventures with battery suppliers 
for this purpose. The finished vehicle is a collaboration. Similar collaborations 
have been identified as being required between regulatory bodies this was 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
Many OEM EV manufacturers describe the design of the battery system for a 
vehicle application as taking a multi layered approach. This is best described in 
Figure 7.4 below;  
 
Figure 7.4 Battery system multilayer (onion) design approach from the battery 
manufacturer Boston Power perspective (Warner 2010). 
 
The same design approach is also given by (Prakash 2010), (Yang 2010) and 
(Zhang 2010a). (Prakash 2010) gives a detailed technical overview of the REVAi 
EV battery pack design approach, which is shown below; 
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Figure 7.5 Reva EV battery design, showing multilayered (onion) approach.  
 
Yang (2010) describes how thermal runaway can be prevented at the cell, pack 
and system level. This design philosophy shows many layers of protection with 
redundancy built into overvoltage, undervoltage and over temperature systems. 
This architecture is consistent with the findings of the risk analysis given in 
Chapter 5 whereby high severity levels are controlled by reductions in likelihood. 
It was found that the likelihood control measures must be reliable to be effective 
in reducing overall risk. The multi layered approach allows the design of a system 
with the use of redundancy to achieve reliability. Pistoia (2010) discusses the 
identification of battery systems design defects and gives some examples of good 
design: 
• The cell protection devices should be appropriately rated  to  handle  the  
open  circuit  voltages 
•  The various levels of protection circuit components should be chosen 
such that they have different failure modes. 
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• The operating parameters of the various protection levels should be such 
that they do not overlap. 
A  systematic  approach  which  includes  the  use  of fault testing, failure  modes  
and  effects analysis, fault tree analysis, and other methods can be used to detect 
design flaws in the battery system Pistoia (2010). 
It is recommended that EV converters use a multilayered approach when 
designing the safety systems for Li-ion battery systems. This gives an overview of 
the battery system design, in the subsequent sections the discussion will focus on 
each level of the battery system and the protections that might be employed. 
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7.5 Lithium Ion Cell Selection 
Li-ion batteries suitable for EV applications are available from many different 
suppliers. China alone has 100 Li-ion cell manufacturers, 30 of which state that 
they are able to supply cells or modules for EVs (Giebel 2010). A major market 
for Li-ion batteries is currently for use in computers, powertools and in E-bike or 
E-scooters. These batteries may or may not be suitable for use as part of a large 
series string in an EV battery pack. In purchasing batteries for an EV conversion 
one must be mindful that there is no agreed understanding or applicability of the 
terms safety, quality and reliability and as such these terms can be freely 
interpreted by battery manufacturers. As these are relative term a more objective 
assessment should be made using methods outlined in this chapter.  
One method commonly used as a decision tool to select a suitable cell is to rank 
and compare 3 or more battery attributes on a radar chart as shown in Figure 7.6 
below. An ideal candidate cell would rank highly in all attributes however this 
method is useful in arriving at a compromise when weighing up conflicting 
attributes. 
 
Figure 7.6 Radar chart comparing the attributes of two different cell types as used 
by (Giebel 2010; Warner 2010; Yang 2010; Zhang 2010b). 
 
The above figure shows Cell A as a cost effective, high performance cell that 
ranks low in safety. Cell B has a good safety profile whilst compromising on 
performance and cost. A cell with a lower safety profile will need extra levels of 
protection which would also increase the cost. 
Power 
Safety 
Cost 
Reliability 
Service life 
Cycle life 
Durability 
Cell B 
Cell A Energy 
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The level of safety of a Li-ion cell is controlled by the following factors; 
1. a stable cathode material, 
2. special separator & electrolyte design, 
3. the presents of a cell Current Interrupt Device (CID), 
4. the presents of a Positive Temperature Coefficient (PTC) Resistor, 
5. the presents of a safety vent to relive internal pressure, and 
6. high cell quality and manufacturing tolerance resulting in the elimination 
of internal short circuits. Internal short circuits are a common and 
dominant failure mode for Li-ion cells. 
These safety mechanisms are often referred to as passive or internal safety 
features as they are inherent in the cell design. The availability of these safety 
features should influence the selection of the cell by the home EV converter. 
A knowledge of the thermal stability of the battery chemistry is important in 
assessing the safety of the battery and in the design of the protection systems that 
ensure the safe operation of the battery system. Thermal stability is measured 
experimentally by using a Differential Scanning Calorimeter (DSC) to measure 
the heat flow [W/g] of a material whilst it is being heated over a temperature 
range. Heat flow measurements of the battery are taken in the fully charged 
condition. These measurements give plots as shown in Figure 7.7 below; 
 
Figure 7.7 The Thermal Stability of Charged Cathode Materials. Adapted from 
(Yang 2007). 
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From Figure 7.7 it can be seen that the phosphate materials (Lithium Iron 
Phosphate (LiFePO4) in particular) have a much lower peak and overall heat flow. 
(Yang 2010) describes that the lithium iron phosphate materials are very stable 
chemically, as the FePO4 is a stable chemical agent due to the very strong P-O 
chemical bond which results in no active Oxygen release even at temperatures of 
500°C. This ‘locking effect’ means that the oxygen is unavailable for reaction 
with the Lithium. Mn and Co oxide cell chemistries evolve free oxygen upon 
heating which results in a thermal runaway reaction releasing large amounts of 
heat. The charge, discharge and thermal controls around these cell chemistries 
must be much more rigorous to achieve the same risk level as a LiFePO4 cell. This 
point is reinforced by showing another set of test results given in Figure 7.8. 
 
Figure 7.8 HEV safety. Heating test results (Li 2010). 
 
The thermal runaway propagation reaction after explosion or fire is extremely 
dangerous as a failure in one cell will propagate to the rest of the battery pack. 
LiFePO4 cells which display no thermal runaway represent a good solution for the 
home EV converter, in terms of a safety and performance compromise. It is 
recommended that the use of other cell chemistries especially those of metal oxide 
type cathode be done with extreme caution and with full knowledge of the risks 
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involved. A full safety ranking of proprietary cells for use by EV converters is 
outside the scope of this project however this is a subject which deserves further 
research by the LVVTA and/or an EV converters advocacy group. 
 
7.5.1 Cell Safety Features 
Balakrishnan (2006) discusses the various types of cell safety features. 
Manufacturers of Li-ion cells have attempted to further enhance the safety of the 
individual cell by special design of the electrolyte and separator. A major function 
of the separator is to keep the cell plates in close proximity but to prevent a short 
circuit of the charged plates by providing a mechanical barrier. The careful design 
of the separator is important because if the separator is penetrated for example by 
a piece of metal from poor manufacturing cleanliness, this may result in an 
internal short circuit which would release a large amount of energy causing 
battery heating.  
Other than good quality control, another strategy that is employed in cell safety is 
separator shutdown. This method uses a special separator design which prevents 
an internal short circuit during abuse conditions. Figure 7.9 shows a SEM of a 
polyethylene separator designed to shutdown upon short circuit. This process will 
ruin the battery but preventing heat production from the short circuit. 
 
Figure 7.9 Separator shutdown (Yang 2010). 
 
A Current Interrupt Device (CID) protects the cell against internal short circuit if 
the pressure in the cell increases. A CID in a ‘can’ type cell is a small mechanical 
diaphragm switch which responds to cell internal pressure, isolating the cell from 
the pack. A PTC resistor can be used to limit the current in the cell as it heats up. 
A PTC resistor sharply increases resistance as the temperature increases, acting as 
a current limiting resistor. Some manufacturers will use flame retardant 
Before short-circuit test After short-circuit test 
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electrolytes and safety vents to protect against fire and explosion. A higher level 
of safety is assured by the selection of cells using these devices. The location of 
these devices in a cylindrical can type Li-ion cell is shown in Figure 7.10. 
 
Figure 7.10 Safety design on Li-ion Cell (Yang 2010) 
 
The use or reuse of cells from other applications is an issue as some EV 
converters may have a source of second-hand cells they may want to use for their 
vehicle. OEM batteries protection devices are tailor made for specific applications 
and risk levels. A battery which was designed for a power tool or cell phone may 
not be suitable for an EV application. 
Some reasons for this are; 
• Cell manufacturing tolerances. Cells designed to be used in a battery pack 
will be designed to have cell characteristics close to each other. The 
battery manufacturers’ quality control process might classify statistically 
uncertain cell characteristics into groups for use in a particular pack 
(Xuezhe 2010). With a cell that is designed for individual use, tolerances 
are less important. Employing a series string of such cells in a pack could 
cause an individual cell thermal hazard due to for example greatly 
differing internal resistance between cells. 
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• Risk level. Battery performance and safety tend to be inversely related. A 
cell designed for a high performance application might not be suitable for 
an EV application because of increased risks due to the much larger pack 
capacity and the closer proximity to human contact. 
• An EV converter might take a pack from a Chevrolet Volt (Several Toyota 
Prius packs could also be wired together to make a useful BEV pack) 
written off in a crash (the batteries in these vehicles are positioned to be 
protected in a crash) and then reused in an EV conversion. Whilst the pack 
might have good energy storage capacity, the EV converter does not have 
the benefit or knowledge of the OEM controlling electronics and BMS. 
 
It is well known that energy density and power density are important requirements 
for EV cells, however Bostock (2010) describes that the for Jaguar Land Rover 
design “…safety, cost and life are more important design factors at present, no 
deterioration of which will be acceptable if higher energy densities become 
available”. This safety focused design approach is what is recommended for EV 
conversions in NZ. External safety systems such as the Battery Management 
System (BMS) will be discussed in the following sections on module, pack and 
system level safety. 
 
7.6 The Implication of Cell Size on Battery Pack Design 
In a battery pack assembled for use in an EV conversion the smallest assembled 
component might be a cell or a module. Many different sizes of cells/modules are 
available to the EV converter. The sizes range from a 2 Ah 18650 (pronounced 
eighteen six fifty) format cell used in consumer electronics to a large format 
prismatic cell of hundreds of Ah. The energy contained in a 200 Ah 4.0 V 
nominal cell is 200(4.0) = 800 Wh = 2880 kJ. If this cell is short circuited or is 
damaged in a vehicle accident this energy is suddenly released and could result in 
fire or explosion. The smaller cell however has 100 times less energy to release 
increasing the chances of containing the failure. Tesla motors’ Gene Berdichevsky 
(2006) describes the process of choosing a cell for the Tesla Roadster; 
 “We started our design by purposely picking a small form factor battery 
cell. This cell is called the 18650 because of its measurements of 18mm 
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diameter by 65mm length (i.e., just a bit larger than a AA battery). Due to 
its small size, the cell contains a limited amount of energy. If a failure 
event occurs with this cell, the effect will be much less than that expected 
from a cell many times larger” (p. 2). 
The Tesla Roadster uses 6831 of these 2 Ah 18650 cells, the pack constructed 
from 11 modules of 621 cells each. Warner (2010) also discusses the safety 
related issues of choosing different cell sizes for use in EV battery packs this is 
summarised in the Figure 7.11 below. 
 
Figure 7.11 “Safety characteristics differ between form factors” (Warner 2010). 
An overview of the pros and cons of various cell packages. 
 
Many different forms of cell packaging will emerge in the EV conversion market, 
everything from user installed fully packaged battery packs with supporting 
electronics to different sized modules will become available. There is no right or 
wrong answer for the EV converter, however the use of a large or small size of 
cell will affect the design of the pack architecture and supporting systems. Both 
design approaches are used in current production vehicles, the Tesla approach 
shown above can be compared to the Misubishi i-MiEV which uses 50 Ah cells 
packaged in 4 cells per module with 22 modules in the pack, using an 88S1P 
configuration (88 series, 1 parallel) to give a pack voltage of 360 V. The EV 
converter is much more likely to use large format prismatic cells as they are 
packaged more conveniently for use in a conversion. The large number of 
electrical connections required (usually made by spot welding tabs on to the 
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terminals) when using 18650 cell and the packing of a large number of cells in the 
form of a module, such as that used by Tesla, is unlikely to be achievable by most 
EV converters. Whereas the fire/explosion propagation risk is greater with a large 
cell, the larger the series cost and BMS requirement for small cells will also 
discourage the use of these for EV conversions. Pistoia (2010) lists the cell size 
issues to be investigated as; 
1. The number of cells that must go into thermal runaway to cause the entire 
battery system to go into thermal runaway. 
2. The requirements of cell balancing and the effects of differential cell 
ageing on the safety and performance of the battery system. 
3. The probability and effect of propagating circuit board failures. 
4. The  orientation  and  placement  of  the  cells  in  the  battery  to  
minimize  the propagation of a cell failure. 
In summary, the battery system design is influenced by the choice of cell size. The 
use of large format prismatic cells in EV conversions should be carried out with 
special attention paid to cell isolation, both from an electrical and fire/explosion 
propagation point of view. 
 
7.7 Module and Battery Pack Protection 
The application of module level safety solutions represent safety systems which 
are applied external to the cell. The safety of the electric vehicle battery system at 
module and pack level is largely managed by supporting systems such as the 
Battery Management System (BMS) and its measurement, monitoring, calculation 
communicating and control actions. These actions are classified as active safety 
features. These safety systems can be physically integrated into the module/cell or 
be externally connected to the cell as part of the BMS. The safety methods that 
can be applied at the module level are the following; 
 
 
• external short circuit fuses, 
• cell/module isolation, 
• thermal management, 
• voltage management. Under Voltage (UV) and Over Voltage (OV), 
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• mechanical packaging for physical, electrical and chemical containment, 
• cell internal-short detection (internal resistance measurement), 
• charge balance devices on each module/cell, 
• PTC devices, thermal cut-offs, bimetal switches, thermal fuses and 
pressure fuses, 
• monitoring electronics to prevent the cells from being overcharged and 
overdischarged, and 
• electrical disconnects. 
The mix of protection devices used will depend on the risks involved in the use of 
a particular cell chemistry. Pistoia (2010) states;  
“Some electrochemical battery cells have strict safe operating limits for 
temperature, voltage, and current, while others can be abused without 
much concern for safety” (p. 499). 
For example an E-bike with a 48V LA battery system might have voltage 
monitoring only, be charged on a timer and have no BMS. In Figure 7.11 from 
Warner (2010) it can be seen that not all safety features are available in each cell 
type, therefore the choice of active safety system should be chosen to compensate 
for the weaknesses in the cell design. It is suggested that for Li-ion cells the 
minimum requirement would be at least one level of active protection for OV, UV 
and thermal for each cell/module. The BMS is discussed in the section below. 
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7.7.1 The Battery Management System (BMS) and Motor Controller 
The BMS is the heart of the vehicles safety system. Batteries do not offer any 
information on the state of the battery without external measurement. This section 
is here to give background to various BMS functions and provide guidance for the 
selection of a suitable BMS. The goal of the BMS is first to protect and then to 
improve performance of the battery pack. The function of a BMS is to; 
• ensure that the battery is operated within safe limits and achieves optimum 
performance over its life. 
• prolong the battery’s calendar and cycle life 
• provide information on the battery’s current state and performance, 
• and  balancing  the  electrochemical  cells 
The BMS achieves this by performing monitoring, measuring, calculating, 
communicating, control and balancing functions. A typical BMS system provides 
the following functionality (Pistoia 2010); 
• cell state monitoring, 
• charge and discharge current measurement and limiting, 
• cooling/heating system management, 
• communications between the battery and the vehicle, 
• high-voltage relay control and 
• state of health and state of charge monitoring and estimation. 
 
Zhang (2010a) from Lishen Battery in China gives the BMS design requirement 
for safety and reliability as; 
Safety 
• Multiple redundancy and safety backup 
• Service plug 
• Voltage, current, temperature, water incursion, collision, overturn, fire 
detection, condensation handling, gas venting 
• Pack thermal prevention 
• Multi level fusing 
• High voltage insulation and chassis insulation. 
Reliability 
• Thermal management 
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• Air cooling and/or water cooling/heating 
• Temperature monitor by controller board 
• Cell balancing – prolong battery life 
• Mechanical robustness 
Underlying different BMS design philosophies is the fact that voltage and 
temperature need to measured or monitored and controlled. Pistoia (2010) 
explains the basic requirements; 
“Typical measurements in a BMS often include voltage, temperature, and 
current – although cell pressure may also be measured in some 
applications.  Measurements for voltage and temperature may be done at 
the individual battery cell level or at the pack level, or both. Current is 
typically measured only at the pack level but could be measured in both 
the positive and negative sides of the battery” (p. 501). 
By assessing the above level of risk it would seem prudent that one level of active 
voltage and temperature monitoring is the minimum requirement for Li-ion 
batteries in EV conversions. A battery pack with cells that are susceptible to 
internal short circuit will need a BMS that will monitor the individual cell/module 
voltage rather than just at the pack level. A sharp drop voltage drop in a cell 
compared to other cells in the pack indicates internal short in that cell.  
A example of two separate levels of voltage control is as follows; first a SOC 
calculator which uses measured voltage values to control charge and discharge 
functions and secondly a high/low voltage threshold monitor which operates a 
failsafe control. As discussed above this multi layered approach provides some 
level of redundancy. 
BMS electronics should be designed to be fail safe, that is if a failure occurs in the 
circuit board or electronics then the system reverts to a safe state, that is with the 
main contactors open. 
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Figure 7.12 The BMS wiring for half of the LiPo pack which is shown under 
construction in Figure 7.24. 
 
7.7.2 BMS Selection 
A BMS may be as simple or as complex as the vehicle and cell chemistry 
requires. A management system could simply be a temperature monitor in the 
form of a fuse used to prevent thermal runaway. The complexity of BMSs can 
vary widely but must match the requirements of the cell used, alternatively the 
BMS complexity might also influence the choice of cell. Giebel (2010) states that 
the Volkswagen approach is;  
“…with Chinese Li-Ion it is best to go for safe technology with the 
advantage of needing a simple BMS”. 
The battery manufacturer’s guidance to the correct BMS selection should be 
sought as they are the expert in safety issues surrounding the particular chemistry 
and construction. The battery manufacturers warranty requirements may in fact 
require the use of a specific BMS. It is also important to ask these questions when 
purchasing cells from an intermediate source. Pistoia (2010) explains that; 
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“When researching a battery management system (BMS), finding a  
similar  application  will  likely  assist  in  the  selection  of  the  battery  
and  management system” (p. 494). 
NCOP-14 (2011) has a clause on battery management with specific 
recommendations for lithium batteries; 
“For series strings of batteries, some form of charge or balance 
management should be implemented. The necessity of this requirement 
will be dependent on the battery chemistry and technology used in the 
vehicle. This is especially critical with lithium chemistry batteries which 
must be maintained within strict upper and lower voltage limits and upper 
temperature limits. Some form of device to monitor these limits on each 
individual cell or group of parallel cells should be present. If  a monitoring 
device is fitted, the monitoring device must be capable,  of  either audibly 
or visually by  means  of  a  flashing  lamp, warning the driver of an 
impending disconnect with sufficient time for the driver to safely park the 
vehicle before disconnection occurs” NCOP-14 (2011) (p. 18). 
This clause represents a good summary of recommendations for lithium cells. 
Although not required in all BMS, onboard self-diagnostic features are becoming 
more critical in vehicles. 
 
7.7.3 Examples of BMS Architecture 
There are two types hardware architecture 1. centralised, 2. distributed. 
Centralised BMS have all the components all in one location and are often 
collocated with the pack (Figure 7.24). With a distributed architecture the 
functions of the BMS are repeated for each module (Figure 7.26), the BMS 
electronics are then mounted directly to the module terminals. Below are some 
schematic representations of BMS architecture. 
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Figure 7.13 Example of HV BMS block diagram (Pistoia 2010) (Figure19.5 p. 
512). 
 
 
Figure 7.14 Protection control circuit used for a HEV battery from (G.L. Plett 
2006) 
 
7.7.4 BMS Summary 
The BMS for EVs are significantly different from traditional management systems 
employed in consumer and industrial products such as laptops, cellular phones, 
two-way radios, power tools, and portable power products. Although the basic 
functions for monitoring, measurement, calculation, communication, control and 
balancing exist, the implementation is more critical due to the physical size, 
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power, energy, and end usage of such batteries in vehicles. By selecting the 
appropriate functions required by the vehicle type and the battery cell chemistry, a 
proper BMS can ensure a robust, safe,  reliable, high-performance battery system 
(Pistoia 2010). 
 
7.8 Charging and Battery Balancing 
Li-ion battery charging is an often overlooked but safety critical issue. Unlike LA 
batteries which can withstand over-charging (overcharging is used to equalise the 
battery pack at full charge), Li-ion batteries are sensitive to overcharging and may 
present a fire risk. The charging of EVs is most often carried out at the home and 
at night, and so the risk of a battery fire during charging must be reduced to an 
absolute minimum. The battery charger reverses the chemical reaction in the cell 
used during discharging by forcing an electric current through it. The functions of 
a Li-ion battery charging system are; 
• charging the battery, 
• controlling the charge – controlling current and voltage (power) to avoid 
battery damage and enhance the batteries life, 
• stabilising – balancing the charge between cells, 
• terminating – finishing the charge to prevent over voltage. 
Most important of all, the charger must be suited to the battery type including 
chemistry, size, voltage and power rating. 
(Pistoia (2010) describes how to charge a generic Li-ion cell;  
“Charging a Li-ion cell is a precise operation requiring features which 
control when and how the cell is charged. Li-ion cells are usually charged 
using the  constant current–constant voltage charge profile which involves 
the cell charged at a constant current until its voltage reaches  the  
predetermined limit  (typically 4.1 or 4.2 V) followed by a constant 
voltage charge state until the  current decreases to a predetermined low 
value” (p. 473-4). 
The most important function from a safety perspective is terminating the charge to 
avoid overcharging the cell. Li-ion cells must not be trickle charged (continuous 
low-current  charging) as is done with LA cells, because of the risk of overcharge 
and damaging  reactions at the anode and cathode (Schalkwijk 2002; Pistoia 
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2010). A battery charger that was designed to charge LA batteries is not suitable 
for Li-ion. Care must also be taken with chargers that use a series of pulses or a 
waveform to charge the battery (used with NiMH or NiCad) as these devices must 
be tuned to the timing of the electro-chemistry. Schalkwijk (2002) explains; 
“The electrode processes of the lithium-ion battery are different and do not 
respond well to the same type of pulse waveforms used for the other 
chemistries” (p. 465). 
A timer based charge control method is not suitable for Li-ion cells. Battery 
temperature and cell aging are again issues to be considered as these factors affect 
the battery internal resistance, as Pistoia (2010) explains; 
“The rate of Li+ transport through the SEI (Solid Electrolyte 
Interface/Interphase) layer is hindered at low temperature. Hence, charging 
the cell in this state can result in lithium plating at the SEI/electrolyte 
interface if the rate at which Li-ions arrive at the surface of the negative 
electrode material exceeds the rate at which they can diffuse from the 
surface into the bulk of the particles. Lithium plating at the surface of the 
negative electrode material can result in dendrite growth and hence in an 
internal short circuit” (p. 475-6). 
An EV battery charger can be temperature compensated or the battery pack can be 
fitted with heating to overcome this issue. A high quality product will have 
heating fitted for cold weather charging. 
A battery charger can be integrated with the motor controller to make dual use of 
the motor controllers power electronics. An example of such a system is shown in 
the schematic in Figure 7.15 over the page. 
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Figure 7.15 Tumanoko EV components and V2G showing integrated charger 
(Court 2010). 
 
7.8.1 Fast Charging 
Standard domestic wiring in NZ operating at 240 V will generally be able to 
charge an EV battery pack at power levels up to about 3 kW (the Chevrolet Volt 
has 3kW charger (Cai 2010b)) this is defined as mode 1 charging. At this charge 
rate a 16 kWh pack will take over 5 hours to charge, as such fast charging at 
higher power levels is desirable. The batteries electrical and thermal acceptance 
capacity however need to be taken into account as Dhameja (2002) explains; 
“The fast charging technique for traction batteries account for the battery 
charge acceptance. The charger adjusts the charge rate continually to 
match the ability of the battery to accept the charge. Danger from 
excessive overcharging can be avoided, and the battery modules can arrive 
at the charge in 20 to 30 minutes. This fast charge also enhances the 
battery life and provides higher battery efficiency (charge recovery)” 
(p.95). 
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7.8.2 On-Board or Off-Board Charger 
The charging of an EV’s battery raises many issues, for example an EV battery 
pack charger is not necessarily found on-board the vehicle and several chargers 
might be used in different locations. The charger could be off-board either in a 
private garage or provided in a public place such as a car park. This raises the 
question as to how to be sure that these different chargers a suitable for the 
particular vehicle. The charger provided in a public place is the subject of 
consumer law. As there is a contract for the provision of energy the provider of 
the charging service must make sure that the vehicle is not damaged. The risk here 
is mitigated by the coercive effect of commercial liability. 
For the off-board charger at home it could be argued that the charger is not part of 
the EV conversion and should not be part of a LVV certification.  
It has been argued within this thesis however, that the battery charger is an 
important safety related component of the EV, whether it is on-board or off-board. 
It has also been shown that an off-board charger is part of the ‘battery system’ by 
the definition given in Section 7.1.2 above. Based on these safety concerns the 
charger should be included in the certification process and information on the 
battery charger (as it was certified) should be included on the LVV plate. Figure 
7.16 shows a LVV certification plate. 
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Figure 7.16 LVV certification plate. 
 
Charger safety interconnects are discussed in the electrical safety Section 6.15 
above. 
 
7.8.3 Charge Balancing 
A large string of cells connected in series as those commonly found in EVs can 
become unbalanced with regard to voltage. Protection is required for each Li-ion 
cell/module as this unbalance can be caused by differences in cell internal 
resistance or self discharge rate due to normal manufacturing variation. The pack 
voltage is equal to the average of the cell voltages, however no two cells in a 
battery are identical or manufactured exactly the same (Dhameja 2002). 
Differences in temperature due to the cells position in the pack can also cause cell 
imbalance. A cell with a lower manufactured internal resistance will be the first 
cell to reach 100% SOC. Dhameja (2002) states; 
“This cell will be the first to undergo repeated overcharge and 
overdischarge, eventually resulting in the failure of the battery” (p. 133).  
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After a number of cycles, the rapidly weakening cell can be driven below the 
manufacturers minimum voltage specification or in an extreme case the cell can 
be forced into voltage reversal by the rest of the pack. This is a dangerous 
situation characteristic of Li-ion cells as Pistoia (2010) explains;  
“If the Li-ion cell is overdischarged frequently, dendrite growth may start 
to occur between the negative and positive terminal which can eventually 
lead to an internal short” (p. 475). 
Identifying and isolating a weaker battery is an important safety feature of the 
Battery management System (BMS). Schalkwijk (2002) and Pistoia (2010) 
reinforce this point by stating that;  
“…due to the normally larger sizes of batteries in electric traction vehicles, 
balancing often becomes a requirement” (Pistoia 2010) (p. 504). 
“Voltage control is paramount for lithium-ion batteries and most 
manufacturers require cells to be controlled to within ± 25 to 50 mV per 
cell” (Schalkwijk 2002) (p. 463). 
Cell balancing takes place as pack approaches 100% SOC, the cells in the pack 
are controlled to allow the undercharged batteries to gain an equalization charge, 
while the fully charged batteries are not overcharged. The simplest method is the 
‘bleed’ or  ‘bypass’ or ‘resistive’ method (Figure 7.17), this approach connects a 
low value resistor across the battery cell that is at a higher voltage or SOC, thus 
bypassing some of the charge current around that cell Pistoia (2010). 
 
Figure 7.17 Resistive cell equalisation. When the cell reaches a cut-off, the 
switch is thrown, bypassing the charging current around the cell (Schalkwijk 
2002). 
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Figure 7.18 A four cell balance controller for a 60Ah cell.  
Balance current 500mA. Voltage accuracy 4mV. Temp accuracy 2°C. Isolation 
Rating 950 V DC. From; http://www.tritium.com.au/products/TRI67/index.html 
 
The disadvantage of this method is that some of the charging energy is dissipated 
in the bypass resistor affecting the efficiency of the vehicle. A charge transfer or 
‘active’ balancing approach is a more suitable, but more complex method. Energy 
from the higher voltage cells is transferred to the lower cells with minimal losses 
using a transformer or inductive method (Pistoia 2010). A table given by Xuezhe 
(2010) (Figure 7.19) lists the benefits and weaknesses of each method. 
 110 
 
Figure 7.19 Cell balancing methods (Xuezhe 2010). 
 
The suitability of a particular cell balancing system should be assessed with 
guidance from the battery manufacturer and by assessing the systems accuracy 
and current capacity. 
A special form of battery charging is that from regenerative braking. Battery 
issues around regenerative braking are discussed in Section 8.5.6. The 
regenerative braking power limit may be controlled by a separate system to the 
charger. 
 
7.8.4 Charger Summary 
The battery charger is a safety critical component of EV conversions, whether it is 
on-board or off-board and as such it should be part of the EV certification. Three 
issues have been identified; 
 
1. charger must be correct for the chemistry, 
2. correct and reliable voltage termination, 
3. reliable cell balancing. 
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7.9 Discharging 
The control of pack discharge is a task usually performed by the motor controller 
and or BMS. The main function is to control the power by measuring or 
monitoring current and temperature for both the battery pack and the traction 
motor. Lithium cells must also not be overdischarged as this can lead to internal 
short circuits and cell failure. An example of battery damage caused by excessive 
current in an electric race car is given in Figure 7.20 below: 
 
Figure 7.20 Heat damaged battery terminals of a Li-ion cell caused by excessive 
discharge current under abuse conditions. 
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7.10 Pack Architecture and Design 
The battery pack enclosure must perform several functions. The key design 
criteria for the battery housing of an EV conversion are found to be; 
• that it must fit into the vehicle structure, 
• provide mechanical impact and vibration protection, 
• contain hazardous material (safety and environmental) and isolate failures 
(pack splitting), 
• comply with impact standards, 
• be light weight, 
• be low cost, 
• have access for inspection and maintenance,  
• allow for cooling and ventilation, 
• be corrosion resistance, 
• provide environmental protection (water, dust, condensation), 
• have features to prevent short circuits and, 
• be fire resistance. 
Battery packs in OEM vehicles take many different forms as the designers 
rationalise these sometimes conflicting design requirements. Each vehicle and cell 
type match will have its own solution. Electronic components and supporting 
systems will also be collocated with the battery pack. The battery pack 
architecture should also facilitate mechanical protection from impact and cell 
isolation, both with to limit the fire/explosion propagation reaction and from an 
electrical perspective. Cooling and ventilation of the battery pack will be 
discussed in a section below. 
The first challenge for an EV converter is to find a way of inserting the pack into 
the vehicle whilst keeping the structure of the vehicle intact. Cutting a section of 
the floor out of the vehicle to utilise the space vacated by the fuel tank is a 
common and accepted method of integrating the pack into the vehicle structure. 
Figure 7.21 shows how this is successfully achieved in a Mazda 3. 
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Figure 7.21 The boot floor of a hatch cut-out either side of the chassis rails to 
allow a LiPo pack to be partially recessed. 
 
7.10.1 Battery Positioning 
The positioning of the battery pack must ensure that sufficient ground clearance is 
maintained and consideration must be given to maintaining a crush zone at the 
front, rear and sides of the vehicle. OEM battery packs are also inserted from 
underneath the car, however ease of access for maintenance may be compromised 
and the homebuilt EV is likely to need more maintenance than an EV from a 
major manufacturer. 
The positioning of some OEM vehicle batteries is shown in Figure 7.22 below. 
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Figure 7.22 Haitec monolithic packs standardised for swapping. Three forms of 
pack shape; box, ‘T’ and underseat (Jen 2010). 
 
A review of battery pack locations for a number of OEM and conversion EVs was 
undertaken and the results are displayed in Figure 7.23 below; 
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Figure 7.23 Typical positioning of EV battery packs in OEM and converted 
vehicles 
 
The results show that all vehicles surveyed with the exception of two EV 
conversions position the battery pack between the vehicles axles. Whilst the 
position of the battery pack in EV conversion will vary from vehicle to vehicle, 
the majority of designs make use of the rear luggage compartment. The pack 
should not extend beyond the vehicles wheels as the battery is best positioned low 
and in the centre of the vehicle for superior handling dynamics, and between the 
wheels for protection from impact. 
 
Toyota Prius (2005) Chevrolet Volt (2010) ‘T’ shaped pack 
Nissan Leaf (2011) Hyundai Getz/Blade Electron (2010) 
Suzuki Alto (1984) typical EV conversion 
Toyota Hilux (1994) typical conversion Toyota Echo (1999) typical conversion 
Mitsubishi i-MiEV (2010) 
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7.10.2 Pack Layout 
The pack layout will most likely be determined by the cell type chosen and 
interconnection of the terminals and supporting electronics. Consideration should 
be given to dividing the pack into equal sections, both physically and electrically 
to reduce the severity of a failure event. A pack can be split in two by a simple 
metal divider or the parts can be separated and positioned in the front and rear of 
the vehicle, as is commonly done with LA conversions. The strategy of using 
battery pack separators will also slow the spread of a fire which breaks out in the 
battery pack. Steel rather than aluminium separators should be used to resist a 
high temperature lithium fire. The Toyota Prius battery pack has the service plug 
(switch) and fuse in the electrical centre of the pack to half the voltage. An 
example is given in Figure 7.24. 
 
 
Figure 7.24 A Lithium Polymer (LiPo) pack under construction, using pouch type 
cells. Aluminium sheet is folded to make the box and then lined with plastic 
coreboard. A cover will be fitted once the second half of the pack and BMS is 
assembled. The BMS and HV contactors are located in the centre of the pack. 
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7.11 Battery Impact, Restraint and Containment 
Vehicle impact and crashworthiness design has become the most stringent 
structural design criteria for motor vehicles. This project is concerned with two 
areas impact safety design;  
1. crash worthiness design for occupant protection,  
2. electrical design for impact and 
3. the safety of the high voltage battery system during impact. 
This section will discuss the latter issue of the battery system impact, the former 
being discussed in the chassis section, page 182 and electrical section page 71. 
Modern passenger vehicles must undergo a set of crash tests into a barrier at 48 
km/h. NZ has adopted the major international standards for frontal impact as  
listed in Land Transport Rule 32006/1 Frontal Impact. In a typical EV conversion 
the structure of the battery restraint system will be a box, a set of racks or hold 
down frames. The standards for the design of battery restraints are described in 
terms of the g force they must withstand, or by testing standards. 
ANCAP does not currently test the integrity of the battery or electrical system 
after the impact test even though this is a requirement of a number of the 
international EV standards. It is recommended that ANCAP update its procedures 
in this area. 
The FMVSS 571.305 (48 km/h) has a requirement for post crash electrical and 
electrolyte spillage testing and ISO6469-1 (2009) also gives specific requirements 
for the crash testing of EVs,  the general requirements from these standards are as 
follows; 
• no battery penetration into the passenger compartment, 
• battery movement shall be restricted, 
• no spilled electrolyte in the passenger compartment, 
• no battery ejection from the vehicle, 
• no electrical short circuit. 
For converted EVs built in NZ vehicle certifiers must assess the risk of the above 
requirements for a particular vehicle and battery configuration. It must also be 
noted that for some battery systems rear impact could be a more stringent 
requirement. 
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Volvo testing of a prototype battery system showing the crush zone before the 
battery is impacted is presented in Figure 7.25; 
 
 
Figure 7.25 Volvo full scale crash test PHEV (Volvo 2009). Available from 
https://www.media.volvocars.com/ accessed 19,01,2011. 
 
The main requirements of the structure are for strength and controlled 
deformation. A calculation design method might be used by EV converters. For 
this method NCOP-14 (2010) gives loading conditions for EV conversions in the 
form of impact forces. These are; 
frontal impact   – 20 g, 
side impact   – 15 g, 
rear impact   – 10 g and 
vertical (rollover) impact – 10 g. 
Protection against chemical leakage is dependent on the risk of the chemistry and 
whether solid or liquid electrolyte is present. The use of a containment system is 
particularly important for LA conversions. It was found that many LA converted 
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EVs have no acid containment. The acid containment system deployed can 
depend on whether the battery contains liquid, gel, or solid electrolytes. 
An opportunity exists for further research into battery pack restraint and impact 
performance, especially the testing of systems. Ip (2008) and Tietzel (2009) 
describe the design of a battery restraint using Finite Element Analysis (FEA). 
The pack used 122 kilograms of Thunder Sky batteries fitted to a Hyundai Getz. 
The frame was made from 25 x 3.0 angle and the upper bars from 25 x 13 RHS. 
 
 
Figure 7.26 Battery restraint system. The design used plastic hold down blocks 
(~50 mm high) to separate the terminals from the upper bars and a transparent 
plastic cover. The BMS architecture used here is the distributed type with the 
BMS mounted directly to each battery module (Tietzel 2009). 
 
FEA design techniques could be used to produce standard designs for EV 
conversion for use by EV converters. Tietzel (2009) questions modelling the 
battery modules as a rigid body by applying the design acceleration as a pressure 
to the side of the enclosure. The use of straps or tie rods to secure the modules 
together inside the pack would justify this assumption. Light weight steel 
strapping such as that used in the packaging industry could be used to strap the 
modules together. Particular attention should be paid to insulation and/or 
grounding of the straps, corner protection of the modules and thermal expansion. 
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Damaged Li-ion cells can pose a severe fire risk during charging. If an EV fitted 
with Li-ion batteries is involved in a minor accident and it is intended that the 
batteries be reused, testing must be carried out to verify that they are still in good 
condition and if there is any doubt, the batteries must be retired. 
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7. 12 Battery Pack Cooling and Heating 
The thermal management system of a Li-ion EV conversion will provide either 
heating or cooling action depending upon the battery pack conditions. The goals 
of the cooling/heating system are; 
• to prevent the battery cells overheating – causing thermal runaway, 
• to have the cells working at their most efficient temperature (Li-ion cell 
performance is highly temperature dependent) and 
• to create an isothermal battery pack – an even temperature from cell to cell 
will minimise charge imbalance during cycling. 
The heating/cooling system needs to operate whilst the vehicle is in use (moving) 
and when it is stationary (parked or charging). The first point is the only a safety 
issue (if the pack has a charge equalisation system that can rebalance the cells). 
Heating of the pack is necessary under cold winter conditions when the vehicle is 
first started and the discharging of the pack during normal driving has not yet 
warmed the cells. As this may be less important considering NZs mild winter 
conditions, the heating aspect of the pack will not be covered in detail. The 
cooling of power electronics are briefly discussed as this is less of a safety issue, 
and the manufacturers of these components will provide details on how their 
product should be cooled.  
Battery packs may be air cooled or liquid cooled by forced or passive means. A 
liquid cooling system requires an extra level of integration that might not be 
achievable by most EV converters. The Chevrolet Volt uses liquid cooled thermal 
fins inserted between the pouch type cells to provide heating and cooling. These 
fins turn the battery pack into a huge radiator7.  
The sources of battery pack heating during normal use are; 
1. the cell, due to normal exothermic and resistive cell processes during 
discharge and charge, 
2. the ambient temperature and 
3. resistive heating of associated electronics and wiring connections. 
The internal heat generation of the battery pack can be estimated using a 
simulated driving profile and a knowledge of the internal resistance and heating 
                                                 
7 An animation of the battery operation is available at http://gmtv.feedroom.com/. 
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characteristics of the cells in the pack, or alternatively it can measured during 
electrical cycling in an isothermal air-flow calorimeter. 
The temperature limits specified by the cell manufacturer should be observed. 
Densham (2010) suggests that the maximum cell temperature allowable for a 
generic Li-Ion cell is Tcell max = 55 - 60°C. Pistoia (2010) also states; 
“In general, whenever a charged Li-ion cell is exposed to temperatures 
above 60°C, there is a risk of initiating exothermic reactions within the 
cell. The heat generated by these reactions may result in a rise in the cell 
temperature, which in turn activates additional exothermic reactions” (p. 
467). 
Isidori (2010) also gives some design targets for Li-ion battery pack temperatures; 
• maximum cell temperature, Tcell max ≤ 40°C 
• temperature within an individual cell, Twithin cell < 5°C and  
• temperature between cells in the pack Tbetween cells ≤5°C.  
Figure 7.27 describes how high currents resulting in an uneven current density can 
cause temperature differences within a cell. 
 
Figure 7.27 Cell uneven temperature. 
 
This Figure shows that the positioning of the temperature sensors within the 
battery pack could be critical to cell safety. 
The ambient temperature exposure of the HEV batteries will depend upon the 
location of the cells within the vehicle under summer conditions (Pistoia 2010). A 
Figure presented by Pistoia (2010) gives a vehicle dashboard temperature of over 
100°C for a 40 degree maximum atmospheric temperature day, strongly 
suggesting that a high ambient temperature must considered by the designer. 
44°C 
50°C 
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High performance controllers are water cooled for example, a 30 kW power 
controller running at 97% efficiency would represent a heat loss of 900 W, this is 
a significant heat load. Staunton (2008) states that power electronic loads will be 
running at approximately ~ 50°C with the motor generators (traction machines) at 
about ~ 80°C.The major electronic heat sources must be placed away from the 
pack and with separate cooling. The above data shows that EV heat loads 
generally have lower temperatures than ICE vehicles due to them being more 
efficient machines. Staunton (2008) states that this can cause cooling issues as; 
“A low heat load is not necessarily any easier to manage than a high heat 
load. This is because heat transfer is dependent on temperature change.  
Q = mCpΔT  ”.  
Staunton (2008) gives an example of two systems that require cooling. The EV 
represents many smaller heat loads at lower temperatures therefore Staunton 
(2008) concludes that each load needs to be cooled individually and as such the 
cooling system complexity increases as the operating temperature decreases. 
A simple calculation can show the resistive heat loss from an EV power pack at 
operating at a certain current level (Densham 2010). The power lost, if not 
removed by the cooling system will result in heating of the battery pack. By Ohms 
law the peak power loss in each cell is given by, Pc = I2 (Rc)  
Where I is the maximum pack current and Rc is the cell internal resistance.  
An example calculation of maximum pack power loss (Densham 2010) is given 
below; 
I = 200 A (Tesla Roadster) 
Rc = 1.0 mΩ 
Pc = 2002 (0.001) ≈ 40 W 
Ppack ≈ 4000 W with 100 cells installed. This figure represents peak power lost 
Densham (2010) suggests that a realistic value for average power lost would occur 
at 40 A i.e. Ppack = 402 (0.001) 100 = 160 W. A more accurate assessment can be 
made by considering the current load during a standard drive cycle or other 
knowledge of vehicle operation using the equation below; 
dtRtINP
t
ccpack ∫=
0
2 )(  
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Battery charging and regenerative braking will also cause battery heating by the 
same resistance mechanism. 
The above calculation requires knowledge of the battery’s internal resistance at 
either the cell, module or pack level. This internal resistance cannot be measured 
directly with an ohmmeter as the total cell impedance is due to resistances  
exhibited  by  the battery  terminal, the battery  plate  welds  and  other  plate-to-
plate  connections,  the ionic conductivity of the electrolyte and the activity of the 
battery during the electrochemical processes occurring at the plate surfaces 
(Dhameja 2002). 
A DC load test or an AC impedance test must therefore be used to determine the 
cell impedance. The EV home builder is not likely to have the knowledge or 
equipment to measure cell internal resistance. The ambient  temperature,  cell  and  
battery life, and discharge history are all factors that affect the AC impedance 
(Dhameja 2002). An ageing battery pack will generate an increasing amount of 
heat as it gets older and the internal resistance increases. End of life impedance 
can be as much as 200% that of beginning of life. The stated internal resistances 
for CBAK Power Batteries is given by Deng (2010) and reproduced below 
showing a large variation. 
 
Type [mm] Voltage [V] Capacity [Ah] IR [mΩ] 
18650 3.6 2.0 70 
26650 3.2 2.2 ≤8 
26650 3.2 2.7 ≤20 
36800 3.2 5.5 ≤10 
(20148130) 3.2 20 ≤2 
(20148240) 3.2 50 ≤3 
(42148240) 3.2 100 ≤2 
Table 7.1 CBAK battery specifications. Cylindrical- ØxL. (Prismatic- TxWxH). 
(Deng 2010). 
 
Detailed thermodynamic design of the of the battery cooling system can take 
place assuming a knowledge of vehicle use, pack heat capacity, ambient air 
temperature, heat transfer and aging and temperature characteristics of the pack. 
An alternative method for the EV converter is to test the thermal performance by 
monitoring the pack temperature during a defined test cycle. A subjective method 
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such as ‘…if you can hold your hand on the battery pack for one minute then it is 
below 50 °C ‘is inadequate, and a test cycle to simulate high performance 
operation should instead be selected. 
 
7.12.1 Thermal Management Design 
The design of a battery pack thermal management system involves steady state 
heat transfer analysis. The model will consist of four parts, a heat transfer model, 
a heat generation model, an ambient temperature model, and a vehicle operation 
model (Dhameja 2002). 
(Gene Berdichevsky 2006) describes the design concepts and thermal 
performance of the Tesla Roadster battery pack which is liquid cooled; 
“This cooling system design is especially effective because we have 
chosen to combine thousands of small cells rather than several large ones 
to build an ESS, dramatically increasing the surface to volume ratio. For 
example, with seven thousand 18650 cells the surface area is roughly 27 
square meters. If there were an imaginary set of 20 much larger cube-
shaped cells that enclosed the same volume, the surface area would be 
only 3.5 square meters, more than seven times smaller. Surface area is 
essential to cooling batteries since the surface is where heat is removed; 
more is better. Also, because of their small size, each cell is able to 
quickly redistribute heat within and shed heat to the ambient environment 
making it essentially isothermal. This cooling architecture avoids “hot 
spots” which can lead to failures in large battery modules” (p. 4). 
The primary design of a thermal management system should keep the battery 
sufficiently insulated. The insulation will help to obtain an acceptably high 
operating temperature during winter and cooling during summer by means of 
cooling during the charging period (Dhameja 2002).  
A pack fitted with insulation will keep the cells on the outside of the pack warmer 
as they are not cooled by conduction through the pack wall. As such it will be 
easier for the cooling system to be able to control the pack the isothermally. The 
many requirements listed above and in the section on impact indicate that a multi 
layer casing is required to perform all these functions. An example would be first 
a steel layer on the outside (impact and structural containment) then foam 
(thermal insulation) and then plastic (electrical insulation).  
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The secondary design criteria is that the circulation and the cooling air flow 
should be properly distributed in space in order to ensure a minimum temperature 
difference between the individual battery modules (Dhameja 2002). For this 
reason it is good practice to install spacers between modules (to provide air gaps) 
and dividers to split the battery pack into individually cooled sections. In hot 
weather the pack could be cooled by a cool air bleed taken from the cabin air-
conditioning. 
During certification the certifier should look for aspects of good design of the 
cooling system such as, the inlet and out let of the battery pack cooling system 
should be as far away as practical from each other. The air tightness of lid as well 
as the positioning of the temperature sensors is important. The air flow should be 
arranged from the bottom to top of the pack to take advantage of the thermo-
siphon effect. 
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7.13 Venting of Gasses during Charging 
Many Li-ion batteries do not require venting as they are fully sealed however no 
rechargeable battery should ever be placed in a fully sealed container. LA 
batteries will be used for EVs in the future so it is useful to review the 
requirements for the ventilation of these batteries. The Li-ion battery system may 
still need ventilation to remove smells from the operation of the electronics and 
contactor arcing. 
A charger for a flooded LA battery pack applies a continuous low current charge 
(trickle charge) as it approaches 100% SOC. This is referred to as trickle 
charging. Continued charging drives the process of electrolysis of the water in the 
cell resulting in the evolution of hydrogen gas. Many EV and industrial battery 
standards deal with the issue of hydrogen explosion hazard. The standards identify 
the hazard to exist in two areas; 
• explosive risk in the vehicle, 
• explosive risk in garaging the vehicle during overnight charging. 
ISO 6469-1: 2009 Part 1 has a vehicle focus and as a general requirement states 
that; 
“No potentially dangerous concentration of hazardous gases and other 
hazardous substances shall be allowed anywhere in the driver, passenger 
and load compartments”. 
The first task is to identify if the particular battery chemistry and design emits 
hazardous gasses during normal operation and charging. The Hydrogen generated 
will rise in the battery compartment and is explosive where the concentration of 
hydrogen exceeds a hydrogen/air ratio of 4 %, this is defined as the lower 
explosion limit (Bossche 2003). Dilution and mixing of the explosive gasses to 
below this threshold is the accepted solution to this problem. The amount and type 
of ventilation (natural or forced) required will depend on several factors including 
the rate of hydrogen production and the physical dimensions of the battery 
enclosure. In the following calculation a safety factor of 5 is applied to the lower 
explosion limit so the design hydrogen concentration effectively becomes 0.8 %. 
SAE (2010) gives the hydrogen concentration limit as 2.0 %. 
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7.13.1 Estimating the Ventilation Requirement 
The standard BS EN 50272-3:2002 BSI (2002) Safety Requirements for 
Secondary Batteries and Battery Installations - Traction Batteries gives an 
accepted method of calculating the ventilation air-flow rate for LA battery 
systems. The gas generation in a vented flooded cell is calculated from the 
overcharge current from which the battery will produce a certain amount of 
hydrogen. BSI (2002) calculates the necessary ventilation airflow for a battery 
location or compartment by the following formula; 
 Q  =  v  q  s  n  Igas  Cn / 100     [m3/h]  
Where; 
Q       =     ventilation air flow [m3/h], 
v        =     necessary hydrogen dilution factor = 24 = (100-4)/4, 
q        =     0.42(10 -3) [m3/Ah] generated hydrogen at 1 Ah overcharge current, 
s        =     safety factor = 5, 
n        =     number of cells, 
I gas    =     current producing gas during the gassing phase of charge [A/100Ah] 
Cn      =     nominal capacity [Ah]. 
For a generic analysis the above formula is simplified to: 
Q  =  0.05  n  Igas  Cn  /100     [m3/h] 
BSI (2002) sates that where standard chargers are used and no detailed 
information regarding the charge characteristic is provided, Igas Cn /100 shall be 
calculated to be a minimum of 25 % of the rated charger output current in Amps. 
For a more detailed calculation the end of charge current, Igas must be known, BSI 
(2002) gives a table providing typical maximum values for various charger 
characteristics. 
7.13.2 Natural or Forced Ventilation 
BSI (2002) gives the requirement for natural ventilation as; 
Each inlet and outlet minimum area, A = 28 Q        [cm2]  (Q in [m3/h]) 
Minimum ventilated room free volume, V = 2.5 Q   [m3] 
Air velocity for natural ventilation is assumed to be 0.1  [m/s] 
From the above formulas it can be seen that it is unlikely that natural ventilation 
can be used to ventilate the battery pack during charging as the free volume 
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requirements would be difficult to achieve due to space restrictions in the vehicle 
(unless the battery cover is opened prior to charging). Forced air flow provided by 
non sparking fans would then be needed to ventilate the gasses. Potential ignition 
sources also must to be kept away from the battery area (>500 mm away) as 
regardless of ventilation, the dilution of the gases cannot always be assured close 
to the cells (BSI 2002). BSI (2002) states that the interlocking of chargers and 
ventilation fans should be considered. 
 
7.13.3 Garage Ventilation 
Another alternative approach is taken by UNECE (2002) Regulation 100 for 
BEVs and the SAE recommended practice J1718. SAE J1718 is aimed at 
determining the concentrations of hydrogen gas emitted by an electric vehicle 
being charged in order to know whether or not forced air ventilation is required in 
the garage (Bossche 2003). 
The general requirements are similar such as; 
“…not allow potentially dangerous accumulation of gas pockets … battery 
compartments containing battery modules which may produce hazardous 
gasses shall be safely ventilated” (UNECE 2002). 
UNECE Regulation 100 (2002) uses a hydrogen emission test during normal 
charging and places limits on hydrogen emissions, which must not be more than 
125 g during a five hour normal charge, or than 42 g in case of charger failure, the 
duration of the failure must be limited to 30 minutes. 
Bossche (2003) questions the applicability of using a hydrogen limit and asks 
where the value of 125 g of hydrogen emission comes from. 
“In  a  typical  garage  of  50 m2 ,  this  corresponds  to  a  concentration  
of  2.8 %  of hydrogen; this value is below the 4 % lower explosion limit, 
but is higher than the 0.8 % specified in EN 1987-1. With the 42 g 
hydrogen  emission in case of failure added, one comes to a total hydrogen 
emission of 167 g; the corresponding volume becomes 1872 dm3, giving a 
concentration of 3.75 % in the garage, just under the explosion limit” (p. 
325). 
Single garages in NZ are considerably smaller than the example given above so it 
is highly recommended that adequate ventilation be installed in garages that house 
EVs with LA batteries during charging. 
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7.14 Battery Certification Issues 
Specific issues have been discussed throughout this Chapter however, it is 
important to clarify the required certification thresholds applicable during the 
vehicles life. Recertification should be required if a vehicles battery is replaced 
with a non OEM item or a battery of a different chemistry. A change (increase) to 
the vehicles pack size also requires a fresh look at the vehicle’s safety systems. A 
15% threshold is proposed for this. The LVV plate (Figure X) makes no mention 
of battery capacity or the number of cells or manufacturer of the cells which 
presents an opportunity of abuse by uncertified modification. 
 
7.15 Battery Summary 
Li-ion batteries are ubiquitous technology in portable devices, the engineering of 
this technology for EVs however is more critical due to the battery size. There are 
still unknowns in the use of EV technology that will be discovered as the 
technology develops. For example, what are the dangers of a lightening strike for 
a grid charging battery pack? Different battery technologies need different 
protection mechanisms to minimise the risk of that particular cell. 
For EV conversion a multilayered design and certification approach should be 
taken using a mixture of active and passive safety features. A comprehensive set 
of design tools and rule prescriptions is difficult to write for EV conversions as 
much of the design is dependent on the cell selection, form factor and space 
restriction. The EV home builder however is most likely to use large format 
prismatic cells/modules due to pack packaging and BMS complexity issues. Cells 
which are sensitive to overcharge and over-discharge should utilise a BMS with 
individual cell monitoring and balancing capability. 
With the use battery chemistries and design which minimizes the risk of failures 
coupled with of adequate safeguards in the form of redundant protection, well 
designed thermal management and ventilation systems EV converters can achieve 
a safe and high performance conversion. 
 
 131 
ABS ! RBS 
Chapter 8 - EV Brake Systems        8 
8.1 Introduction 
The single most important active safety feature of a vehicle is the brake. The 
conversion of an ICE vehicle to electric drive will generally utilise the existing 
brakes of the vehicle as designed by the OEM, with or without some modification. 
This chapter will outline a number of ways the substitution of an electric motor 
will affect the performance of the OEM brake system, whether the brakes are 
modified or not . In this Chapter it becomes clear that the characteristics of the 
substituted electric motor provides new challenges and opportunities for brake 
system design. The major issues that have been identified during this research 
include: 
1. The added battery weight increases the overall weight of the vehicle which 
will affect the power requirements brake system. A Centre of Gravity 
(COG) change will also affect the fore-aft brake balance (brake 
proportioning) of the OEM brake. 
2. The substitution of the ICE (with engine braking) with an EV motor that 
has no auxiliary braking (regeneration) capability also affects the power 
requirements of the braking system during long descents. It has been found 
that most homebuilt EV conversions use DC motors without regeneration. 
3. There is a need to design and supply a supplementary vacuum energy 
supply to the OEM brake to replace the inlet manifold vacuum source after 
conversion. 
4. The use of the EV motor as a high power auxiliary brake or regenerative 
brake raises safety issues of correct brake control and proportioning 
(braking one axle only). Wheel lockup similar to ‘shift locking’ in ICE 
vehicles can occur. Brake signal control during regenerative braking is 
also discussed. 
5. Battery energy and power capacity limitation during regenerative braking. 
6. Anti skid braking (ABS) and Electronic Stability Control (ESC) issues. 
                                                 
5 ISO 2575: Road vehicles - Symbols for controls, indicators and tell-tales. Brake warning symbols 
(red). 
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7. Certification. Simple and cost-effective means must be developed by 
which vehicle brake compliance can be assessed or tested. 
This Chapter will discuss these issues and make suggestions for EV conversion 
guidelines for safe modification of vehicles. The automotive brake systems will 
first be discussed to identify where electric vehicle brake systems differ and how 
changes in vehicle mass and mass distribution affect the brakes. OEM brakes with 
vacuum boosters are then discussed and a design method for a vacuum pump 
substitution is given. Next, the many complex systems for electric regenerative 
braking control are discussed in relation to the EV converter. The results of ICE 
engine brake deceleration testing are given to show the design limits for 
regenerative braking. Each section is summarised with recommendations. 
The substitution of an engine with an electric motor should be seen as a vehicle 
modification that requires the brake system to be recertified (as a LVV) even if no 
modification has strictly been made to the brake system (it is common practice for 
EV converters to use vehicles that have no vacuum booster so that the brakes do 
not need any modification). This recertification of the vehicle brake system is 
justified by the fact that international type approval systems for brakes such as 
UNECE Regulation 13 (2008) require a new type approval to be undertaken if the 
vehicle has a different engine type or any regenerative braking system is added. 
 
8.1.1 Brake System Comparisons 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the differences between ICE (hydraulic 
with vacuum boost assist) and electric vehicle brake systems (not EBS as in air 
brake systems) and identify the critical safety issues with regard to the design of 
EV brake systems. Three functions of the braking system are given by (Happian-
Smith 2002). The braking system must; 
1. decelerate a vehicle in a controlled and repeatable fashion and when 
appropriate cause the vehicle to stop and, 
2. should permit the vehicle to maintain a constant speed when travelling 
downhill and, 
3. hold the vehicle stationary when on the flat or on a gradient. 
In addition, this must occur under normal and emergency braking situations with a 
fully or lightly loaded vehicle, straight and curve line braking, and in a variety of 
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environmental conditions including low friction road surfaces. This research has 
added ‘modified vehicle’ to this list.  
In Table 8.1 below the brake system is split into subsystems and the method by 
which these subsystems are applied is given for three brake system types 
including electric braking. For the purpose of this thesis ‘electrical braking’ does 
not include a ‘Brake by Wire’ Electro-Mechanical Brake (EMB) system, which is 
a friction brake system with electrical energy source, modulation and transmission 
systems. 
 Standard ICE 
Vehicle 
(EMB) 
Electromechanical 
Brake (Brake by Wire) 
Electric Brake 
Energy source 
Generates and 
stores or releases 
energy 
Pedal effort 
Vacuum Servo 
Electrical Kinetic energy of the 
vehicle 
Modulation 
system 
Controls the level of 
braking 
Driver 
Valves 
Electronic control 
ABS 
Sensors 
Driver 
Electronic control 
ABS 
Sensors 
Driver 
Electronic Control 
ABS 
Sensors 
Transmission 
System 
Transmits energy 
Brake fluid, lines 
and hoses 
Pistons 
Cables 
Electric current 
Electric cable 
Electric current 
Electric cable 
 
Energy Storage 
Stores or 
Dissipates Energy 
Thermal Thermal RESS 
Thermal 
Foundation 
Brakes, 
Generate forces to 
oppose vehicle 
motion 
Friction Brakes Friction Brakes Electromechanical 
Generator 
Table 8.1 Brake system designs. 
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8.2 Vehicle Brake System Requirements 
Braking systems for EVs must comply with the current brake regulations for ICE 
motor vehicles. Of the many regulatory requirements for brake systems some of 
the most important are system redundancy (Service Braking, Secondary Braking 
and Park Braking) and the efficient use of available tyre-ground adhesion. Many 
types of auxiliary brakes are also fitted to vehicles, the most common being the 
engine compression brake. These aspects, concentrating on vehicle safety are 
discussed in the Section below. 
 
8.2.1 Brake Proportioning and Adhesion Utilisation 
Road vehicles must perform to strict stability criteria under a variety of braking 
conditions and loading. Friction between the vehicle tyre and road surface 
provides directional control and stability against disturbances such as lateral 
gradient, side wind or left to right brake imbalance. When an axle locks under 
braking there is reduced friction in both the longitudinal direction and lateral 
direction and so the vehicles ability to travel in a straight line is reduced. Happian-
Smith (2002) gives an analysis to show that the yaw moment produced if the rear 
axle of a vehicle locks first, has a destabilising effect causing the vehicle to spin. 
This analysis shows it is preferable to design the vehicle for front axle lock in 
preference to the rear as this is a stable condition and directional control can be 
regained by simply releasing the brakes. This basic requirement is met through 
compliance with the European brake standard UNECE Regulation 13 (2008) 
which states that for  all  states  of  load  of  the  vehicle,  the adhesion  utilisation  
curve  of  the  rear  axle shall not be situated above the front axle for all load cases 
and values of deceleration between 0.2 and 0.8 g (Annex 10 3.1.2.). The adhesion 
utilisation shall also lay below the line k = z(0.007)/0.85. This requirement is 
shown graphically in Figure 8.1 below. 
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Figure 8.1 Diagram 1A of Annex 10 (UNECE 2008). For all states of vehicle 
load, the adhesion curve of the front axle shall be situated above that of the rear 
axle.  
 
Happian-Smith (2002) states that;  
“…compliance of the braking system to the constraints defined in (Figure 
X) above ensures that the rear wheels do not lock in preference to the front 
wheels and that the proportion of braking effort exerted at the front of the 
vehicle is limited so that the braking system does not become to 
inefficient” (p. 462). 
Static weight distribution is generally not equal among axles (a ≠ b in Figure 
8.2(a) below) and weight is transferred to the front axle during deceleration 
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(Figure 8.2(b)). This weight transfer is dependent on deceleration, z, centre of 
gravity height, h and vehicle wheel base, l as given in the equations below. 
 
Figure 8.2 (a) Static axle loads (b) Free body diagram of the decelerating vehicle 
(Happian-Smith 2002). 
l
PzhFR ff +=                                 l
PzhFR rr −=  
For maximum braking efficiency, where both axles are on the point of locking, 
the brake force on each axle will be in proportion to the weight carried by each 
axle. As most vehicles have a fixed brake ratio, the ideal brake ratio changes with 
vehicle deceleration, z a variable brake ratio is therefore required to fully utilise 
the available tyre-ground adhesion, and the choice of a fixed brake ratio is 
compromised. 
The Individual Vehicle Approval Standards in the UK (IVA-M1 2009) state that; 
“The braking ratio of the axles, for all values of total brake force must be less than 
the friction force ratio (taking into account weight transfer) between axles in 
running order” (an exception is made for ABS equipped vehicles). This 
requirement also ensures a front axle locks first characteristic. Although it seems 
reasonable that this check be made for vehicles in NZ this test is not practical as it 
requires equipment not available in NZ, such as a brake pedal effort measuring 
device and two sets of brake rollers. After plotting the brake ratio for the axles a 
theoretical method can be used to take into account weight transfer. In the absence 
of this method a deceleration test such as the one described in IVA-M1 (2009) can 
be used:  
“Drive the vehicle on a level road at a steady speed of approximately 
20mph and apply the service brake sufficient only to obtain wheel lock. 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
h 
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Observe whether all the wheels of the rear axle(s) lock prior to both 
wheels of the front axle” (p. 93). 
An observer is required for this test. 
 
Happian-Smith (2002) lists the factors other than deceleration affecting weight 
transfer as: 
• change in vehicle weight, 
• change in weight distribution, 
• the effect of gradients, 
• the effect of cornering, 
• varying road surfaces and weather conditions including split friction 
surfaces, and 
• the GoG moving forward and down due to vehicle pitching under severe 
braking. (Happian-Smith 2002). 
 
Removing an ICE, full fuel tank and other components from a vehicle and 
replacing these with an electric motor, controller and battery pack could result in a 
change in the first two vehicle properties listed above. The effect of these factors 
will be discussed in further detail. 
A converted vehicle should seek to keep the above variables within the vehicle 
manufacturers limits so that the vehicle’s brakes perform as designed. Many 
people interviewed during this project who had converted EVs told me that they 
had been able to keep the front-rear weight distribution ratio (Ff /Fr) close to the 
manufacturer’s empty weight value. It was discovered that this is also something 
that LVV certifiers look for.  
People who had used LA batteries for their conversion placed batteries in the front 
and the rear of the vehicle so that the rear did not become too heavy. The removal 
of rear seating positions so the vehicle did not go over weight was also common 
to this type of conversion. The MkIII Blade Electron (Hyundai Getz) and 
Energetique evMe (Mazda 2) conversions with lighter Li based batteries have the 
battery pack located entirely in the rear of the vehicle. 
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8.2.2 Vehicle Design Process 
An important outcome of a successful EV conversion is to ensure the brake 
system is not overloaded during sudden decelerations and long descents. The 
energy, E required to be dissipated during a braking event is given by; 
22
2
1
2
1 IwmvE +=   
Where m is the vehicle mass, v is vehicle velocity, I is the rotational inertia of the 
rotating components and w is the rotational speed. 
This shows that not only the mass of the vehicle has an effect on deceleration but 
also the rotational inertia and gear ratio of the rotating components, such as the 
wheels, drive train and motor. The rotational inertia only has an impact when the 
brake system is power limited but is not important when the brake system is 
traction limited, as when the wheels are locked up the rotating components have 
already come to a stop. The substitution of the electric motor will most likely 
result in a reduction of the drive system rotational inertia as electric motors tend to 
be lighter however, this would need to be confirmed by measurement. 
Weighing the vehicle before modifications take place is important. Axle weights 
should be recorded for the lightly loaded and fully laden condition (all seating 
positions occupied). The designer should make sure to include a full tank of petrol 
as the weight of fuel will also be removed from the vehicle (unless it is a HEV). 
Obtaining manufacturers’ maximum axle ratings for light vehicles can be difficult 
as they are generally not published. If available, this data can be used and should 
not be exceeded when the vehicle is loaded with passengers and payload. If the 
data is not available then the fully laden condition should be taken as the GVM. A 
calculation such as the one given in IVA-M1 (2009) 44, Annex 2 should be used 
to calculate the GVM and can be included in an LVV EV standard. Weights for 
calculation and loading purposes in NZ are given as 80 kg/person (LVV 
Suspension standard (195-00(00)) and in Australia 68 kg/person + 13.6 kg of 
luggage/person as in the (ADR Definitions). Using ADR requirements could be 
advantageous to the designer as luggage is placed in the rear luggage 
compartment. 
The European calculation as given in UNECE (2009) is as follows;  
“The  mass  of  the  driver  and,  if  applicable,  of  the  crew  member  is  
assessed  at  75 kg (subdivided into 68 kg occupant mass and 7 kg luggage 
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mass according to ISO Standard 2416 - 1992), the fuel tank is filled to 90 
per cent and the other liquid containing systems (except those for used 
water) to 100  per cent of the capacity specified by the manufacturer” (p. 
22). 
The weight distribution among the front and rear axles should be shown to be 
within the manufacturers limits by choosing a worse case occupant loading before 
and after modification.  
One vehicle certifier explained that under certain circumstances, you could justify 
and increase in GVM rating of the vehicle due to a change in the use of the 
vehicle. The vehicle has now been modified to become an ‘EV city vehicle’ which 
can expect lighter chassis loadings from dynamic sources because of reduced 
mileage capability and lighter duty city use. The reduced mileage capability is due 
to a short range (say less than 60 km/charge) and/or long recharge time. Research 
is needed to quantify the new loadings to be used in any LVV standard however 
any increase in GVM rating would generally not exceed 20%. 
As mentioned above, a common and acceptable method of keeping the vehicle 
within its manufacturers GVM is to remove rear passenger seating positions. To 
make this a permanent modification the seat and seatbelt should be removed or 
the seat belt removed and the seat labelled. An example is the 5 seater Hyundai 
Getz EV conversion, as shown in Figure 8.3.  
 
Figure 8.3 Rear centre seat label fitted to Blade Electron Mk III. 
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The use of the term ‘occupants’ rather than ‘passengers’ would make this label 
less ambiguous as ‘passengers’ could be interpreted as not including the driver. 
 
8.2.3 Effect of a Change in CoG Height 
The conversion of a vehicle to electric drive can in general, have the effect of 
lowering the CoG as the substantial weight of batteries is added low in the vehicle 
(for common battery locations see Section 7.10.1). This will reduce the amount of 
weight transfer to the front axle during braking resulting in a vehicle which is 
over-braked on the front axle. This modification will result in the vehicle retaining 
its front axle locks first characteristic, a safe condition. It will also have the effect 
of reducing adhesion utilisation on the rear axle resulting in reduced braking 
efficiency on the vehicle overall. A modified vehicle fitted with ABS will be more 
tolerant of CoG height changes. It should be noted that under severe braking the 
vertical change in height of the CoG equates to approximately 5% of its original 
height (Happian-Smith 2002). Before and after measurements of CoG height can 
be made by the converter to ensure CoG height remains approximately equal and 
some methods are detailed in Appendix 7. 
The Australian vehicle EV modification standard NCOP-14 (2011) has recently 
been reviewed and handles the preceding issues in the following way; 
“Because mass distribution is an important factor in maintaining good 
handling and braking characteristics of a vehicle, it must be considered 
carefully in the design of a conversion or (ICE vehicle). For example, a 
significant reduction of front axle mass may lead to poor cornering 
behaviour as a result of loss of traction together with deterioration in 
braking performance. Care should therefore be taken to minimise changes 
in mass distribution. Where this is unavoidable, brake bias must be 
adjusted to take into account the changes in mass distribution. Locating the 
battery pack entirely behind the rear axle should be avoided as it may 
lighten steering and/or cause the vehicle to yaw in a dangerous manner, 
particularly if the vehicle has a relatively large rear overhang. Vehicles 
with front wheel drive may also lose drive traction. Vehicles displaying 
any of the above undesirable characteristics will be rejected by 
Registration Authorities”  (p. 20). 
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This type of requirement is very subjective and does not require the design to be 
proven by engineering measurements or calculation. Some simple measurements 
and calculations described above could be developed for NZ EV converters to use 
however, this would result in a small increase in compliance costs.  
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8.3 Vacuum Brake Boosters 
A vacuum booster is fitted to most ICE vehicle brake systems to increase the 
brake line hydraulic pressures and allow the driver to decelerate a heavy vehicle 
while maintaining the brake pedal force and pedal travel within acceptable limits. 
The conversion of an OEM vehicle to battery electric will generally have the 
following effects on the vacuum booster system: 
• An increase in the unladen weight of the vehicle due to the extra weight of 
batteries will put extra demands on the brake system, thus correct booster 
function is critical. 
• ICE engine braking may not be replaced by regenerative braking making 
correct booster function critical (most EV conversions in NZ use cheaper 
DC motor/controller sets that do not have regeneration capability). 
• Removal of the ICE will remove the engine manifold vacuum energy 
source for the brake booster. This vacuum is used by the brake booster 
during engine idle and higher levels of vacuum are available during 
downshifting deceleration. 
During an EV conversion, an increase in vehicle weight is likely therefore it is 
critical for a safe conversion that the brake system is modified in a safe manner. 
When a driver downshifts during a brake manoeuvre the engine produces a 
negative torque (
.
θ∝−T ) as well as a higher manifold vacuum to the booster. 
Both these effects mean that less brake pedal force is required by the driver for a 
given deceleration rate. This effect is absent with an EV (even if retro-fitted with a 
vacuum booster system). It is justified that extra design and certification effort is 
directed at the brake system and in particular the vacuum booster. To further 
illustrate this point UNECE (2008) states that;  
“…where the use of an auxiliary energy source is essential for the 
operation of a braking device, the energy reserve must be such as to ensure 
that, should the engine stop, the braking performance remains sufficient to 
bring the vehicle to a halt in the prescribed conditions”. 
Removal of the ICE will remove the engine manifold vacuum energy source for 
the brake booster. This will greatly increase the braking force required for a given 
deceleration as vacuum boosters increase the brake system gain (boost ratio) by 3 
to 4 for smaller cars and as much as 9 for a large car. Brake systems are usually 
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designed for a gain not greater than 4 to 6 in order to ensure safe vehicle 
deceleration in the event of a boost failure (Limpert 1999). A new source of 
vacuum is required to replace the manifold vacuum. 
The EV conversion industry standard solution to this problem is to fit an electric 
vacuum pump and control circuits with or without an auxiliary vacuum reservoir. 
Many products and kits are available through EV equipment suppliers. A 
schematic of a generic system showing the components of a good design is given 
in Figure 8.4 below. 
     
 
Figure 8.4 Generic vacuum pump brake system. 
 
8.3.1 Vacuum system requirements 
The retrofit vacuum system requirements are; 
• Sufficient vacuum during all vehicle operating conditions. 
• Sufficient energy capacity (vacuum storage) during all vehicle operating 
conditions and during pump failure (UNECE 2008). 
• High Reliability 
• Controllable linear boost characteristic(Limpert 1999) 
• The system must react at a speed comparable to the OEM system (IVA-
M1 2009). 
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Compliance with the vacuum system requirements for an EV conversion raises 
many issues. The first is what are the OEM specifications for the vacuum for a 
particular conversion? As this data is not published by the automakers some 
measurements of engine vacuum were taken on a selection of vehicles. Some 
devices which are commonly used to measure engine manifold vacuum are shown 
in Figure 8.5 below. For the vacuum testing the vacuum gauge shown in Figure 
8.5 (b) was used with a scale zero to -100 kPa This device was bought for under 
40 NZD. Standard pneumatic tubing and brass fittings were used to plumb the 
gauge into the vacuum line either before or after the check valve. 
 
 
Figure 8.5 (a) Automotive vacuum test gauge 0 to -100 kPa (anticlockwise) 
integrated with fuel pump pressure tester (b) Vacuum gauge 0 to -30 inHg (100 
kPa) (anticlockwise). 
(b) (a) 
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Figure 8.6 Tee junction and pneumatic line for vacuum gauge. 
 
Two vehicles (a Toyota Vitz and Ford Mondeo) were chosen for this test to 
represent vehicles which are commonly subject to EV conversion. Engine intake 
manifold vacuum varies with the engine operating mode. In the engine off or 
stalled condition the manifold vacuum is zero (unless the engine is driven by the 
gearbox), at full throttle the vacuum is also close to zero. The engine idle and 
engine braking conditions are the relevant conditions for brake booster 
performance. Testing showed that at engine idle (closed throttle) the manifold 
pressure is at its maximum and a generic brake booster needs at least 16 inHg (-54 
kPa) of vacuum at idle. Under hard engine braking (down shifting) manifold 
vacuum can reach 23 inHg (-85 kPa) further reducing pedal force for a given 
deceleration. Limpert (1999) uses a value of 23.3 inHg (-79 kPa) in a generic 
brake boost analysis. Details of the vacuum values measured during this project is 
given in Figure 8.2 below. 
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Vehicle Nominal 
engine 
size [l] 
Tare [kg] Idle + 2 kPa Hard braking 
[kPa] + 5 kPa 
50 km/h in 2nd 
Toyota Vitz (Echo) 1.0 900 -65 -85 
Ford Mondeo 2.0 1500 -70 -82 
Table 8.2 Measured manifold vacuums. Note: Vacuum was measured with a new 
or freshly cleaned air filter. 
 
The above figures are only a guide for EV converters with the point of this 
exercise to explore the variance in manifold vacuums given the lack of available 
data. Ideally it is recommended that measurements of each converted vehicle are 
used for both design and testing the vacuum system. 
It is also useful to review commercial 12V vacuum pumps and EV vacuum kits to 
assess their suitability. An EV converter might source a pump originally designed 
for another purpose to provide a vacuum source. For example, it is conceivable 
that a cost effective 12 V tyre inflation pump could be modified for use in an EV 
conversion. It is not the intention to exclude this however a converter must show 
that the device is suitable in terms of performance, design and reliability. This 
would include an assessment of pressure (vacuum), flow rate and pump motor 
duty cycle. A table of products advertised as suitable for EV conversions is given 
in Appendix 8. 
 
8.3.2 Vacuum System Design 
The braking system reaction speed is related to the volumetric capacity of the 
system, as there will be a delay of the service brake operation with the reaction 
time of the remotely applied electric vacuum pump. The vacuum system requires 
volume which can be provided by the booster volume (VB) line pipes (VL), or a 
reservoir (VR) fitted to the system. Adequate volumetric capacity in a vacuum 
system serves a number of purposes of which those relevant to vacuum boosters 
are; 
• to supplement pump suction, 
• to maintain system vacuum, and 
• As an emergency power source. 
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Vacuum energy capacity can be estimated by calculating the reduction in vacuum 
during braking. The vacuum should not reduce below say 16 inHg (-54 kPa) 
during single full stroke brake application. In the following analysis, for a single-
diaphragm booster, it is assumed that the vacuum pump is slower to respond than 
the time it takes to apply the brake. 
The initial system volume, RLB VVVV ++= 11  where;  
VB1 is the initial booster volume,  
VL is the volume of the vacuum hoses and, 
VR is the reservoir (accumulator) volume (see Figure X).  
The system volume after brake application is RLB VVVV ++= 22 . Where VB2 is 
the booster volume after brake application calculated from the pedal travel, pedal 
ratio and booster diaphragm radius. 
The required minimum system volume can be estimated by considering the 
reduction in vacuum during one full brake application. It is assumed that the pump 
runs intermittently, the vacuum is as such delivered by the capacity of the system 
and reservoir. The change in vacuum must not result in a pressure higher than -54 
kPa, or a value decided after the vehicle is tested by measuring the OEM vacuum 
requirements for a particular vehicle model. In the following example a standby 
system vacuum, P1 of −70 kPa is assumed. The system design pressures are 
shown graphically in Figure 8.7 below. 
 
Figure 8.7 System vacuum pressures 
 
-kPa 
Vacuum warning, Pw 
Lower design, P2 (Minimum safe vacuum) 
Upper pump switch (off), P1 
Switch 
hysteresis 
Atmospheric ambient 
Lower pump switch (on), P 
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Calculation Example: 
For an ideal gas undergoing a reversible adiabatic process the relation 
is λλ 2211 VPVP = . Where λ = 1.4. The minimum reservoir volume, VRmin can be 
calculated by choosing the minimum system vacuum, P2min: 
 
1min2
2min211
min
)]([)]([
PP
VVPVVPV LBLBR −
−−+
=  
 
Typical dimensions for a generic brake system are: 
Pedal travel Sp = 0.1 m. Maximum pedal travel should not exceed 150mm 
(Limpert 1999). 
Pedal ratio lp = 2.4 (by measurement of brake pedal lever) 
Booster Ø 8 in (203 mm) 
Initial Vacuum, P1 = 101.3-70 = 31.3 kPa Absolute (Std Atm = 101.3 kPa) 
Minimum vacuum, P2min = -50 = 47.3 kPa Absolute 
Vacuum line ID, = 6.0 mm 
Vacuum line length, L = 1.0 m 
 
Booster stroke is calculated to be 0.1/2.4 = 0.0416 m from this the booster volume 
is estimated to be, VB1 = π(0.203/2)2(0.0416) = 1.3(10-3) m3 (Neglecting push rod 
diameter). The VB2 is conservatively taken as zero (fully exhausted booster). The 
energy stored in the elastic flexibility of the system materials is neglected. Line 
volume is calculated as VL = π(0.003)2(1) = 2.8(10-5) m3. Taking the brake system 
properties from above and applying equation below the VRmin is evaluated as; 
  
)3.31(3.47
))]10(8.20(3.47[))]10(8.2)10(3.1(3.31[ 553
min −
−−+
=
−−−
RV  
 = 2.7(10-3) m3  
 = 2.7 litres 
The final system properties are then: 
P1 = -70   kPa 
P2 = -54   kPa 
V1 = 4.0(10-3)   m3 
V2 = 2.7(10-3)   m3 
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VRmin = 2.7  litres 
 
For this example the line volume is negligible when compared to booster volume 
and reservoir volume. A reasonable sized reservoir is required to keep P2 within 
the limits defined (-54 kPa). 
To ease the calculation of system size, a PV chart with adiabats plotted can be 
used. This graphic aid is based on the adiabatic change of condition and is thought 
to be sufficiently accurate for most reservoir system problems. The previous 
example is plotted below to show the graphical calculation method in use. 
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Figure 8.8 System volume calculation, characteristic curves. 
 
The red lines represent the charged vacuum system before brake application. 
During a full brake application the volume change of the booster cavity shown by 
VB1 and the PV plot follows the black arrow resulting in the final pressure P2. 
 
8.3.3 Vacuum Consumption Rate and Pump Flow 
A cyclic brake fade test as described in the LVV brake standard LVVTA (2000) is 
not adequate to test the vacuum system as the pedal applications occur over a 
relatively long period of time (2 minutes). The vacuum pumps capacity to 
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recharge the vacuum system must be tested separately using repeated pedal 
applications over a prescribed period of time. The basis for this test might be a full 
brake application rate of one stroke every two seconds. Using data from the 
example above a theoretical pump flow rate of at least 39 l/min will be required. 
The Table in Appendix 8 shows this is within the stated flow rate of the Thomas 
pump model, 107CDC20. Physical testing can take place in a stationary vehicle 
with the vacuum system at its maximum operational vacuum, P1. It is suggested 
that the system must sustain five full pedal applications of the service-brake with 
full release of the brakes after each application over a ten second period without 
P2 being reached or the vacuum warning signal (Pw) being triggered. The test 
suggested above takes guidance from the requirements for the testing of a heavy 
passenger service vehicle compressed air brakes (NZTA 2006). 
 
8.3.4 Pressure Gauge Requirements 
Heavy vehicles in NZ that have compressed air braking systems must be fitted 
with at least one pressure gauge that is readily visible to the driver at all times 
from the driver’s normal driving position. This gauge indicates to the driver the 
pressure in the service brake reservoirs (NZTA 2006). Whether a requirement for 
a vacuum gauge is introduced for low volume EVs is open to debate. A pressure 
warning light or audible signal should certainly be introduced as required by 
NCOP-14 (2011), however whether this is supplemented or replaced by a vacuum 
gauge is not clear. The heavy vehicle requirement for a compressed air gauge is 
not strictly applicable to vacuum systems as the vacuum is only a supplementary 
source of energy, supplementing the force from the driver’s foot. A simple low-
cost warning buzzer or light would seem to provide adequate warning of vacuum 
failure. An EV converter who has had a vacuum gauge fitted for setup and testing 
purposes may leave it installed to supplement the warning signal. 
 
8.3.5 Certification Issues 
The certification procedures given in LVVTA (2000) and Johnson (2007) are 
generally adequate for the assessment of vacuum pump retrofitted OEM brake 
systems. Special consideration however must be given to the adequacy of the 
vacuum source and control regime. Theoretical calculation and design as outlined 
in this section can be provided to the certifier to show that the vacuum system 
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requirements outlined above have been met. Apart from the visual inspection of 
the system design, materials and workmanship, the certifier must also perform 
physical tests to prove compliance. The recommended tests for vacuum systems 
are listed below: 
• Test ICE vehicle for OEM idle vacuum and deceleration vacuum. This 
will provide data for system design. 
• Pedal Sink Test on start up - release vacuum. 
• System capacity test with pump off. Vacuum held by check valve. One (1) 
full brake application. Measure system pressure (P2) after pedal is 
released. 
• A stationary pump capacity test. A number of full pedal applications of the 
service-brake with full release of the brakes after each application over a 
certain defined period without P2 being reached or the vacuum warning 
signal (Pw) being triggered. 
 
8.3.6 Recommendations for Vacuum Systems 
A well designed vacuum system should include the following attributes as well as 
those given in LVVTA (2000) Section 2.3: 
1. 12 V (or other) vacuum pump limited to or just above OEM idle vacuum 
to prevent over vacuum which could make the brakes very sensitive and 
difficult to control. A pump flow rate capacity to replenish the system 
during a cyclic brake fade resistance test such as described by Johnson 
(2007) in section 19.12. 
2. Vacuum hoses supplied to approved standards and installed correctly. 
3. A check valve fitted as close as possible to the vacuum pump. 
4. A pump control vacuum switches which switch with differential vacuum 
(not absolute) and has hysteresis. An absolute vacuum switch will give 
reduced brake performance at high altitude. A pressure drop of 11.5 kPa is 
expected at 1000m above sea level (desert road central north island). 
Pressure drop due to storms will not have significant effects. 2.3 kPa drop 
in pressure is experienced with a 990 hPa storm event when compared 
with standard atmospheric pressure (1015 hPa). The pump must actuate 
above 54 kPa or other design value. 
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5. Low vacuum warning indicator must light if the vacuum drops below 54 
kPa or other design value. EEC (1971) requires an ‘optical or acoustical 
signal when the energy, in any part of the installation preceding the control 
valve, falls to 65 % or less of its normal value.’ 
6. A system capacity to allow compliance with a cyclic brake fade resistance 
test such as described by Johnson (2007) in section 19.12. 
7. A vacuum system capacity to ensure that, should the vacuum pump stop, 
the braking performance remains sufficient to bring the vehicle to a halt. 
8. Booster runout point (saturation) should not be reached for decelerations 
less than 0.9 g (Limpert 1999). A modified OEM brake system will meet 
this requirement. 
9. The energy source for the vacuum pump motor must be given priority over 
other vehicle functions in the event of circuit failures. The use of an 
auxiliary 12 V battery assures this. 
10. The calculated service efficiency with the servo depleted must be at least 
30% (IVA-M1 2009) - A modified OEM brake system will meet this 
requirement. 
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8.4 Auxiliary Brakes and Regenerative Brakes 
     9 
 
 
 
8.4.1 Introduction 
Engine braking passively reduces wear on brakes and helps the driver to maintain 
control of the vehicle. Active use of engine braking (shifting into a lower gear), is 
advantageous when it is necessary to control speed while driving down very steep 
and/or long slopes. It should be applied before regular disk or drum brakes have 
been used, leaving the brakes available to make emergency stops. Improper 
engine braking can cause the wheels to skid (also called shift-locking), especially 
on slippery surfaces such as ice or snow. In a skid caused by over-braking the 
vehicle will not regain traction until the wheels are allowed to turn more quickly, 
meaning the driver must reduce engine braking (shifting back up) to regain 
traction. It is useful to review the regulatory definitions of brake systems to 
understand how electrical braking devices fit into this system. 
 
8.4.2 Electric Auxiliary Brakes Regulatory Definitions 
Electrical devices for reducing the speed of a moving vehicle, or bringing it to a 
halt, or holding it stationary are generally defined as being a “braking devices” or 
a “brake” (EEC 1971). An engine brake is also defined as a “brake” in EEC 
(1971) when the (braking) forces are derived from a controlled increase in the 
braking action of the engine transmitted to the wheels. Section 1.17. EEC (1971), 
defines a ‘Retarder’ as; 
“…means  an  additional  braking  system  having  the  capability  to 
provide and to maintain  a braking effect  over a long period of time  
without  a  significant  reduction  in  performance.  The term ‘retarder’ 
covers the complete system including the control device.” From these 
definitions we can say that engine or motor braking, which is part of the 
vehicle brake system, is both a brake and retarder and as such should be 
taken into account in the overall brake system design”. 
                                                 
9 NZ road signs from http://www.nzta.govt.nz/ 
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8.4.3 Types of Electric Auxiliary Brake 
Several types of auxiliary brake technologies are in current use on motor vehicles 
including engine (compression) brakes, various types of exhaust brakes (diesel 
engines) and hydraulic retarders. The engine brake is the most common and is 
intrinsically present with petrol powered ICE vehicles. This type of brake is 
activated when the driver lifts the foot off the accelerator with the transmission in 
gear and clutch engaged (for automatic transmissions low gear must be selected). 
In the petrol engine most of the retarding torque is provided by the engine pistons 
working against the vacuum created by the closed throttle valve.  
The torque production in an ICE vehicle during engine braking is analogous to 
viscous damping. The amount of torque produced (-T) is approximately 
proportional to the engine speed, 
.
θ  ie; 
.
θ∝−T  or 
.
θCT =−  
where C is the engine braking coefficient. The capacity of a generic ICE for 
engine braking is that it will produce approximately 45 to 50% of the base power 
of the engine without any special provision to increase the retarding effect (eg 
exhaust brakes) (Limpert 1999). This capacity for power dissipation is very useful 
and sometimes essential on long descents and for improving friction brake life. 
The electric motor on the other hand has a 100% capacity for producing braking 
effect through regenerative braking and/or resistance braking and/or plug braking. 
The ‘four quadrant’ control capability of the electric motor torque verses speed is 
shown in Figure 8.9 below; 
 155 
 
 
Figure 8.9 Electric motor four quadrant capability. Quadrant A and C represent 
forward and reverse motoring respectively. Quadrant B and D represent forward 
and reverse braking. 
It is important to consider how this braking is controlled so that the result is a safe 
and controlled deceleration. Hughes (2006) describes the various types of electric 
motor braking and their control, of which regenerative braking is the most 
important for EVs. These have been summarised in the Table 8.3 below: 
Brake Motor Type Control Energy  
Dynamic 
Braking 
DC Switch resistor across armature brushes or 
simply short circuit for high power braking 
Dissipated as heat in 
resistor and motor 
windings 
Plug Braking 
(Reversal) 
AC Interchange two of the 3ph supply leads. 
High currents generated (greater than 
starting). Switch off supply before going into 
reverse 
Dissipated as heat in 
motor windings 
Injection 
Braking 
AC DC current fed into stator Dissipated as heat in 
motor windings 
Regenerative AC & DC Motor switched to generator Energy recovered to 
supply (RESS) or 
dissipated in resistor 
Table 8.3 Electric motor braking and control. Note: For the purpose of this thesis electrical 
braking does not include a ‘Brake by Wire’ Electro-Mechanical Brake (EMB), which is a friction brake system 
with electrical energy source, modulation and transmission systems. 
 
Speed 
Torque 
A 
B 
D 
C 
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8.5 Regenerative Braking 
Regenerative braking in an electric vehicle is a type of auxiliary brake. 
Regenerative braking is the most important braking technology for electric motor 
vehicles as it takes advantage of the intrinsic characteristics of the electric motor 
to act as a generator and recover a portion of the kinetic energy of the vehicle 
during braking. Regenerative braking then returns this energy to the battery 
thereby improving the energy efficiency of the vehicle. As with engine 
compression braking, regenerative braking torque decreases to zero as the vehicle 
comes to a rest and as such, it is a suitable replacement for engine compression 
braking in an EV conversion. 
The design of regenerative braking systems involves complex compromises and 
competing design goals and these issues have been summarised in Figure 8.10 
below.  The following section will discuss regenerative braking in more detail. 
 
Figure 8.10 The competing design considerations of regenerative braking systems 
for EV conversions. 
 
8.5.1 Regenerative Brake Power 
A large amount of energy is consumed in braking. For example a 1000 kg vehicle 
stopping at 0.9 g from a speed of 100 km/h (27.7 m/s) stops in a time of 3.1 s. The 
energy absorbed is 383 kJ and the power required is 122 kW. This amount of 
power cannot be absorbed by the electric motor alone as the vehicle may only 
Regenerative 
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have a 40 kW electric motor installed. The battery pack will also be limited by the 
maximum power it can accept. To meet this demand there is a strong argument 
that a hydraulic brake system is needed to supplement the electric braking so that 
the regenerative brake system is controlled in an integrated manner. 
 
8.5.2 Is Regeneration Necessary? The case of Automatic Transmissions 
Vehicles with automatic transmissions always have gear selector positions for low 
gears (the ‘2’ and ‘1’ positions) to provide the engine braking function. The 
Toyota Prius uses a ‘B’ position to select the engine ‘braking function’ of the 
automatic transmission. Anecdotal evidence suggests drivers of automatics do not 
use these ‘gears’ very much as automotive mechanics report that these vehicles 
need more frequent friction lining replacement. This suggests that vehicles can be 
safely operated without regenerative retardation. 
Regenerative braking should always be considered in regard to a vehicle’s safety 
system as it is another way of converting kinetic energy and slowing down the 
vehicle. The majority of the current EV conversions do not have regenerative 
braking as they use low cost DC motors and controllers without regeneration 
capability. This gives the vehicle a neutral gear coasting effect when the 
accelerator is not depressed. An electric motor has no engine compression like an 
ICE so if the regular braking system fails there is no alternative system to 
decelerate the vehicle. Whilst it is not suggested that all EVs must have 
regeneration, it is strongly recommended that EV converters use traction systems 
which have regenerative capability. Furthermore, the lack of regeneration in an 
EV conversion should be considered a modification of the brake system and if no 
regeneration is present, then careful design of the remaining brake system must be 
undertaken. 
 
8.5.3 Types of Regenerative Brake and their Control Strategies 
EV technology provides opportunities for new user interfaces with the vehicle 
brakes such as user selectable regeneration control, single pedal 
acceleration/braking and regeneration user displays. This section will discuss how 
this new technology is being deployed. 
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Ehsani (2004) identifies and discusses the two basic questions of regenerative 
braking control which can be summarised as: 
 1. how  to  distribute  the  total braking  forces  required  between  the  
regenerative  brake  and  the  mechanical friction brake so as to recover the kinetic 
energy of the vehicle as much as possible and, 
2.  how to distribute the total braking forces on the front and rear axles so as to 
achieve steady-state braking (and good front rear brake proportioning).  
The basic brake control strategies for a hybrid braking system which has 
regenerative and mechanical brakes, are analogous to hybrid power systems and 
can be described in the same terms; series braking (series hybrid), parallel braking 
(parallel hybrid), and series-parallel braking (series-parallel hybrid). Optimal 
driver feel or optimal energy recovery control strategies can also be employed 
(Ehsani 2004). 
An additional, simpler method which is common with EV converters has been 
termed by the author as ‘fixed regeneration’. Each of these brake control strategies 
including fixed regeneration are discussed below. 
 
8.5.3.1 Series Braking 
The shortest braking distance and optimal braking efficiency requires the braking 
forces on the front and rear wheels to follow the ideal braking force distribution 
curve shown in Figure 8.1. Series braking involves control strategies which 
requires the regenerative brake to be applied first and then the hydraulic brake 
provides any additional braking power. These systems are highly integrated and 
require active control of both electric regenerative braking and mechanical 
braking forces on the front and rear wheels they are also usually integrated with 
an ABS system.  
Due to development costs of this type of system series braking is unlikely to be 
utilised by the home or professional EV converter. 
 
 159 
8.5.3.2 Parallel Braking 
Parallel braking involves the simultaneous application and control of both brakes. 
Ehsani (2004) describes in detail parallel braking as; 
“The parallel braking system does not need an electronically controlled 
mechanical brake system. A pressure sensor senses the hydraulic pressure 
in the master cylinder, which represents the deceleration demand. The 
pressure signal  is  regulated  and  sent  to  the  electric  motor  controller  
to  control  the electric motor to produce the demanded braking torque. 
Compared with the series braking of both optimal feel and energy 
recovery, the parallel braking system has a much simpler construction and 
control system. However, the driver’s feeling, and amount of energy 
recovered are compromised.” (Ehsani 2004, p.343). 
 
8.5.3.3 Series-Parallel Braking 
In practice vehicle products which come from large auto manufacturers will 
employ complex brake control topologies to achieve conflicting design goals. In 
vehicles like the Toyota Prius, engine braking is simulated by computer software 
to match the feel of a traditional automatic transmission. For long downhill runs 
the driver can shift the gear selector to ‘B’ mode. The drive system then acts like a 
lower gear, if necessary employing higher engine speed in the ICE to dissipate 
energy preventing the battery from becoming overcharged by the regenerative 
brake. Some control strategies from the Toyota Prius are given in the Figures 
below. 
 
 160 
 
 
Figure 8.11 Toyota Lexus brake control, adapted from Williamsen (2007) (a) 
Regenerative Braking (Gen 1) (b) Electronically Controlled Braking (ECB)(Gen 
2) 
 
 
Figure 8.12  (a) Electronically controlled braking (b) Brake Force Proportioning 
Toyota Gen 1 (Williamsen 2007). 
 
8.5.3.4 Fixed Regeneration 
Fixed regeneration- a term coined by the author describes a simple and common 
control strategy that is used by EV converters. In fixed regeneration the vehicle is 
designed so that the regeneration is activated when the accelerator pedal is 
released (throttle off regeneration). The regeneration can be modulated on the 
accelerator pedal or just switched on when the pedal is released. Regeneration 
systems with a power adjustment knob on the dash-board are also common. If 
regeneration is modulated on the accelerator pedal and a large amount of 
(a) (b) 
 161 
regeneration is set, then both acceleration and braking can be actuated on the same 
pedal. This is a new type of vehicle control and while offering some advantages to 
the expert driver, it could be disconcerting and dangerous for most drivers as the 
modulation for braking is the reverse of the brake pedal (release pedal for greater 
deceleration). For this reason and the fact that large braking forces on a single axle 
can cause axle lock on low friction surfaces, large amounts of regeneration on the 
accelerator pedal is not recommended. Fixed regeneration however, is 
recommended for the EV converter as it represents a cost effective solution 
without requiring a large amount of integration with the friction brake system (as 
with series and parallel braking). Throttle off regeneration also negates the need 
for integration with the ABS system. 
EV converters should aim to keep the feel of the vehicle controls similar to before 
the conversion which includes using regeneration to simulate engine braking. This 
will avoid any dangerous surprises when a new driver uses the vehicle for the first 
time. This is especially important for professional converters who sell their 
products on the open market. Professional converters also need to design their 
vehicles carefully due to their higher liability.  
Although it is beneficial to set regeneration high in order to recover as much 
kinetic energy from the vehicle as possible, relying on driver feel has inherent 
risks such as front axle lockup on low friction surfaces which will limit the 
amount of regeneration possible. To establish a practical limit for regenerative 
braking power some vehicle tests were carried out. These are discussed in Section 
8.6. 
 
8.5.4 Brake Standards and Regenerative Braking 
To gain an understanding of the legal requirements of regenerative brake systems, 
a review of UNECE (2008) was undertaken. Currently in NZ international vehicle 
standards including UNECE (2008) which detail requirements for regenerative 
braking, are cited and applied as approved standards by the Land Transport Rule, 
Light Vehicle Brakes. The definitions used within these standards are similar to 
those discussed in the previous section on auxiliary brakes. The definition for 
regenerative braking as provided in UNECE (2008) has been applied in this 
research and is detailed as: 
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“2.12 Electric   regenerative   braking;   means   a   braking   system   
which,   during deceleration, provides for the conversion of vehicle kinetic 
energy into electrical energy.” (UNECE 2008, p.11) 
UNECE (2008) identifies two regenerative braking categories, depending if they 
are part of the service braking system or not. Section 2.17.2 defines Category A as 
a regenerative braking system not part of the service braking system and Category 
B as a regenerative braking system which is part of the service braking system. 
This corresponds with the previous categorisation of regenerative brake types 
where Category ‘A’ would include fixed regeneration and Category ‘B’ would 
include the Series and/or Parallel control schemes. 
 
The legal requirement for the different categories of regenerative brakes is defined 
by UNECE (2008) in Regulation No.13. Relevant sections from this document 
have been cited and can be referred to in Appendix 9. Regulation 13 (UNECE 
2008) shows that low technology (low cost) options are available to the EV 
converter while still meeting requirements. These options however, are likely to 
include a fixed regeneration control scheme. A recent draft version of NCOP14 
(2011) addresses this issue as detailed below; 
“Regenerative braking, if used, should not alter the balance between front 
and rear braking characteristics of the original vehicle.  As a general 
guideline, regenerative braking should not exceed the deceleration levels 
generated by the original internal combustion engine and must never 
disconnect the friction braking system. Service braking systems that are 
modified to include regenerative braking as part of the service braking 
system are not covered by these Guidelines and advice must be sought 
from the relevant Registration Authority if this type of modification is 
contemplated. Similarly, advice must be sought from the relevant 
Registration Authority if an ICV is to be designed to have regenerative 
braking incorporated in the service braking system.  (For the purposes of 
these Guidelines, activation of regenerative braking by either lightly 
touching or applying pressure on the brake pedal means that regenerative 
braking is part of the service brake system and therefore not covered by 
these Guidelines)” (NCOP-14 2011, p. 20). 
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8.5.5 Regeneration Control by the Driver 
The ‘selectable engine braking’ of automatic transmission equipped vehicles 
(discussed on page 158) provides a precedent for regenerative braking systems to 
have a driver selectable on – off function. The ‘off’ position would serve as a 
‘coasting function’ and the ‘on’ position used for braking and long descents. To 
allow easy use by the driver it would be best to position this switch as a steering 
column stalk switch behind the steering wheel. An example of a two position stalk 
switch can be seen on heavy diesel vehicles to switch the exhaust retarder. 
The selectable engine brake is defined as an ‘Independent retarder’ by UNECE 
(2008) section 1.17.1 and is defined as a retarder “…whose control device is 
separate from that of the service and other braking systems”. A dash board mount 
is not recommended for this switch as an unsuitable location would require the 
driver to let go of the steering wheel to activate the brake. UNECE (2008) section 
5.2.18.1.1. also does not allow the use of a stalk switch for vehicles less than 3500 
kg as it states that “…regenerative braking shall only be activated by the 
accelerator control and/or the gear neutral position”. If a manual gearbox and 
clutch is retained as part of the conversion, regenerative braking can be 
disengaged by the driver at anytime.  
This implies that the control of brake power should be exclusively handled by the 
brake pedal and rules out any dash board control of regeneration, activation or 
power. The regeneration power must then be set and fixed by the vehicle’s 
manufacturer or modifier.  
There are some significant advantages for including a stalk type on – off switch 
for regeneration, as a coasting function (off) facilitates energy efficient driving 
and the regeneration function (on) supplements braking power. It is recommended 
that this area is debated further, including the development of additional safety 
features that would support this system such as a warning light to alert the driver 
to any failure of the regenerative brake. 
 
 
8.5.6 Battery Considerations 
As discussed earlier, the battery packs power acceptance capacity must not be 
exceeded in regeneration or in battery charging. Although it is noted that this 
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power capacity is different from energy capacity during charging, both must be 
taken into account when designing a regenerative braking system.  
Dhameja (2002) describes the charge acceptance (power) as follows: 
“…The charge acceptance (due to batteries internal resistance) curve 
describes the maximum charge rate, which the battery is capable to accept 
(i.e., convert into stored electrochemical energy). Anything above this 
charge rate constitutes an overcharge. Thus the battery pack can be driven 
into an overcharge at any time, in any state of charge by excessive charge 
current process (Dhameja 2002, p. 96) 
Dhameja (2002) goes on further to say: 
“A battery in a battery pack can be reduced to a weak state by excessive 
discharge rates. These conditions of abuse are characterized by short 
powerful bursts of charging current at excessive voltages during 
regenerative braking. Regeneration can exceed the absolute maximum 
charge acceptance ability of the battery if it is not properly managed. This 
condition exceeds the charge acceptance ability of the battery in the range 
of 80 to 100% SOC (the charge acceptance ability of the battery in 100% 
SOC is  zero). Under these conditions, the battery becomes a large heat 
sink” (p. 134). 
This highlights the requirement that a regenerative braking controller needs 
detailed information about the charge acceptance curve (internal resistance) which 
is dependent on SOC, temperature and battery age. Lower temperatures result in 
higher internal resistance. 
A worse case scenario could be a person driving down from the top of a hill on a 
cold morning in an EV which has been charged overnight. If the controller is not 
monitoring the battery SOC and the cooling capacity is exceeded, then the battery 
could overheat leading to disastrous consequences. Although high temperature 
cut-off sensors and contractors would avoid this possibility, a safer strategy is to 
control RESS charging by using the controller electronics to determine both the 
energy and power to the RESS. 
UNECE (2008) also notes that electric regenerative braking capacity is influenced 
by the electric SOC and state that during brake design, curves shall be plotted 
taking into account the electric braking component under the minimal and 
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maximum conditions of delivered braking force. These curves have been given in 
Figure 8.12 above. The hyperbolic curves are the regeneration power limit. 
A simple calculation of a typical pack power capacity can be made using the 
specific power figures published by manufacturer. For a 24 kWh Li-ion battery 
pack the specific power would be 24kW calculated from a specific energy of 100 
Wh/kg and specific power of 100 W/kg ((Dhameja 2002) gives a range of 20 – 
220 W/kg). The regeneration controller would need to be limited to this value. 
Notwithstanding the above complexities, simple control of regeneration can be 
achieved by a controller or BMS high voltage cut-off (excess energy) at 100% 
SOC and a high power cut-off (excess power). These requirements should allow 
safe regeneration operation if we take a conservative estimate of the battery 
charge acceptance capacity at 99% SOC, -10° C temperature (NZ) for an aged 
battery. 
 
8.5.7 Regeneration and Brake Lights 
Not all vehicle decelerations normally result in illumination of the vehicles brake 
signal. ICE engine vehicles brake lights do not illuminate under engine 
compression braking. UNECE (2008) states that as electric regenerative braking 
systems produce a retarding force upon release of the throttle pedal (fixed 
regeneration, Category A), this will not generate a braking signal to illuminate 
stop lamps. Regeneration systems of Category B should require a deceleration 
level at which the brake signal is illuminated to be decided by the designer. The 
following section will show by deceleration testing that this value is likely to be 
between 0.1 and 0.2 g. 
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8.6 ICE Engine Brake Capacity 
NCOP-14 (2011) states; 
 “As a general guideline, regenerative braking should not exceed the 
deceleration levels generated by the original internal combustion engine 
and must never disconnect the friction braking system” (p. 20). 
To ascertain the level of engine compression controlled braking acceptable for 
ICE vehicles, it was decided to test the engine braking capacity of some vehicles. 
It has already been shown that engine braking (regeneration) must be limited to 
below 0.2 g to avoid drive axle lockup on low friction surfaces and to achieve 
compliance with international standards. In this section the methodology and 
results of the deceleration testing is described and discussed.  
8.6.1 Instrumented Passenger Cars 
The vehicles chosen for the deceleration test were a 1999 Toyota Vitz (Echo) four 
door hatch and a 2005 Ford Mondeo station wagon. The vehicles were chosen to 
represent potential vehicle models that could be suitable as a donor vehicle for an 
EV conversion. These vehicles were also readily available to the author for testing 
purposes. Although an obvious limitation is that only two vehicles were tested, the 
primary objective of the deceleration test was to measure the deceleration 
characteristics of ‘typical’ vehicles during down shifting. The data obtained from 
these two vehicles provided a starting point to discuss this area. 
The instrumentation that was fitted to the vehicle was a Gulf Coast Data Concepts 
Model X6-2 three axis accelerometer. The X6-2 was configured with a range of 
+2 g and a sample rate of 40 Hz. The accelerometer was recalibrated using the 
method given on the website http://www.gcdataconcepts.com/calibration.html. 
The data, recorded as a .csv file, was analysed and plotted in a spreadsheet. The 
accelerometer was mounted on the passenger’s side floor of the vehicle using a 
steel mount which was fabricated for this purpose. This is shown in the Figure 
8.13 below. The bulls-eye bubble and adjustment screws were used to set up the 
accelerometer to be level for testing. A detailed setup and testing procedure is 
described in Appendix 7. During data analysis the roll error introduced by road 
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camber was corrected using euler rotation of the data about the x-axis. The 
average road camber measured using this method was between 1.6 and 3.6°. The 
error due to vehicle pitching during deceleration was neglected as an analysis of 
pitch angle versus deceleration showed that for decelerations of interest (around 
0.1g) the error would be around 0.5°. 
Figure 8.13 X6-2 accelerometer mounted to the floor of a test vehicle. 
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Figure 8.14 The Toyota Vitz 1999 (1000 cc) test vehicle. 
Figure 8.15 Ford Mondeo 2005 (2000 cc) test vehicle. 
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The tests were conducted on a straight, level road with some camber. The days for 
testing were chosen for low traffic density and calm wind conditions. 
8.6.2 Results 
The tests were carried out by decelerating the vehicle from 100 km/h by changing 
gear at the appropriate time and recording the deceleration history. A typical plot 
recorded is shown below. 
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Figure 8.16 Data plots for a typical test run (run-009) 1999 Toyota Vitz (Echo). 
Ax - vehicle braking and acceleration, Ay – lateral acceleration, Az – vertical 
acceleration (gravity and road noise). Velocity and distance integrated from 
acceleration data is also shown. 
The Ax plot clearly shows the gear changes made the first gear change (1st-2nd) 
was very rough (the clutch and driveline oscillations are evident) with a 2nd gear 
acceleration of around two (2) g. The engine braking deceleration period (25 -55 
sec) is reproduced below for more clarity and discussion. The Ay plot shows the 
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lateral acceleration due to the vehicle turning, body roll and road noise. This plot 
was corrected for road camber by an Euler rotation of 2.7° so that the -0.05 g 
average is now approaching 0.0° as shown. The plot of Az shows gravity, g and 
road noise. 
-0.3
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0.1
25 30 35 40 45 50 55
Figure 8.17 Typical engine braking deceleration plot Toyota Vitz (Echo) 1000 cc. 
 
The first slope represents the accelerator being released at 100 km/h with fifth 
gear engaged. The 5th – 4th gear change is shown as slight reduction in 
deceleration (clutch depressed) and then a sharp increase as the clutch is released 
followed by oscillations due to clutch and driveline flexibility. During the 2nd – 1st 
gear change at approximately 45 km/h these oscillations are violent. Decelerations 
during in-gear coasting (ignoring gear change transients) are fairly constant at 
around 0.05 g, 1st and 2nd decelerations are slightly higher but not exceeding 0.1 g. 
Average decelerations for in-gear coasting for the three vehicles tested are given 
in Table 8.4 below. 
 
Vehicle 5th 4th 3rd 2nd 1st 
1999 Vitz (Echo) 1000cc 0.046 0.045 0.043 0.076 ____ 
2006 Ford Mondeo 2000cc 0.040 0.053 0.074 0.075 ____ 
Table 8.4 Average decelerations for in-gear coasting [g]. 
 
The above measurements taken during deceleration testing have shown that any 
regenerative braking system with a fixed control scheme should have the 
maximum deceleration limited to 1.0 g. Simulation of engine braking by the 
regenerative brake can be achieved with regeneration set to 0.05 g, however a 
limit of up to 0.1 g could be justified if energy recovery is to be maximised. To 
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avoid axle locking on low friction surfaces and to ensure the design of the brake 
system complies with UNECE (2008), a deceleration of more than 0.2 g should 
not be permitted. UNECE (2008) states specific requirements for the distribution 
of brake force among the axles between 0.2 and 0.8 g 
 
8.6.3 Testing and Certification of Regenerative Brakes 
The setup, workmanship and control scheme of fixed regenerative brakes are 
easily inspected and certified. The deceleration levels however, are more difficult 
to evaluate due to the low acceleration values involved. Deceleration values such 
as those seen during the testing are not readily measured using a pendulum type 
brake tester such as a Tapley meter commonly used by vehicle certifiers. Vehicle 
certifiers should be able to judge by ‘feel’ the level of regeneration that is 
appropriate for a certain vehicle. This deceleration should be set to simulate the 
engine braking of the donor vehicle. UNECE (2008) requires vehicles with 
regenerative braking systems of category A (fixed regeneration) to undergo 
behaviour tests carried out on a track with a low adhesion coefficient (coefficient 
of adhesion of 0.3 or less). During testing, transient  conditions  such as  gear  
changes  or  accelerator  control  release shall  not  affect  the  behaviour  of  the  
vehicle  and wheel locking is not allowed. These behaviours can be subjectively 
explored by the vehicle certifier, however the use of a low adhesion coefficient 
surface is not possible as such controlled conditions are not available. In light of 
this, vehicle certifiers should be conservative when setting regeneration level. The 
certifier must also keep in mind the how the battery SOC (power acceptance) 
effects the performance of the regenerative braking system. It may be appropriate 
to test the vehicle at 50% SOC so the regeneration is at its most effective. This 
could be particularly important with a mild hybrid vehicle with a relatively small 
battery pack. 
 
8.7 Vehicle Stability 
The effect of regenerative braking on vehicle stability during braking depends on 
which axle the brake acts on. Front axle regeneration will increase the brake force 
on the front axle and cause the front axle to lock first. Although this is a stable 
condition, it should be noted that the vehicle braking efficiency will reduce. Rear 
axle regeneration will increase the tendency for the rear axle to lock first. This 
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configuration is not recommended because of weight transfer during braking. 
During this research it is assumed that regeneration is on the front wheels only 
and it is not recommended that EV converters install regenerative braking on the 
rear wheels only. Vehicle certifiers should be extremely wary of this configuration 
and ask for evidence of careful design. 
The regenerative braking system should also be ‘failure tolerant’ in case the 
electric transmission is compromised in any way. For example a short-circuit of 
the motor armature can cause maximum braking torque leading to axle lock, 
which may result in negative consequences (Bossche 2003). 
 
8.8 Anti Skid Braking (ABS) and Electronic Stability Control (ESC) 
Modern vehicles are increasingly fitted with electronic controls for braking and 
stability as standard equipment. These control systems improve the handling of 
the vehicle during extreme events. International studies confirm that ESC is 
highly effective in helping the driver maintain control of the car, thereby saving 
lives and reducing the severity of crashes. An example of how this particular 
system is integrated in the Toyota Vehicle Stability Control (VSC), is shown 
below 
 
Figure 8.18 Toyota VSC. Each function has its own control area. Each operates 
independently (Williamsen 2007). 
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In NZ, EV home converters tend to select older vehicles without ABS or ESC for 
conversions. One reason for this is to keep the cost of the donor vehicle low, but 
another reason is that the electronic vehicle systems do not need to be integrated 
into the conversion. This research suggests that this situation does not result in the 
safest EV fleet. If the effects of the conversion on the electronic systems of the 
vehicle can be kept to a low level, a safer vehicle will be the result as the newer 
vehicle is more likely to have other safety features such as a crush zone and 
airbags. EV converters should be encouraged to convert later model vehicles.  
The Low Volume Vehicle Standard for Braking Systems, LVVTA (2000) allows 
the removal of an ABS braking system from a vehicle. It remains to be seen if a 
similar clause would be introduced for ESC. The brake systems of EV 
conversions with ABS fitted will be less affected by conversion factors such as a 
change in mass distribution. 
Currently, it is not a legal requirement to have ESC so its removal from a 
particular vehicle would be accepted. This general rule however, fails to account 
how ESC may have been used by manufacturers to suppress or design-out 
undesirable handling characteristics. A well known example is the early Mercedes 
A Class which failed a stability test (the elk/moose test) shortly after its 
introduction in 1998. The vehicle suspension was subsequently redesigned with 
an ESC system which means its removal could affect the safety of the vehicle. 
Integration of the ESC systems into the EV conversion can be problematic if the 
sensors include engine speed and/or torque. A requirement to keep ESC in the 
vehicle after conversion will likely exclude these vehicles from being converted. 
This would result in older vehicle (without ESC) being converted resulting in an 
older converted EV fleet with its associated reduction in safety engineering. Many 
vehicles include an off-switch for the ESC and these vehicles could be suitable for 
conversion. A certifier must judge which case is appropriate. 
The inclusion of a highly integrated ESC as standard equipment in vehicles 
represents a challenge for EV converters as ESC designs which integrate engine 
sensors may preclude the vehicle from electric motor substitution. 
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8.9 Braking Summary 
The substitution of an ICE with an electric motor and battery pack has many 
effects on the brake system. An increase in vehicle Tare mass, change in mass 
distribution, the removal of brake booster vacuum source and the removal of ICE 
engine braking are major issues when considering an EV conversion. During a 
successful EV conversion, changes in vehicle mass should be kept to a minimum 
by careful accounting of mass changes before and after the conversion. Brake 
force distribution should be adjusted for vehicles which have had significant 
change to either longitudinal and or vertical CoG. 
The original specifications of the OEM vacuum source should be replicated by an 
alternative such as a vacuum pump. Testing of the OEM system before conversion 
provides the required design data for a detailed design, however testing showed 
the range of OEM manifold vacuum to be within -65 to -85 kPa. A simplified 
graphical design method can be used for vacuum reservoir sizing.  
Removal of the ICE has the effect of removing engine compression braking as a 
supplementary source for long and/or steep descents. Engine braking is not always 
replaced by electric regenerative braking so the cumulative effect of increased 
weight, poor vacuum performance and no engine braking may have a serious 
effect on the vehicles brake capacity. For this reason the inclusion of regenerative 
braking in an EV conversion is strongly recommended. Deceleration testing 
showed that regenerative braking for accelerator controlled regeneration should be 
set below 0.1 g for engine braking simulation and must never exceed 0.2 g to 
preserve the vehicles OEM brake force distribution. 
The functioning of the braking system is of utmost importance when it comes to 
the safe operation of the vehicle. The safe modification of a brake system for an 
EV conversion is possible by taking into account a number of design and vehicle 
certification issues outlined in this chapter. 
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Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a brief over-view of the auxiliary systems for EVs. Although the 
Sections in Chapter 9 deviate from the previous chapters about electrical, brake 
and battery safety systems, the following topics have been included as they have 
been identified as important in contributing to a vehicle’s overall safety 
performance. These include; 
• Power Steering 
• Window Demisting 
• EV Motors 
• Vehicle Noise and Pedestrian Safety 
• Chassis Loading, Tyre Loading and Vehicle Handling 
• Occupant Impact Protection, Airbags and Crash Testing 
 
9.2 Power Steering 
Vehicle power steering systems are hydraulic electro-hydraulic or electrical 
steering servo to reduce the steering wheel force required by the driver. The most 
common is a hydraulic system with the hydraulic pump being belt driven off the 
ICE. Whilst the electro-hydraulic and electric OEM systems may not need any 
modification, removing the ICE during a conversion means that the source of 
energy is lost and must be replaced. This is most commonly achieved by installing 
an appropriately sized auxiliary electric motor and drive belt. An example is given 
in Figure 9.1 below. 
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Figure 9.1 The power steering motor (retrofitted) and pump in an EV conversion. 
 
Control of the motor should drive the pump when the vehicle is in the ‘on’ or 
‘ready’ mode. OEM systems are designed to ‘fail to safe’ (in the event of belt 
drive failure) as the steering system will still operate in the event of hydraulic 
pressure loss, albeit with higher steering wheel force required. NCOP-14 (2011) 
states that power and capacity must be sufficient for the original application to 
function correctly. 
 
9.3 Window Demisting 
Removal of the ICE will also affect the performance of the window demisting 
system as the waste heat from the ICE (vehicle heater) is no longer available. The 
international EV standards do not discuss this issue. EV conversions need to 
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comply with general requirements but it is interesting to see that the Glazing, 
Windscreen Wipe and Wash, and Mirrors Rule has no requirement for demisting 
equipment. The requirement to keep the windscreen clear is a requirement of the 
operator, not the equipment. The Passenger Service Vehicle (PSV) rule however, 
does have requirements for windscreen equipment (section 6.10). 
It is proposed that window demisting equipment should be recommended for EV 
conversions but not mandated (unless they will be used as PSVs) as the 
windscreen in most vehicles can be kept clear by the operator using a cloth. The 
EV conversion industry offers a number of products to provide an alternative heat 
source for the vehicle heater and the windscreen demisting equipment or 
homemade equipment such as a modified 230 V domestic hot water heating 
element can be used as a heat source. 
 
9.4 Vehicle Noise and Pedestrian Safety 
EVs are generally much quieter than ICE vehicles and as such emit less traffic 
noise pollution. The noise emitted from ICE vehicles has also been gradually 
reducing over the last few decades. EVs are so quiet that there is a safety concern 
that pedestrians may be less aware of EVs. Furthermore EVs do not generate any 
noise when at a standstill unlike an ICE vehicle that has the engine idling. It will 
be a significant challenge for EVs that they must emit an appropriate sound to 
make people aware of their movements (Hyder 2009). 
High noise emissions EVs during battery charging from the charger itself or from 
cooling fans is also considered a problem (Bossche 2003). Charger noise is an 
environmental issue and falls outside the scope of this research. 
 Figure 9.2 shows a reduction in noise of 5 dB for the Mitsubishi iMiEV verses 
the ICE base model, the i Car. 
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Figure 9.2 i MiEV exterior noise from (Kazunori 2007) 
 
Although a primary concern is for sight-impaired pedestrians who are accustomed 
to aural cues to sense vehicles, sighted pedestrians such as runners, cyclists and 
children are also affected by the increased risks associated with a decrease in 
exterior noise from EVs. 
In 2009 the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration  published a study 
that investigated pedestrian and bicyclist crashes that involved hybrid electric 
vehicles (HEV) and to compare the results to ICE vehicles under similar 
circumstances. The study found that HEVs have a higher incidence rate of 
pedestrian and bicyclist crashes than do ICE vehicles in certain vehicle 
manoeuvres. HEVs were two times more likely to be involved in a pedestrian 
crash during slowing or stopping, backing up, or entering or leaving a parking 
space than ICE vehicles. These vehicle manoeuvres were studied as a group, as 
the difference between the sound levels produced by the hybrid verses ICE 
vehicle is the greatest at low speed (NHTSA 2009). 
NZ vehicles have a maximum noise limit of 81 dB measured by a drive-by test 
however currently, there is no minimum noise requirement. The Vehicle 
Equipment 2004, Rule 32017 has a requirement for ‘audible warning devices’ to 
be fitted to vehicles, but this term is not defined  and it is likely that it is referring 
to a vehicle’s horn. The following clause also states that a “… bell, siren or 
whistle must not be fitted to a motor vehicle if it is audible outside the motor 
vehicle” (NZTA 2004).  
The NZ regulation therefore, does not allow an ‘engine noise simulator’ to be 
fitted to a very quiet vehicle, but allows reverse warning signals. It would be 
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useful to clarify these points in any amendments to allow quiet vehicles such as 
EVs to have these devices fitted. In 2010 Toyota began sales of an onboard device 
designed to automatically emit a synthesized sound of an electric motor when the 
Prius is operating as an EV at speeds up to approximately 25 km/h. The device 
will be available in Japan for approximately 150 USD. The increased risk from 
very quiet vehicles is preventable through vehicle designs which take into account 
the multi-sensory nature of traffic detection and avoidance. Regulations that 
require vehicles to emit a minimum level of sound would also help to address this. 
As the major responsibility for avoiding an accident is with the driver, EV drivers 
in particular need to be made aware of the specific safety issues that EVs pose to 
the public given that they emit little or at times, no noise. EV safety education 
aimed at drivers and the general public can help to address this. 
NCOP-14 (2011) recommends the use of closed circuit televisions, proximity 
sensors or reversing alarms for EV conversions. 
 
9.5 Chassis Loading, Tyre Loading and Vehicle Handling 
Adding an electric motor and battery pack to a vehicle can place high demands on 
the vehicles chassis and tyres. The battery can represent a significant physical 
load to the vehicle in terms of mass and volume. Consequently, the battery exerts 
a significant factor in the vehicle design. The Gross Vehicle Mass (GVM) of the 
vehicle must never be exceeded without an engineering assessment and 
strengthening of the vehicle chassis components. Calculation methods for chassis 
loadings were discussed in Section 8.2.2 (p. 139) (Brake Proportioning and 
Adhesion Utilisation). Common methods of achieving this are up rating the rear 
suspension with stiffer springs or ‘air shocks’. Standard design and certification 
guidelines for this purpose already exist in the form of the LVV standards and the 
NZ Hobby Car Technical Manual. 
The certifier must also ensure front axle is not too light to cause steering 
instability. As a rule of thumb when a vehicle is loaded to its maximum permitted 
gross weight and its rear axle is loaded to its maximum permitted weight, the front 
axle weight must not be less than 30% of the maximum gross vehicle weight. This 
can be assessed by comparing the before and after fore-aft weight data, lightly and 
fully-loaded and confirmed by a subjective handling test. 
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9.6 Occupant Impact Protection/Airbags/Crash Testing 
When modifying a vehicle that has the latest occupant impact protection systems 
installed it is important to ensure that the functioning of these systems stays intact. 
The impact protection of batteries and electrical components is discussed in the 
respective sections. 
LVV standards for modified impact protection already exist, these are LVV 
standards Frontal Impact 155-30 (00) and Interior Impact 155-40 (00). These 
standards do not contain any specific requirements for EVs. An EV conversion 
will modify the stiffness of the frontal structure of the vehicle as the ICE is 
replaced with an electric motor and other supporting components such as the 
controller and possibly even batteries. The general principals listed by LVVTA 
(2002) to keep OEM occupant protection systems intact include the following; 
• minimise additional longitudinal stiffening forward of occupant cell and 
• minimise risk of deformation of occupant cell and 
• minimise the likelihood of penetration of components into the occupant 
cell. 
LVVTA (2002) also gives some general construction requirements and a stringent 
process for the permanent removal of airbags. 
The international EV standards require impact testing (LVVTA (2002) also gives 
circumstances that require testing) which is outside what EV converters can 
access or afford. The first EVs to undergo crash testing have been hybrids with 
the Toyota Camry Hybrid model tested by ANCAP in Australia early in 2010 (the 
Prius also has a long history).  
The Camry Hybrid model achieved a similar score to the ICE model with both 
vehicles receiving a four star ANCAP rating. Another EV conversion which has 
been tested in both EV and ICE variants is the Hyundai Getz. The Blade Electron 
is a BEV conversion of the 2002 – 2010 Hyundai Getz. The Blade Electron 
(Hyundai Getz) passed the ADR 73 offset frontal impact testing requirements at 
Autoliv in late 2009. The crash data however is not comparable to the Hyundai 
Getz ICE model testing carried out by ANCAP as the impact speeds were 
different for the two tests. The ANCAP test was carried out using a 40% offset 
test at 64 km/h whereas the ADR 73 test (equivalent to UNECE Reg.94) uses 40% 
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offset carried out at 56 km/h. These results however show that it is possible to 
design EVs and EV conversions to comply with international impact standards. 
EV converters tend to use older donor vehicles as these primarily cost less (shown 
to be important in Chapter 2) and secondly, are easier to modify as the safety 
systems such as ABS, air bags and crush structures are not as integrated. Recent 
vehicles however, are safer than older vehicles due to the structural design and the 
introduction of safety systems such as airbags. The improvement of vehicle 
structures is shown in Figure 9.3 by a downward trend in ‘A pillar’ rearward 
displacement during recent crash tests. Paine explains from his study of historical 
ANCAP test results; 
“Residual rearward displacement of the A-pillar (adjacent to the upper 
hinge of the front door) gives an indication of the integrity of the 
passenger compartment. Large displacements are usually associated with 
catastrophic collapse of the roof, driver's door and floorpan” (Paine 2009) 
(p. 4). 
Similar results for brake pedal rearward movement, measured Head Injury Criteria 
(HIC) and chest compression for drivers dummies are also shown over this period. 
 
 
Figure 9.3 ‘A’ pillar rearward displacement from historical ANCAP testing. 
 
 183 
After a period of development where impact absorption was the key, vehicle 
structures (occupant cells) are now becoming stiffer and are being supplemented 
by protective devices such as air bags and seatbelt pre-tensioners. 
For these reasons it is recommended that EV converters are encouraged to use 
recent/newer model vehicles for EV conversions insofar that they have adequate 
knowledge of how these systems work to avoid a poor modification. The 
alternative is to use chassis from older model vehicles without airbags.  
Huang describes the airbag deployment as a function of the timing of the airbag 
and occupant movement; 
 “…the desired sensor activation time is determined by the relative travel 
(displacement) of an unbelted occupant in the compartment. The 
computation of sensor activation time is based on the assumption that (1) 
an unbelted occupant moves forward 5 inches in the compartment before 
the air bag is fully deployed, (2) the time to fully inflate the air bag is 30 
ms, (3) the depth of the fully deployed air bag is 10 inches, and (4) the 
initial distance between the torso and the steering hub where the air bag is 
packaged is 15 inches” (p. 71) (Huang 2002). 
. 
The airbag sensor tells the airbag when to inflate and the triggering of the sensor 
is dependent on the characteristics of the structure. The crushability of the 
structure in front of the sensor or sensors must remain unchanged. Adding 
stiffness to the structure will cause the airbag to deploy too early and vice-versa. 
This is especially relevant in some vehicles where the air bag system employs 
multiple sensors and complex algorithms to trigger the airbag. 
More research into the effects of an EV conversion on the occupant protection 
systems of vehicles is required. The difference in mass and stiffness between the 
ICE removed and the replacement components is critical. This subject could 
benefit from the use of Finite Element Analysis (FEA) to assess the structural 
differences before and after an EV conversion. 
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 9.7 Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) 
EVs are subject to EMC issues as they make use of electromagnetic power 
conversion. EMC is an important technical issue as the EVs inverters, converters 
and commutator circuits all switch very high currents and are a source of 
electromagnetic energy.  As many of the international EV standards including ISO 
6469-2 and SAE J2344 have requirements for EMC, it is important to briefly 
evaluate how these will affect NZ EV converters10. 
The requirement in NZ is for all electrical products to conform to various levels of 
EMC standards. As the EV is a source and a potential receiver of electromagnetic 
energy, emissions and susceptibility must be considered (Bossche 2003). EV 
conversions are exempt if supplied in a total quantity of no more than 10 per 
annum (Sanjai 2004). Above this threshold EMC testing would need to be 
conducted and as the EV represents a level 3 product, these must be tested by an 
accredited testing body. 
Simple methods can be employed to reduce the radio frequency interference of 
converted EVs such as matched impedance and shielded power cables. The power 
cables in the Toyota Prius and Blade Electron are shielded to reduce 
electromagnetic interference. Alternating current systems should achieve a power 
factor close to one so the voltage and current harmonics are reduced. To assess 
radio emissions some EV converters also used an informal method such as a 
handheld AM radio to test for interference before and after modification to 
improve the vehicle’s interference performance. 
 
                                                 
10 Although EMC issues will not be discussed in detail here, Bossche  (2003) provides a detailed 
description of international EMC standards relating to EVs. 
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Chapter 10 - Consumer Issues 
10.1 Introduction 
Environmental performance is very different from energy performance and 
measuring all vehicles against environmental performance holds many challenges. 
Defining the way a vehicle is used and charged is the key to this measurement, as 
the environmental burden is shifted to the energy supplier. 
Establishing a standard way of reporting on EV environmental performance is 
important as there have been many documented claims of ICE vehicle CO2 
performance being misrepresented in advertising. This is expected to be no 
different for EVs when they emerge on the market.  
 
10.2 Energy Use (Fuel Economy Labelling) 
The procedures for measuring energy consumption performance for pure ICE or 
pure EV vehicles are well established. Fuel economy needs to be displayed to the 
public in comparable units - the fuel saver website uses $ fuel cost per year. 
The energy use of BEV’s is typically expressed in watt-hours per kilometre 
(Wh/km), and can be defined and measured at the battery pack terminals or the 
wall plug. This value typically ranges from about 124 Wh/km for small EVs to up 
to 249 Wh/km for larger vehicles (Pistoia 2010). A standard should be chosen for 
NZ where the energy consumption is measured at the charger supply and not at 
the battery terminals as energy is consumed during charging by charger, battery 
efficiency and cooling/ventilation equipment. It is important to capture this energy 
use because it is part of the total EV energy cost. The efficiency of the power 
generator and grid should not be considered as consistent when evaluating energy 
use with ICEs. For example, energy is lost in the extraction, refining and delivery 
of petrol but this is not counted in ICE calculations. 
The energy consumption for EVs in Wh/km can be converted into an equivalent 
value such as litre/100km to provide a consistent comparison with ICE vehicles. 
Conversely the ICE value for fuel efficiency given in l/100km can be multiplied 
by 9.695 to yield Wh/100km (assuming a lower heating value for petrol of 35 
MJ/l and 1 MJ = 277.77 Wh). 
PHEV are more difficult to test as different operation modes are available in the 
same vehicle. Test procedures for PHEV should take into account both EV and 
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HEV operation modes (Bossche 2003). PHEV energy consumption varies with 
the way the vehicle is used. The drive cycle chosen for testing needs to make an 
agreed assumption on the battery recharge frequency. The energy consumption 
tests need to be more closely defined. SAE J1711 uses a Partial Charge Test 
(PCT) which  represents  the  charging  habits  of  a  driver  who  never supplies 
external charge to the vehicle and a Full Charge Test (FCT) which represents the 
driver who recharges the battery every day from an off-vehicle source (Bossche 
2003). The charging efficiency is also affected by the particular charge rate 
employed. SAE J2841 gives utility factor definitions for PHEV using 2001 US 
Department of Transport national household travel survey data. A utility factor 
would need to be defined for NZ by utilising the latest NZ household travel 
survey data. An example of the importance of standardised testing to provide a 
consistent comparison between ICE vehicles and EVs is given here. 
The bi-annual AA Energywise Rally organised by the NZ Automobile 
Association, the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (EECA), and Gull 
Petroleum NZ is designed to promote vehicle fuel efficiency. Vehicles compete 
against each other with the supreme winner being the vehicle which costs the least 
to run over the entire event. 
 Although the intent of the event is positive, it is biased as it does not demonstrate 
the vehicles’ ‘cost’ in terms of typical day-to-day conditions.  The event is also 
discriminatory against BEVs as the course covers hundreds of kilometres per leg 
which is well outside the range of most EVs. EVs however, typically have a range 
performance well within the average daily requirement of most people. It is 
expected that this event in the current format will cease to be relevant once a 
greater number of OEM EV models are available on the NZ market. 
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Chapter 11 - Conclusion 
11.1 Conclusion 
It has been shown that Electric Vehicles (EVs) are a good choice for sustainable 
transport technology in NZ to mitigate concerns about peak oil, energy security 
and climate change. The EV represents a spectrum of vehicle technology which 
includes BEVs, HEVs, PHEVs, REV and FCVs all with their own particular 
issues regarding regulation and technical standards. 
During research for this thesis it was discovered that NZ has a base of EV 
enthusiasts and engineers with the knowledge and capability to produce ICE to 
EV conversions to a reasonable standard and performance. A cost analysis 
however, has shown that the extra capital cost of EVs currently on the market 
cannot be justified on the basis of reduced energy costs over the life of the vehicle 
(based on 2010 cost of petrol and electricity). The purchase cost of EVs is 
currently the most important cost factor. EVs and converted EVs therefore 
represent a hibernating (dormant) technology that could emerge under the right 
economic conditions.  
The recent development of new interest in EV technology has highlighted the 
need for technical safety focused standards to govern the modification and scratch 
building of EVs in NZ. No LVV Standard for EV conversions currently exist 
however LVV certifiers have been using an unofficial standard to certify vehicles. 
The need for a LVV technical standard for EV conversions has been identified by 
government regulators. Although it might be difficult for NZ regulators to justify 
the expense of implementing new standards considering the small number of EV 
vehicles being built, standards need to be in place before they are needed. 
A strong argument for the development regulations for EV conversions is to 
mitigate against the risks associated with new technology. This is not only to 
protect public safety but also the integrity and the future market perception of 
EVs. 
The EV does not fit into the same regulatory framework as the ICE, as such 
government regulators need to collaborate across many new areas to regulate for 
EVs. Many areas of current legislation have been identified which affect EVs 
including clauses in the Land Transport Rules. This legislation affects EVs whilst 
not having been written specifically with EVs in mind. One regulation is the 
Electricity Safety Regulation (2010) where it is unclear whether EVs are required 
 188 
to be certified by an Electrical Warrant of Fitness (EWOF). Implications for EVs 
that are hired or leased are also identified. Without further clarification, it is likely 
that the requirement for a EWOF for EV conversions has been adopted by the 
certification community without it being an actual legal requirement. These areas 
need urgent clarification to avoid further confusion. Any new LVV standard for 
EV conversions must also clarify the roles and demarcations (electrical and 
mechanical) of the certifiers involved in assessing the EV conversions 
compliance. 
During this research it was discovered that currently, EV’s cannot be identified in 
the NZ vehicle fleet using the motor vehicle register. Changes must be made to 
the motor vehicle register to include classifications for ICE, BEV, HEV, and 
PHEV. The safety profile of these vehicle types can then be assessed by future 
research into EV accidents. 
The EV is a new technology (rather than a mix of existing technologies) that 
presents unique challenges to regulators and the automotive industry to foresee 
the risks of EVs. This thesis implemented a formal risk management process to 
identify appropriate risk controls for EV conversions. The ‘first draft’ risk 
analysis showed that most EV risks related to electrical, battery and braking safety 
are controlled by implementing a reduction in risk event likelihood, rather than a 
reduction in risk event severity. This indicates that risk controls need to be reliable 
in order to be effective. 
A literature review of the major international EV safety standards found many 
recommendations relevant to EV conversions which have been discussed 
throughout this work including UNECE Regulation 100 (2010) which is 
recognised by NZ. 
The design of EVs requires unique engineering solutions in order to reduce the 
inherent safety risks of the technology however, there are many simple things that 
EV converters can do to increase the safety of EV conversions.  
The three major areas of technological risk for EV conversions identified by this 
project are; the electrical system, the traction battery and the braking system. 
EV conversions contain potentially lethal levels of electrical voltage and current. 
An EV electrical system can include a number of components that are not onboard 
the vehicle thus making certification more difficult. The need for a clear 
certification of both the on and off board charging components was identified. 
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When electrical components fail it is essential that they fail in a safe manner. A 
number of technical requirements have been identified which should be 
implemented in LVV standards. 
Chapter 7 focused on a systematic building of design methods for the safe 
installation and use of traction batteries for EV conversions. EV converters are 
learning about the performance benefits of Li-ion cells and these cells are rapidly 
becoming the ‘cell of choice’ for OEM vehicles as well as EV conversions. Cells 
which are sensitive to overcharge and over-discharge such as Li-ion cells embody 
a particular safety risk for EV converters. A multi layered design approach to the 
safety systems surrounding the battery system should be undertaken, with the 
choice of active safety protection chosen to compensate for the weaknesses in the 
cell design. Methods by which the design and certification of battery cooling and 
ventilation systems can take place were also identified. 
The single most important active safety feature of a vehicle is the brake. The 
substitution of the ICE with an electric motor during an EV conversion will have 
an effect on the vehicles brake system – if the brakes are modified or not. The 
cumulative effect of increased weight, poor vacuum performance and no engine 
braking may have a serious effect on the vehicles brake capacity and safety. 
Therefore the brake system must be carefully assessed during an EV conversion. 
A design method for a retrofit vacuum pump has been developed. Research 
showed that regenerative braking for accelerator controlled regeneration (fixed 
regeneration) should be set below 0.1 g for engine braking simulation and must 
never exceed 0.2 g to preserve the vehicles OEM brake force distribution. This 
finding was supported by carrying out deceleration testing on two vehicles. 
The correct functioning of the vehicles auxiliary systems such as the power 
steering, heating and window demisting equipment can be assured by providing 
substitute power sources (electric motors) supplied preferentially by the vehicles 
battery. A functioning window demisting system is a recommended but not an 
essential requirement. 
The lack of vehicle noise emitted by EVs has raised concerns about pedestrian 
and child safety. EV converters are thus encouraged to incorporate safety 
equipment such as noise generating devices, closed circuit televisions, proximity 
sensors or reversing alarms into their vehicles. 
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EV converters should do everything possible to keep OEM occupant protection 
systems such as crush zones and airbags intact. Recent crash testing of EVs (and 
EV conversions) has shown that it is possible to design a vehicle that complies 
with international standards. EV converters however tend to use older donor 
vehicles (>15 years old) as these cost less and are easier to modify as the safety 
systems such as ABS, air bags and crush structures are not as integrated. To 
encourage EV modifiers to use safer, newer vehicles more research into the 
effects of an EV conversion on the occupant protection systems of vehicles is 
required. The difference in mass and stiffness between the ICE removed and the 
replacement components is however critical. 
Although not a safety issue Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) compliance 
issues will affect professional EV converters who produce more than 10 vehicles 
per annum. 
With the use of battery chemistries and design which minimises the risk of 
failures, coupled with adequate safeguards in the form of redundant protection, 
well designed thermal management and ventilation systems, EV converters can 
achieve safe and high performance conversions. Several interviewees expressed 
the opinion that with the right controls EVs could be safer than ICE vehicles. 
Although there are different risks in the use of EV technology, findings from this 
thesis do support this claim by showing that EV conversion methods can produce 
EVs that are as safe, if not safer than ICE vehicles.  
The future challenge for NZ regulators and EV converters is to develop and 
implement new standards without imposing undue costs on the EV industry. A 
number of EV converters are strongly opposed to more regulation in this area. The 
key is to involve the EV community in the development of an EV standard 
however currently NZ has no formal advocacy group for EV converters. It is 
strongly recommended that such a group be formed to become an active voice in 
this process. 
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11.2 Recommendations for Further Research 
Research areas that were identified as outside the scope of this project but 
important for the development of EV technology in NZ were outlined in Section 
1.1. Instead, this section focuses on recommendations for further research that 
have resulted from dominant issues identified in this thesis. These are summarised 
below. 
An iterative risk analysis of EVs is important as more EVs enter the mainstream. 
A risk analysis should use EV accident data as this information becomes 
available. A particular area of interest will be pedestrian accidents involving EVs 
in NZ. 
To encourage EV modifiers to use safer, newer vehicles more research into the 
effects of an EV conversion on the crashworthiness and occupant protection 
systems of OEM vehicles is needed. The impact testing of several typical EV 
conversions could be carried out to facilitate this. It is strongly recommended that 
a set of guidelines on the safety and use of various proprietary batteries be 
developed to inform EV converters and certifiers during the design of an EV 
conversion and certification process. 
Research on how EVs are used in NZ could inform national policy making for EV 
incentives and develop an effective measure of EV use. More information in this 
area would also help address the technical issue of energy use of plug-in vehicles 
as discussed in Chapter 10. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. Organisations Interviewed 
 
The organisations interviewed include: 
• NZ Transport Agency (NZTA) 
• Low Volume Vehicle Technical Association (LVVTA) 
• Australian Electric Vehicle Association (AEVA) 
• Meridian Energy (Wellington) 
• NZ Motor Trade Association (MTA) 
• NZ Ministry of Economic Development (MED) Energy Safety Service 
• Standards Australia (Sydney) 
• RMIT University, School of Aerospace , Mechanical and Manufacturing 
Engineering (Melbourne) 
• Australian New Car Assessment Program (ANCAP) 
• Blade Electric Vehicles (Castlemaine) 
• Energetique 
• Toyota Motor Corporation Australia (Melbourne) 
• Betterplace (Sydney) 
• Various EV home builders and EV component suppliers in NZ and 
Australia. 
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Appendix 2. Land Transport Rules Affecting EVs. 
NZ Transport Law 
The NZ Acts of Parliament and regulations relating to transport are administered 
by the NZ Transport Agency (NZTA) under the guidance of the Ministry of 
Transport.  No specific regulations for electric vehicles exist in NZ. The safety of 
vehicles is governed by the Land Transport Act 1998. Section 6 of this act 
requires “vehicles to be safe and operated in compliance with rules.” Ordinary 
transport rules made by the Minister are administered by the NZTA. The NZ Land 
Transport Rules are a set of documents which dictate the requirements for vehicle 
standards and use. 
The set of rules comprises of the following which have been identified to affect or 
relate to EVs and EV conversions. 
 
Dangerous Goods 2005, Rule 45001/1 
This rule allows the use of batteries in vehicles as a source of motive power even 
though they may be considered dangerous goods if transported for any other 
purpose. As such the Rule does not apply to the transport on land of dangerous 
goods that are:  
1. required for the motive power or control of the vehicle and are contained 
within the fuel system, electrical system or control system; or 
2. required for the operation of ancillary equipment on the vehicle and are 
contained within the fuel system or electrical system; or 
Section 6 (Segregation) could be used as a guideline for the segregation of 
batteries and passengers and liquid containing systems such as batteries. 
 
Door Retention Systems 2001, Rule 32001/1 
Not specifically related to EVs. 
 
Driver Licensing 1999, Rule 91001 
Electric vehicles are of the “Automatic type”. 
 
External Projections 2001, Rule 32008/1 
Not specifically related to EVs. 
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Frontal Impact 2001, Rule 32006/1 
A modification to a motor vehicle such as an EV conversion will affect its frontal 
impact performance as designed by the manufacturer. The modification; 
• must not prevent the vehicle from complying with the rule; and 
• must be certified as specified in Land Transport Rule: Vehicle Standards 
Compliance 1998. 
The manufacturer’s operating limits is defined as; 
1. in relation to a motor vehicle, the allowance provided by the 
vehicle manufacturer in terms of performance capability and 
dimensions, relative to deterioration, malfunction or damage 
beyond which the safe performance of the vehicle, as defined by 
the vehicle manufacturer, is compromised; and 
2. in relation to a system, component or item of equipment, 
incorporated in or attached to a vehicle, the allowance provided by 
the system, component or equipment manufacturer in terms of 
performance capability and dimensions, relative to the 
deterioration, malfunction or damage, beyond which the safe 
performance of the system, component or item of equipment (and 
consequently the vehicle) is compromised. 
 
Fuel Consumption Information 2008, Rule 33020 
Only applies to petrol, diesel, LPG or CNG vehicles not BEVs. Providing fuel 
consumption information for BEV and PHEV will be a challenge however it is 
important that these vehicles compared directly and accurately with ICE vehicles. 
Energy consumption information would be a better title. 
 
Glazing, Windscreen Wipe and Wash, and Mirrors 1999,  Rule 32012/1 
This rule has no requirement for demisting equipment so a modification to the 
vehicles heating system is allowed. The requirement to keep the windscreen clear 
is a requirement of the operator, not the equipment. The PSV Rule however does 
have requirements for windscreen equipment (section 6.10) 6.10(1) states that 
“The front windscreen and side windows (of the PSV) used by the driver must be 
equipped with effective demisting equipment, adjustable from the driver’s seat. 
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Head Restraints 2002, Rule 32010/1 
Not specifically related to EVs. 
 
Heavy Vehicle Brakes 2007, Rule 32015 
Not specifically related to EVs. 
 
Heavy Vehicles 2004, Rule 31002 
Not specifically related to EVs. 
 
Interior impact 2001, Rule 32001 
Not specifically related to EVs. 
 
Land Transport (Road User) Rule 2004, Rule 61001 
Only excessive noise is limited, not minimum noise levels. The windscreen must 
be kept clear. A driver of a motor vehicle fitted with a forward windscreen must at 
all times keep the windscreen clean and clear so that the driver's view forward is 
not impeded or obstructed. 
 
Light-Vehicle Brakes 2002, Rule 32014 
A parking brake needs to be fully mechanical. An engine brake or a driveline 
retarder, if fitted in a vehicle, must be designed and constructed so that its use 
does not cause the drive axle wheels of the vehicle to lock. 
 
Operator Licensing 2007, Rule 81001 
A rental or taxi company need to comply with electricity regulations, ie the four 
yearly EWOF inspections. 
 
Operator Safety Rating 2008, Rule 81002 
Not specifically related to EVs. 
 
Passenger Service Vehicles 1999, Rule 31001 
Section 6.2 gives the requirements for fire fighting and protection against fire. The 
main sections are headed; materials and design, fuel tanks and protection against 
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fumes and, gases and fire extinguishers. Electric PSVs may require different 
design solutions to that of standard EVs. 
Requirements exist for electrical voltages of more than 32 volts AC or 115 VDC 
(Section 6.5). There is no mention of standards that must be met, but general 
requirements are given and 6.5(2) states that; “Inspections must be carried out by 
a person registered under either section 75 or section 77 of the Electricity Act 
1992”. The Toyota Prius is commonly used as a PSV and has a traction system 
utilising more that 115 V. 
Windscreen demisting equipment is required to be fitted to the vehicle. 
 
Seatbelts and Seatbelt Anchorages 2002, Rule 32011 
Not specifically related to EVs. 
 
Seats and Seat Anchorages 2002, Rule 32004 
Not specifically related to EVs. 
 
Setting of Speed Limits 2003, Rule 54001 
Not specifically related to EVs. 
 
Steering systems 2001, 32003/1 
Not specifically related to EVs. 
 
Traction Engines 2010, Rule 63001 
Not specifically related to EVs. 
 
Traffic Control Devices 2004, Rule 54002 
A road controlling authority can set aside a specific area of roadway for a class or 
classes of road user (such as EVs). EV parking and charging infrastructure is 
facilitated by this. 
 
Tyres and Wheels 2001, Rule 32013 
Not specifically related to EVs. 
 
Vehicle Dimensions and Mass 2002, Rule 41001 
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Not specifically related to EVs. 
 
Vehicle Equipment 2004, Rule 32017 
Section 2. does not allow an ‘engine noise simulator’ to be fitted to a ‘very quiet 
vehicle’. However reverse warning signals are allowed. 
Vehicle Exhaust Emissions 2007, Rule 33001/2 
For a battery electric car - totally powered by electricity - you must show it meets 
safety standards. But you don't need to provide: evidence that it meet emissions 
standards fuel consumption information.  
Vehicle Lighting 2005, Rule 32005 
Not specifically related to EVs. 
Vehicle Repair 1998, Rule 34001 
Not specifically related to EVs. 
Vehicle standards compliance 2002, Rule 35001  
This Rule sets out requirements to control the entry of vehicles into, and operation 
of vehicles in, the NZ land transport system including EVs. Section 10.6 
establishes the LVV system 
Work Time and Logbooks 2007, Rule 62001 
Not specifically related to EVs. 
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Appendix 3. Risk Control Matrix 
 
Definition of Controls 
Avoid   Prevent 
Mitigate  Lessen in severity or intensity 
Reduce  Lessen in likelihood 
Transfer  Pass risk another party (ie insurance)  
Risk Assessment Controls Reduced Risk 
Risk 
Category 
Risk 
ID 
Risk 
Description S L 
Hazard 
Risk 
Number 
 (HRN) Avoid 
Mitigate 
(ΔS) 
Reduce 
(ΔL) Transfer Accept 
Hazard 
Control 
Number 
(HCN) 
Hazard 
Risk 
Number 
HCNc Sc Lc 
ICE Risk 
Evaluation 
  1.0 Vehicle fire 
unrelated to 
accident 
5 2.5 12.5 
 
 
        
  12.5 
 
 
  
  1.1 Vehicle fire 
after 
accident 
7   0 
     
  0 
    
  1.2 Pedestrian 
minor injury 
accidents 
2008 
5 2.2 11 
 
 
   
  11 
    
  1.3 Pedestrian 
serious injury 
accidents 
2008 
6 1.8 10.8 
     
  10.8 
    
  1.4 Pedestrian 
fatal 
accidents 
2008 
7 1.0 7 
     
  7 
    
  1.5 Annual 
likelihood of 
vehicle crash 
2008 
0 5.5 0 
     
  0 
    
  1.6       0             0     
Actual risks  
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Electrical 
Safety 
  2.0 Electrocution 
during 
manufacture 
and 
maintenance 
6 4.0 24 
    Insulate, 
label and 
use 
interlock 
switches to 
access HV 
areas 
    
0.4 9.6 6 1.6 
  2.1 Fire from 
electric 
short/arc 
4 3.0 12 
short 
circuit 
warning 
and 
interlock. 
Remove 
combustible 
materials 
from around 
cables 
Insulate 
hazardous 
voltages, 
restrain HV 
cables from 
chafing, 
remove 
sharp 
objects 
from 
penetrating 
cable 
    
0.5 6 4 1.5 
  2.2 Fire during 
charging 
6 4.0 24 
Use 
correct 
charger, 
BMS over 
temp cut-
off switch 
Use LA or 
LiFePO4 
battery 
chemistry 
Use LA or 
LiFePO4 
battery 
chemistry 
    
0.5 12 5 2.4 
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  2.3 Electrocution 
after impact 
6 4.0 24 
    Insulate 
hazardous 
voltages 
with flexible 
conduit and 
install crash 
interlock 
switch, 
battery 
enclosure 
insulation 
with pack 
installed in 
safety cell. 
    
0.4 9.6 6 1.6 
  2.4 Short circuit 
5 4.0 20 
detection 
and 
control 
        
0.3 6 5 1.2 
  2.5 Soft short 
4 4.0 16 
detection 
and 
control 
        
0.3 4.8 4 1.2 
  2.6 Motor over 
temp leading 
to damage 
2 4.0 8 
        Not safety 
related 1 8 2 4.0 
RESS Cell 
level 
risks 
3.0 Internal short 
of cell 
leading to 
heat and 
pressure 
generation 
and resulting 
in cell 
thermal 
runaway 
5 4 20 
  Use LA or 
LiFePO4 
battery 
chemistry, 
BMS 
detection 
and 
isolation 
short 
resistant 
cells, 
electrode 
separators 
    
0.4 8 3 2.7 
3.1 External 
short 
4 3 12 
    Good 
mechanical 
design and 
insulation 
    
0.5 6 4 1.5 
3.2 Cell 
overcharge 5 6 30 
    BMS 
detection 
    0.5 15 5 3.0 
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and control. 
3.3 Cell Fire 
6 5 27 
Good 
BMS 
thermal 
control 
Use LA or 
LiFePO4 
battery 
chemistry,  
      
0.5 13.5 3 4.5 
3.4 Elevated 
temperature 
4 5 20 
Good 
BMS 
thermal 
control 
Use LA or 
LiFePO4 
battery 
chemistry,  
      
0.4 8 2 4.0 
Module 
level 
risks 
3.5 Short circuit 
4 3 12 
    Good 
mechanical 
design, 
insulation 
and 
termination 
    
0.6 7.2 4 1.8 
3.6 Over charge 
5 6 30 
Correct 
charger 
  BMS 
detection 
and control 
    
0.5 15 5 3.0 
3.7 Module Fire 
6 5 30 
Install 
over temp 
cut-off 
switch 
Install fire 
extinguisher 
BMS temp 
control 
    
0.6 18 6 3.0 
3.8 Elevated 
temperature 
5 5 25 
Install 
over temp 
cut-off 
switch 
  BMS temp 
control 
    
0.5 12.5 5 2.5 
Pack 
level 
risks 
3.9 HV Short 
circuit 
6 5 30 
    Good 
mechanical 
design, 
insulation 
and 
termination 
    
0.5 15 6 2.5 
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3.10 Over charge 
(energy) 
5 6 30 
Correct 
charger 
and BMS 
  BMS 
detection 
and control, 
controller 
regen 
limited, 
active cell 
balancing 
and charge 
control 
    
0.3 9 5 1.8 
3.11 Over Charge 
(power) 
4 5 20 
Charger 
power 
correct 
  controller 
regeneratio
n limited 
    
0.2 4 4 1.0 
3.12 Pack Fire 
7 4 28 
Install 
over temp 
cut-off 
switch 
Install fire 
extinguisher 
BMS temp 
control 
    
0.4 11.2 6 1.9 
3.13 Elevated 
temperature 
3 4 12 
Install 
over temp 
cut-off 
switch 
  BMS temp 
control 
    
0.5 6 3 2.0 
3.14 Crush 
5 5 25 
    Design 
crush zone, 
install pack 
in vehicle 
safety cell 
    
0.5 12.5 5 2.5 
3.15 Drop 
4 4 16 
  Use LA or 
LiFePO4 
battery 
chemistry 
Design 
crush zone, 
install pack 
in vehicle 
safety cell 
    
0.6 9.6 3 3.2 
Battery 
system 
3.16 Short circuit 
6 5 30 
    Good 
mechanical 
design, 
insulation 
and 
termination 
    
0.5 15 6 2.5 
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3.17 Over voltage 
5 4 20 
    BMS and 
charger 
    
0.4 8 5 1.6 
3.18 Chassis fault 
leading to 
energising of 
body 
6 4 24 
    Insulate 
hazardous 
voltages, 
restrain HV 
cables from 
chafing, 
remove 
sharp 
objects 
from 
penetrating 
cable 
    
0.4 9.6 6 1.6 
3.19 Loss of HV 
continuity 1 4 4 
        Reset 
switches or 
replace 
fuse 
0 4 1 4.0 
3.20 Contactor 
fails closed 4 5 18 
  Fuse of 
correct 
rating 
installed 
Use high 
quality 
contactor 
    
0.5 9 3 3.0 
3.21 Over 
discharge 
resulting in 
under 
voltage 
(energy) 
2 5 10 
BMS 
manage-
ment 
  active cell 
balancing 
  Replace 
damaged 
battery 
pack 0.3 3 2 1.5 
3.22 Over 
discharge 
resulting in 
heat 
generation 
(power) 
4 5 20 
controller 
power 
limited 
Fuse of 
correct 
rating 
installed 
      
0.3 6 2.0 3.0 
Brakes   4.0 Brake failure 
6 5 30 
    correct 
design of 
vacuum 
brake 
system 
    
0.4 12 6 2.0 
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4.1 Loss of 
stability on 
low friction 
surface 
6 4 24 
    Limit 
regeneratio
n and check 
vehicle 
balance 
    
0.4 9.6 6 1.6 
4.2 Loss of 
stability 
during 
cornering 
6 4 24 
    Check 
vehicle 
balance 
    
0.4 9.6 6 1.6 
Vehicle 
Use 
  5.0 Pedestrian 
accident 
6 3 18 
    Introduce 
engine 
noise 
simulation, 
pedestrian 
education 
  Trade 
increased 
risk for 
environmen
tal benefits 
0.9 16.2 6 2.7 
5.1 RF 
Interference 
1 7 7 
        Accept 
increased 
AM band 
pollution, 
small 
numbers of 
EV 
conversions 
0 7 1 7.0 
Auxiliary 
Systems 
  6.0 No demist, 
accident due 
to lack of 
vision 
3 5 15 
          
0 15 3 5.0 
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Appendix 4. IP Codes 
 
Table A4.1  
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Table A4.2  
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DIN 40 050 Table 9, Examples of the allocation of degrees of protection against 
water for passenger vehicles. 
 
Table A4.3. From DIN 40 050 Road Vehicles Degrees of protection (IP codes) 
Protection against foreign objects, water and access for Electrical equipment.
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Appendix 5. Selected Vehicle Battery Details 
Vehicle/Ref Cell Ah Cells/ 
Module 
Modules/ 
Pack 
(Cells/Pack) 
Voltage 
[V] 
Capacity 
[kWh] 
Wh/kg W/kg Power  
[kW] 
Mass 
[Kg] 
Battery Range 
[km] 
Speed 
[km/h] 
Tesla Roadster 
(Gene 
Berdichevsky 2006; 
Yang 2010) 
2.0 
(18650 format) 
3.1 for new 
pack  
621 11 (6831) 375 53   200 450 378 200 
Mitsubishi Imev 
(K Hanada 2007; 
Yang 2010) 
50 4 22 (88) 360 16 140 1000   160 130 
Nissan Leaf (Hyder 
2009) 
 
    24     160  
Chevrolet Volt 
PHEV (Hyder 2009) 
    16     64  
Toyota Prius HEV   6 28 (168) 201      -  
Hyundai Blade 
Electron (Hyder 
2009) 
    16     100  
Coda Sedan 
(Zhang 2010a) 
  (728) 104s7p 333 33.8 90    144 - 196 128 
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 97 Prius 
(Generation I) 
Japan Only 
00 Prius 
(Generation II) 
04 Prius 
(Generation III) 
2010 Prius 
(Generation IV) 
Form Factor Cylindrical Prismatic Prismatic Prismatic 
Cells 
(Modules) 
240 (40) 228 (38) 168 (28) 168 (28) 
Nominal 
Voltage [V] 
288.0 V 273.6 V 201.6 V 201.6 V 
Nominal 
Capacity [Ah] 
6.0Ah 6.5Ah 6.5Ah 6.5Ah 
Specific 
Power [W/kg] 
800 W/kg 1000 W/kg 1300 W/kg 1310 W/kg 
Specific 
Energy[Wh/kg] 
40 Wh/kg 46 Wh/kg 46 Wh/kg 44 Wh/kg 
Module 
Weight [g] 
1090g 1050g 1045g 1040g 
Module 
Dimensions 
35(oc)x384(L) 19.6x106x275 19.6x106x285 19.6x106x285 
Figure X. Toyota Prius battery specifications adapted from 
http://www.toyotapriusbattery.com/. 
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Appendix 6. EV Li-ion Battery Standards 
EV Li-ion Battery Standards from (Engineers 2010; Tabaddor 2010). (Bossche 
2003) gives a table of standards (p.438) for other battery chemistries. 
 
Standard Detail 
UL 2580 
(2011) 
Batteries for use in Electric Vehicles 
- Covers: Rechargeable cells, modules, battery packs and 
battery systems for use in electric vehicles (over 60 
VDC) 
- Evaluates: Hazards associated with fire, electric shock 
and personal injury 
ISO 12405 Electrically propelled road vehicles — Test specification for  
lithium-ion traction battery packs and systems 
- Scope covers performance, reliability and abuse testing 
for high power lithium ion battery systems used for 
propulsion applications 
IEC 62660 -1 Secondary lithium-ion cells for the propulsion of electric road vehicles - 
Part 1: Performance testing for lithium-ion cells 
- Scope covers performance testing for high energy lithium 
ion cells for propulsion of BEV and HEV applications 
IEC 62260 -2 Secondary lithium-ion cells for the propulsion of electric road vehicles – 
Part 2: Reliability and abuse testing 
- Scope covers reliability and abuse testing for high 
energy lithium ion cells for propulsion of BEV and HEV 
applications 
SAE J2380 
(2009) 
Vibration Testing of Electric Vehicle Batteries 
- Scope; testing of a single battery (test unit) consisting of 
either an electric vehicle battery module or an electric 
vehicle battery pack 
SAE J1797 
(2008) 
Recommended Practice for Packaging of Electric Vehicle Battery Modules 
- Recommended Practice provides for common battery 
designs through the description of dimensions, 
termination, retention, venting system, and other features 
required in an electric vehicle application 
SAE J2289 
(2008) 
Electric-Drive Battery Pack System: Functional Guidelines 
- Scope: common practices for design of battery systems 
for vehicles that utilize a rechargeable battery to provide 
or recover all or some traction energy for an electric drive 
system. It includes product description, physical 
requirements, electrical requirements, environmental 
requirements, safety requirements, storage and 
shipment characteristics, and labelling requirements. It 
also covers termination, retention, venting system, 
thermal management, and other features. 
SAE J1766 
 
Recommended Practice for Electric and Hybrid Electric Vehicle Battery 
Systems Crash Integrity Testing 
- Scope: defines test methods and performance criteria 
 211 
which evaluate battery system spillage, battery retention, 
and electrical system isolation in Electric and Hybrid 
Electric Vehicles during specified crash tests. 
SAE J2464 
 
EV & HEV Rechargeable Energy Storage System (RESS) Safety and 
Abuse Testing Procedure 
- Abuse testing is performed to characterize the response 
of a Rechargeable Energy Storage Systems to off-
normal conditions or environments that could reasonably 
be expected to occur 
SAE J2929 
Not published 
Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Propulsion Battery System Safety Standard: 
Lithium-based Rechargeable Cells 
- Defines a minimum set of acceptable safety criteria for a 
lithium-based rechargeable battery system to be 
considered for use in a vehicle propulsion application as 
an energy storage system connected to a high voltage 
power train 
UN-T 
(UN-3090) 
 Shipment of Lithium cells and batteries in bulk (class 9 dangerous goods) 
- Under United Nations transportation regulations primary 
lithium and rechargeable lithium ion and lithium polymer 
cells and batteries must comply with the UN T1 - T8 
testing requirements given in (UN 2003) -
Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous 
Goods, Manual of Tests and Criteria. 
BATSO 01 
(2008) 
Manual for Evaluation of Energy Systems for Light Electric Vehicle – 
Secondary Lithium Batteries 
USCar 
USABC 
FreedomCAR 
SANDIA 
EUCAR 
 
Chinese 
(Chengwei 
2010) 
  
 
( QC/T744-2006) • Nickel-Metal hydride Batteries for Electric Vehicle 
( QC/T743-2006) • Lithium-ion Batteries for Electric Vehicle 
( QC/T742-2006) • Lead-acid Batteries for Electric Vehicle 
( QC/T741-2006) • Ultra capacitors for Electric vehicles 
Table A6.1 EV Li-ion battery standards. 
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Appendix 7. Brake Test Procedure 
The following outlines the methods used for brake booster vacuum and engine 
brake deceleration testing. 
 
Preliminary 
• Collect vehicle ID data 
• Fill fuel tank 
• Set tyre pressures to manufacturer’s requirements 
• Clean or change engine air filter 
• Weigh vehicle Tare weight. 
• Measure and calculate vehicle CoG height and axle weights using the 
modified reaction, null point, weight balance or pendulum method. The 
null point method used is described below. 
• Measure and calculate front and rear axle spring rates. Calculate and plot 
theoretical pitch angle vs deceleration. 
• Calibrate accelerometer using guidelines given at 
http://www.gcdataconcepts.com/calibration.html 
• Fit accelerometer to passengers floor area and level with bullseye. Vehicle 
must be on a level surface with driver sitting in the vehicle. Confirm that 
• Run straight line braking to set up accelerometer x axis with vehicle centre 
line. Ay data should average at zero  
• Fit vacuum gauge to vehicle and check operation 
• Set accelerometer to level using bulls eye level. Check Az reads -1.00 
• Have clip board on hand to record notes. 
• Record engine vacuum at idle, 3000 RPM and Max RPM 
 
Standard Test Runs Engine Brake 
Roll down from 100 km/h (2 in each direction). Record direction. 
Roll down from 100 km/h with engine braking, changing gear when appropriate. 
(2 in each direction). Record direction. Record speed at which deceleration gear 
changes take place. 
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Standard Test Runs Engine Manifold Vacuum 
Measure Idle vacuum (1 Vacuum test only) 
Measure hard engine braking vacuum down hill (1 Vacuum test only) 
 
Data Analysis 
Down load data files 
Analyse in spreadsheet (Ref) 
Analyse acceleration errors with respect to deceleration pitch angle. 
Make Euler rotations to correct for road camber. 
 
CoG Height by the Null Point Method 
The null point method requires  a  platform  that  has  two  parallel  knife  edges  
several  inches  apart  from  each other.  In this method the vehicle is placed so the 
CoG is between the two knife edges. The vehicle is then tilted in either direction 
until the vehicle balances on one knife edge.  This  indicates  when  the  vehicle  
CG  has  rotated  outside  the  stable  zone between the knife  edges. Therefore, 
the CoG height can be calculated from the two tilt angles. This method is more 
accurate than the modification reaction method, but requires a special rig (Price 
2008) shown below. 
 
 
Figure A7.1 Null point method 
 
Figure A7.2 on the following page shows the vehicle balanced on the knife edges. 
100 = 
x1+x2 
WB RO FO 
H 
h 
a 
b 
α1 α2 
h' 
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Figure A7.2 Vehicle balanced on knife edges. Protractor with 0.5° accuracy 
shown. 
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Appendix 8. Commercial EV Vacuum Pumps 
 
Manufacturer 
Supplier Model I [A] 
Max 
Vacuum 
[kPa] 
Flow 
Rate 
l/min 
Time to - 
50 kPa 
vacuum 
2l 
reservoir 
[s] 
Cost 
[USD] 
Pump 
only 
MES DEA 70/6E 2.5 -65  12  
 70/6E2 5 -72  6  
EV Source #310-VACP-
K 
 >-15  1.6 358 Kit 
 Gast #310-
VACP 
4.5-6 -76.2   255.88 
SSBC Electric 
Vacuum 
Pump Kit 
 
 >-16   265 
KTA Kit/Gast Gast MOA-
V111-JH 
6.8 -81.3   395 Kit 
Thomas/ 
EV Parts 
107CDC20 8.5 -77.5 39.6  325.55 
Everything EV VP1 2.5 -60   ₤458 
Table A9.1 Commercial EV vacuum pumps. 
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Appendix 9. Relevant Excerpts in from UNECE (2008) 
 
UNECE (2008). Uniform Provisions Concerning The Approval of Vehicles 
of Categories M, N and O with Regard to Braking U. Nations. Geneva, UNECE. 
Regulation No. 13. 
 
2. Definitions 
2.14.    "Phased braking" is a means which may be used where two or 
more sources of braking are operated from a common control, whereby one source 
may be given priority  by  phasing  back  the  other  source(s)  so  as  to  make  
increased  control movement necessary before they begin to be brought into 
operation (p. 10). 
 
Category A (Regeneration Not Part of Service Brake) 
5.2.1.24.1  The electric regenerative braking shall only be activated by the 
accelerator control and/or the gear neutral position for vehicles of category N1 
(<3500 kg)  
5.2.1.24.2.     In addition, for vehicles of categories M2 and N2 (>3.5 and < 5 
tonnes), the electric regenerative braking control can be a separate switch or 
lever.  
5.2.1.24.3.    The requirements of paragraphs 5.2.1.25.6. and 5.2.1.25.7. also 
apply to Category A regenerative braking systems (p. 32). 
 
Category B (Regeneration Part of Service Brake) 
5.2.1.7.2.  In  the  case  of  (light) vehicles  equipped  with  electric  
regenerative  braking  systems  of category  B,  the  braking  input  from  other  
sources  of  braking,  may  be  suitably phased  to  allow  the  electric  
regenerative  braking  system  alone  to  be  applied, provided that both the 
following conditions are met:  
5.2.1.7.2.1.   Intrinsic  variations  in  the  torque  output  of  the  electrical  
regenerative  braking system  (e.g. as a result of changes in the electric state of 
charge in the traction batteries) are automatically compensated by appropriate 
variation in the phasing relationship … (p. 25) 
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5.2.1.7.2.2  Wherever necessary, to ensure that braking rate remains related to 
the driver's braking demand, having regard to the available tyre/road adhesion, 
braking shall automatically be caused to act on all wheels of the vehicle (p. 26). 
5.2.1.25.6. The operation of the electric regenerative braking shall not be 
adversely affected by magnetic or electric fields. 
5.2.1.25.7. For vehicles equipped with an anti-lock device, the anti-lock 
device shall control the electric regenerative braking system of either category (p. 
32). 
5.2.1.25.1.  it must not be possible to disconnect, partially or totally, one part 
of the service braking system other than by automatic means…(p. 32). 
5.2.1.25.2. the service braking system must have only one control device;  
5.2.1.25.3. the service braking system must not be adversely affected by the 
disengagement of the motor(s) or by the gear ratio used (p. 32). 
5.2.1.18.3.          For vehicles fitted with an electric regenerative braking system of 
either category, all the relevant prescriptions shall apply except paragraph 
5.2.18.1.1. above. In this case, the electric regenerative braking may be actuated 
by the accelerator control and/or the gear neutral position. Additionally, the action 
on the service braking control must not reduce the above braking effect generated 
by the release of the accelerator control. 
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